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

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CENTRAL EURASIA



FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

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CONTENTS

8 June 1994

RUSSIA

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Signers of Social Accord Document Listed [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 18 May]	1
Significance of 'Civic Accord' Agreement Weighed [NOVOYE VREMYA No 18-19, May]	13
ZAVTRA on Election Violations [ZAVTRA No 14, Apr]	17
Kryuchkov on Security, Opposition [ZAVTRA No 14, Apr]	18
ZAVTRA Holds Opposition Gathering [SEGODNYA 14 May]	25
Party Roots of Extremists Viewed [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 20 May]	26
Shakhray's Political Moves Viewed [OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA 20 May]	28
Skokov Appeals to Independent Deputies [OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA 20 May]	30
RF Urban Population Polled on Political Leaders' Popularity [SEGODNYA 26 May]	31
Head Author Podberezkin on 'National Doctrine of Russia' [ZAVTRA No 16, Apr]	34
Local Officials Raise Newspaper Delivery Costs [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 May]	35
Government Officials' Pay, Privileges Examined [TRUD 19 May]	36
Draft Criminal Code General Section Examined [IZVESTIYA 18 May]	38
Decree on Mandatory Workplace Certification [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 May]	41
Decree on Geographic Name Standardization [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 May]	42
Decree on Support for Education System [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 May]	44

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Tatarstan Bank Chief Views Current Tasks [RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN 28 May]	45
Kabardino-Balkaria To Work on Treaty With Russia [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Apr]	47
Kabardino-Balkaria Considers Limiting Residence Permits [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Apr]	47
Kabardino-Balkaria Signs Treaty With Ingushetia [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Apr]	48
Kabardino-Balkaria Publishes Law on Security [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 16 Apr]	50
Kabardino-Balkaria Reports First Quarter Food Prices [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Apr]	54
Kabardino-Balkaria Radio Services Cut [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 16 Apr]	56
Kabardino-Balkaria Decree on Fighting Crime [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 8 Apr]	56
North Caucasus Anticrime Chief Views Current Tasks [KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Apr]	58
Kazan 1993 Budget Reviewed [KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 26 May]	61
Alignment of Sverdlovsk Political Forces Surveyed [URALSKIY RABOCHIY 5 Apr]	62
Sverdlovsk First Quarter Socioeconomic Statistics Published [URALSKIY RABOCHIY 28 Apr]	65
Siberian Bank To Pay Off Trade Obligations [VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK 25 May]	70
Decrease in Oblast's Productivity Observed [VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK 25 May]	71
Contamination of River Ob Examined [VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK 24 May]	71
Extent of Money Counterfeiting Reported [NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 26 May]	72
New Chief of Moscow Criminal Investigation Department Interviewed [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 12 May]	73

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dangers Seen in Russian Involvement in NATO Peacekeeping [SEGODNYA 13 May]	76
CIS-NATO Security Link Seen More Effective Than PFP [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 17 May]	78
PFP: Fears of Conflict With 'South' Discounted [SEGODNYA 20 May]	80
Kremen'yuk Ponders 'Partnership' With West [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 24 May]	82

Observations on Duma Delegation's Visit to Former Yugoslavia [SEGODNYA 13 May]	84
Zatulin Discusses Duma Delegation's Conclusions on Ex-Yugoslavia [ROSSIYA No 19, 18-24 May]	93
Yeltsin Visit to Germany, Future Ties Eyed [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 18 May]	93
Commentary Assesses Geneva Talks on Bosnia [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 17 May]	94
Accident Prevention Accords Signed With Norway [AFTENPOSTEN 25 May]	95
Foreign Investment Said To Benefit Small Business [DELOVOY MIR 2-8 May]	96

CENTRAL ASIA

KAZAKHSTAN

Legislature's 'No Confidence' Statement [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 31 May]	99
Deputy on Why Committee Post Was Refused [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Jun]	99
Development of Armed Forces Evaluated [ABV 30 May]	100
Transport Minister Interview on Railroad Performance [GUDOK 20 May]	102
Officials Review Anticrime Measures [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 28 May]	104

TURKMENISTAN

RF Railways Minister Meets With Turkmen Officials [GUDOK 31 May]	105
--	-----

UZBEKISTAN

Relations Between Uzbek Opposition Parties Viewed [ERK No 3, 16 Feb]	106
Bank Officials Discuss Draft Law on Foreign Investment [NARODNOYE SLOVO 3 May]	107
Ecological Problems of Desert Zones Viewed [NARODNOYE SLOVO 3 May]	108
Cabinet of Ministers Views Energy Conservation Measures, Violations [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 12 May]	108

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Signers of Social Accord Document Listed

944F0715A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
18 May 94 pp 3-4

[Text, under the rubric "Officially," of list: "Who Signed the Treaty on Social Accord"]

[Text] The president of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, the president's Administration, the Government,

and the Federal Assembly are receiving many requests from public organizations and individual citizens from different regions of the country to provide the names of organizations and persons who signed the Treaty on Social Accord of 28 April and 5 and 12 May. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI readers are also making such requests. Today we are publishing the list of persons and organizations who signed the Treaty.

List of Participants in the Civic Accord Assembly

28 April 1994 Moscow, the Kremlin Large Kremlin Palace Georgiyevskiy Hall Start at 1400 Hours

Person	Post
Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich	president of the Russian Federation
Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich	chairman of the Russian Federation Government
Shumeyko, Vladimir Filippovich	chairman of the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly
Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich	chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly

Leaders of the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation

Dzharimov, Aslan Aliyevich	president and chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Republic of the Cabinet of Adygey
Tleuzh, Adam Khuseynovich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of the Republic of Adygey
Petrov, Vladimir Ivanovich	chairman of the Republic of Altay Government
Chaptynov, Valeriy Ivanovich	chairman of the people's assembly (El Kurulay) of the Republic of Altay
Rakhimov, Murtaza Gubaydullovich	president of the Republic of Bashkortostan
Demin, Yuriy Sergeyevich	acting chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Bashkortostan
Saganov, Vladimir Bizyayevich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Buryatia
Potapov, Leonid Vasilyevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Buryatia
Mirzabekov, Abdurazak Mardanovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Dagestan
Magomedov, Magomedali Magomedovich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Dagestan
Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich	president of the Ingush Republic
Keligov, Murat Yusupovich	chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Ingushetia
Kokov, Valeriy Mukhamedovich	president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Zhaboyev, Makhmud Nazirovich	chairman of the Council of Representatives of the Parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Nakhushev, Zaurbi Akhmetovich	chairman of the Council of the Republic of the Parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan Nikolayevich	president of the Republic of Kalmykia—Khalmg Tangch
Maksimov, Konstantin Nikolayevich	chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Kalmykia—Khalmg Tangch
Khubiyev, Vladimir Islamovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic
Savelyev, Viktor Nikolayevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic
Stepanov, Viktor Nikolayevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Karelia
Blinnikov, Sergey Petrovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karelia
Khudyayev, Vyacheslav Ivanovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Komi Republic
Spiridonov, Yuriy Alekseyevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic
Zotin, Vladislav Maksimovich	president of the Republic of Mariy El
Smirnov, Anatoliy Anatolyevich	chairman of the State Assembly of the Republic of Mariy El
Shvetsov, Valeriy Nikolayevich	chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Republic of Mordovia
Biryukov, Nikolay Vasilyevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Mordovia
Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich	president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

Galazov, Akhsarbek Khadzimurzayevich	president of the Republic of North Ossetia
Biragov, Yuriy Grigoryevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of North Ossetia
Shaymiyev, Mintimer Sharipovich	president of the Republic of Tatarstan
Mukhametshin, Farid Khayrulovich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
Oorzhak, Sherig-ool Dizizhikovich	president of the Republic of Tyva
Bicheldey, Kaadyu Ool Alekseyevich	chairman of the Supreme Khural of the Republic of Tyva
Volkov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Udmurt Republic
Tubylov, Valeriy Kuzmich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Udmurt Republic
Smirnov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Khakasia
Shtygashev, Vladimir Nikolayevich	chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Khakasia
Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich	president of the Chuvash Republic
Korshunov, Lev Aleksandrovich	head of administration of Altay Kray
Yegorov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich	head of administration of Krasnodar Kray
Semenov, Vladimir Nikolayevich	deputy head of administration of Krasnoyarsk Kray
Vermachenko, Stanislav Vasilyevich	chairman of the kray Legislative Assembly of Krasnoyarsk Kray
Nazdratenko, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	head of administration of the Maritime Kray
Kuznetsov, Yevgeniy Semenovich	head of administration of Stavropol Kray
Zerenkov, Valeriy Grigoryevich	chairman of the kray State Duma of Stavropol Kray
Ishayev, Viktor Ivanovich	head of administration of Khabarovsk Kray
Polevanov, Vladimir Pavlovich	head of administration of Amur Oblast
Balakshin, Pavel Nikolayevich	head of administration of Arkhangelsk Oblast
Isakov, Nikolay Alekseyevich	chairman of the oblast Assembly of Arkhangelsk Oblast
Guzhvin, Anatoliy Petrovich	head of administration of Astrakhan Oblast
Borodayev, Valeriy Vasilyevich	chairman of the oblast Representative Assembly of Astrakhan Oblast
Savchenko, Yevgeniy Stepanovich	head of administration of Belgorod Oblast
Seliverstov, Yuriy Ivanovich	chairman of the oblast Assembly of People's Representatives of Belgorod Oblast
Karpov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	head of administration of Bryansk Oblast
Rogachev, Valeriy Stepanovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Volgograd Oblast
Vlasov, Yuriy Vasilyevich	head of administration of Vladimir Oblast
Shabunin, Ivan Petrovich	head of administration of Volgograd Oblast
Semergety, Leonid Vasilyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Volgograd Oblast
Podgornov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich	head of administration of Vologda Oblast
Kovalev, Aleksandr Yakovlevich	head of administration of Voronezh Oblast
Shabanov, Ivan Mikhaylovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Voronezh Oblast
Laptev, Adolf Fedorovich	head of administration of Ivanovo Oblast
Tikhomirov, Vladislav Nikolayevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Ivanovo Oblast
Nozhikov, Yuriy Abramovich	governor of Irkutsk Oblast
Matochkin, Yuriy Semenovich	head of administration of Kaliningrad Oblast
Ustyugov, Valeriy Nikolayevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Kaliningrad Oblast
Deryagin, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	head of administration of Kaluga Oblast
Sudarenkov, Valeriy Vasilyevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Kaluga Oblast
Biryukov, Vladimir Afanasyevich	head of administration of Kamchatka Oblast
Kislyuk, Mikhail Borisovich	head of administration of Kemerovo Oblast
Desyatnikov, Vasily Alekseyevich	head of administration of Kirov Oblast
Mikheyev, Mikhail Aleksandrovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Kirov Oblast
Arbuzov, Valeriy Petrovich	head of administration of Kostroma Oblast

Bychkov, Andrey Ivanovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Kostroma Oblast
Gerasimov, Valentin Pavlovich	head of administration of Kurgan Oblast
Bogomolov, Oleg Alekseyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Kurgan Oblast
Shuteyev, Vasilii Ivanovich	head of administration of Kursk Oblast
Pyatnitskiy, Yuriy Georgiyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Kursk Oblast
Belyakov, Aleksandr Semenovich	head of administration of Leningrad Oblast
Stepanko, Vitaliy Maksimovich	chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly
Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	mayor of the city of St. Petersburg
Narolin, Mikhail Tikhonovich	head of administration of Lipetsk Oblast
Mikhaylov, Viktor Grigoryevich	head of administration of Magadan Oblast
Tyazhlov, Anatoliy Stepanovich	head of administration of Moscow Oblast
Vorontsov, Aleksey Alekseyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Moscow Oblast
Komarov, Yevgeniy Borisovich	head of administration of Murmansk Oblast
Nemtsov, Boris Yefimovich	head of administration of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and governor
Kozeradskiy, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
Prusak, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	head of administration of Novgorod Oblast
Boytshev, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Novgorod Oblast
Indinok, Ivan Ivanovich	head of administration of Novosibirsk Oblast
Polezhayev, Leonid Konstantinovich	head of administration of Omsk Oblast
Varnavskiy, Vladimir Alekseyevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Omsk Oblast
Yelagin, Vladimir Vasilyevich	head of administration of Orenburg Oblast
Grigoryev, Valeriy Nikolayevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Orenburg Oblast
Stroyev, Yegor Semenovich	head of administration of Orel Oblast
Volodin, Nikolay Andreyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Orel Oblast
Kovlyagin, Anatoliy Fedorovich	head of administration of Penza Oblast
Kuznetsov, Boris Yuryevich	head of administration of Perm Oblast
Tumanov, Vladislav Nikolayevich	head of administration of Pskov Oblast
Shmatov, Yuriy Anisimovich	chairman of the Oblast Assembly of Pskov Oblast
Chub Vladimir Fedorovich	head of administration of Rostov Oblast
Popov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Deputies of Rostov Oblast
Merkulov, Gennadiy Konstantinovich	head of administration of Ryazan Oblast
Kosikov, Mikhail Filippovich	chairman of the Ryazan Oblast Duma
Titov, Konstantin Alekseyevich	head of administration of Samara Oblast
Belykh, Yuriy Vasilyevich	head of administration of Saratov Oblast
Krasnoyarov, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich	head of administration of Sakhalin Oblast
Strakhov, Aleksey Leonidovich	head of administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast
Glushenkov, Anatoliy Yegorovich	head of administration of Smolensk Oblast
Antufyev, Sergey Vladimirovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Smolensk Oblast
Babenko, Vladimir Dmitriyevich	head of administration of Tambov Oblast
Suslov, Vladimir Antonovich	head of administration of Tver Oblast
Kurbatov, Vladimir Nikolayevich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Tver Oblast
Kress, Viktor Melkhiorovich	head of administration of Tomsk Oblast
Maltsev, Boris Alekseyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Tomsk Oblast
Sevryugin, Nikolay Vasilyevich	head of administration of Tula Oblast
Derevyanko, Viktor Vasilyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Tula Oblast
Roketskiy, Leonid Yulianovich	head of administration of Tyumen Oblast

Baryshnikov, Nikolay Pavlovich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Tyumen Oblast
Goryachev, Yuriy Frolovich	head of administration of Ulyanovsk Oblast
Solov'yev, Vadim Pavlovich	head of administration of Chelyabinsk Oblast
Ivanov, Boris Petrovich	head of administration of Chita Oblast
Veshnyakov, Vitaliy Yevgenyevich	chairman of the oblast Duma of Chita Oblast
Lisitsyn, Anatoliy Ivanovich	head of administration of Yaroslavl Oblast
Melekhin, Valentin Borisovich	chairman of the State Duma of Yaroslavl Oblast
Luzhkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	mayor of the city of Moscow
Maksimov, Viktor Anatolyevich	chairman of the Moscow City Duma
Volkov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich	head of administration of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Vavilov, Stanislav Vladimirovich	chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Tsedashiyyev, Gurodarma Tsedashiyyevich	head of administration of the Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug in Chita Oblast
Rabdanov, Vladimir Rabdanovich	chairman of the okrug Duma of the Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug in Chita Oblast
Poluyanov, Nikolay Andreyevich	head of administration of the Kom.-Permyak Autonomous Okrug in Perm Oblast
Leushkin, Sergey Gennadyevich	head of administration of the Koryak Autonomous Okrug in Kamchatka Oblast
Suvorov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich	chairman of the okrug Duma of the Koryak Autonomous Okrug in Kamchatka Oblast
Komarovskiy, Yuriy Vladimirovich	head of administration of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Arkhangelsk Oblast
Nedelin, Gennadiyy Pavlovich	head of administration of the Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetsk) Autonomous Okrug in Krasnoyarsk Krai
Batagayev, Aleksey Nikolayevich	head of administration of the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug in Irkutsk Oblast
Filipenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	head of administration of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug in Tyumen Oblast
Sobyenin, Sergey Semenovich	chairman of the okrug Duma of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug in Tyumen Oblast
Nazarov, Aleksandr Viktorovich	head of administration of the Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug in Magadan Oblast
Yakimov, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich	head of administration of Evenki Autonomous Okrug in Krasnoyarsk Krai
Neyelov, Yuriy Vasilyevich	acting head of administration of the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug in Tyumen Oblast

Chairmen of the Factions of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly

Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich	chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia faction
Travkin, Nikolay Ilyich	chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia faction
Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna	chairman of the "Women of Russia" faction
Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich	chairman of the "Russia's Choice" faction
Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich	chairman of the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" faction
Lysenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich	member of the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" faction and cochairman of the Russian Federation Republican Party

'Women of Russia' Political Movement

Fedulova, Alevtina Vasilyevna	chairman of the Union of Women of Russia
Dobrovolskaya, Marina Karamanovna	chairman of the Union of Women of the Navy

Leaders of the Trade Unions of the Russian Federation

Abramov, Mikhail Ivanovich	chairman of the central committee of the Russian Federation Trade Union for Workers in Automotive and Agricultural Machinebuilding
Arzhavkin, Spartak Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
Bazayev, Vladimir Fedorovich	chairman of the ispolkom of the Russian Federation Trade Union of Employees of Joint Ventures
Blagov, Viktor Vasilyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of the Strategic Missile Troops
Bobkov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	chairman of the Russian Federation Trade Union of Employees in Catering, Consumer Cooperation, and Entrepreneurship, "Torgovoye yedinstvo" [Trade Unity]
Breusov, Anatoliy Fedorovich	chairman of the ispolkom of the Association of Russian Trade Unions of the Defense Sectors of Industry
Vasilevskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers in Local Industry and Municipal-Domestic Enterprises
Voroshilov, Mikhail Albertovich	cochairman of the Russian Metal Workers Trade Union

Denisov, Oleg Ivanovich	chairman of the governing board of the Russian Association of Trade Union Organizations for VUZ Students
Dudin, Yuriy Ivanovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Engineering-Technical Personnel, Scientists, and Employees of the Coal Industry of Russia
Yefremenko, Andrey Lvovich	chairman of the coordinating council of the United Trade Union of Employees of Public Catering Enterprises
Zhovnerik, Valeriy Konstantinovich	chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Employees of Scientific and Production Cooperatives and Enterprises
Ziborov, Nikolay Antonovich	chairman of the council of the Congress of Russian Trade Unions
Kandaratskov, Nikolay Timofeyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of Aerospace Units
Klebanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Central Committee of Free Trade Unions
Kolchev, Mikhail Ivanovich	chairman of the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen of the Russian Federation
Korpachev, Valeriy Petrovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Special Construction Employees of Russia
Kosarev, Yuriy Alekseyevich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Employees of Medium-Sized and Small Business
Kosyakov, Andrey Ilyich	chairman of the central committee of the Independent Trade Union of Employees of Detective Services of the Russian Federation
Koshelev, Valentin Timofeyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of Ground Forces
Kremnev, Boris Alekseyevich	chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Aviation Workers of Russia
Krivopuskov, Viktor Vladimirovich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Employees of Exchange and Commercial, Private Firm, and Other Entrepreneurial Structures
Kuzmenko, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Health Care Workers of the Russian Federation
Lobacheva, Lidiya Borisovna	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of the RF Ministry of Defense
Makavchik, Vladimir Yevgenyevich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Shipbuilding Workers
Markov, Valeriy Yefimovich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Radioelectronic Industry Workers
Moskovkin, Aleksey Yevgenyevich	chairman of the council of the Russian Federation "Yedineniye" [Unity] Trade Union
Nazeykin, Anatoliy Georgiyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Communications Workers of the Russian Federation
Nekrasov, Viktor Romanovich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Seamen
Nechayev, Vladimir Alekseyevich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Innovation and Small Enterprise Workers
Neshitoy, Nikolay Yemelyanovich	chairman of the Russian Federal Independent Trade Union of Workers of the Consumer Cooperative System and Different Forms of Entrepreneurship
Ochekurov, Valeriy Nikolayevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Timber Management Sectors Workers of the Russian Federation
Savchenko, Vladimir Petrovich	chairman of the central committee of the Trade Union of Workers of State Institutions and Public Service
Semenenko, Nina Mikhaylovna	chairwoman of the medical workers trade union
Sosnina, Tatyana Ivanovna	chairwoman of the Russian Textile and Light Industry Workers Trade Union
Slonin, Viktor Petrovich	chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Workers in Culture
Soshenko, Boris Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers of the Russian Federation
Spichenok, Yuriy Sergeyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of General Machinebuilding Workers of the Russian Federation
Startsev, Vladimir Vladimirovich	chairman of the Russian Atomic Power Engineering and Industry Trade Union
Starchenko, Gennadiy Grigoryevich	chairman of the Association of Trade Unions of the Transport Sectors of the Russian Federation
Stanin, Valeriy Nikolayevich	chairman of the central committee of the Trade Union of Workers in the Chemical Sectors of Industry
Trofimov, Viktor Alekseyevich	chairman of the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of the Russian Federation Navy
Trudov, Gennadiy Alekseyevich	chairman of the Machine Builders' Trade Union of the Russian Federation
Filippov, Aleksandr Viktorovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Laborers of Military and Specialized Construction Organizations of Russia
Fonin, Igor Alekseyevich	chairman of the central committee of the Russian Trade Union of Workers in Construction Organizations and Enterprises of Nonstate Forms of Ownership
Khramov, Sergey Vladimirovich	chairman of the Association of Trade Unions of Russia, SOTsPROF
Chernykh, Aleksey Vasilyevich	chairman of the Russian Association of Trade Unions, "Solidarnost" [Solidarity]

Shinkevich, Ivan Artemovich	chairman of the Independent Trade Union of Railway Workers and Transport Builders of the Russian Federation
Shmakov, Mikhail Viktorovich	chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
Shulga, Vladimir Vladimirovich	cochairman of the Russian Trade Union of Drivers and Workers in City Transport
Yakovlev, Vladimir Mikhailovich	president of the Association of Trade Unions of Workers of the Nonproduction Sphere of the Russian Federation

Heads of Religious Associations

Aleksiy the Second	Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus
Alimpiy	Metropolitan of Moscow and All Rus
Archbishop Tadeush Kondrusevich	Apostolic Administrator for Catholics of the Latin Rite of the European Part of Russia (Roman Catholic Church)
Bishop Yozef Vert	Apostolic Administrator for Catholics of the Latin Rite of the Asian Part of Russia (Roman Catholic Church)
Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin	chairman of the Central Religious Administration of Muslims of Russia and the European Countries of the CIS
Khamba Lama Choy-Dorzi Budayev	chairman of the Central Religious Administration of Buddhists of Russia
Shayevich, Adolf Solomonovich	Chief Rabbi of the Congress of Jewish Religious Communities and Organizations of Russia
Konovalchik, Petr Borisovich	chairman of the Union of Churches of the Evangelical Christian Baptists of Russia
Murza, Vladimir Moiseyevich	chairman of the Union of Christians of the Evangelical Pentecostal Faith of Russia
Link, Robert Robertovich	president of the Russian Union of Churches of Seventh Day Adventists
Shneyder, Nikolay Nikolayevich	superintendent of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia

Social Chamber Under the President of the Russian Federation

Topornin, Boris Nikolayevich	cochairman of the Social Chamber under the president of the Russian Federation
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All-Russian Council of Veterans of War, Labor, the Armed Forces, and Law Enforcement Organs

Trunov, Mikhail Petrovich	chairman of the All-Russian Council of Veterans of War, Labor, the Armed Forces, and Law Enforcement Organs
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Russian Academy of Sciences

Gonchar, Andrey Aleksandrovich	vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad

Ratiyev, Viktor Nikolayevich	supreme ataman of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad
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Union of Cossacks of Russia

Martynov, Aleksandr Gavrilovich	ataman of the Union of Cossacks of Russia
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List of Those Who Signed the Treaty on Social Accord

5 May 1994 Moscow, the Kremlin Large Kremlin Palace
Vladimirskiy Hall Start at 1400 Hours

Members of the Social Chamber Under the President of the Russian Federation

Person	Post
Ananich, Vladimir Yulianovich	chairman of the council of the Fund To Support Advertising Publishers
Bashmachnikov, Vladimir Fedorovich	president of the Association of Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives of Russia
Bendukidze, Kakha Avtandilovich	chief executive officer of the Eurasian People's Oil Investment Industry Corporation
Gavrilov, Rambom Immanuelovich	president of the Union of Entrepreneurs of the North Caucasus
Gartsev, Oleg Ivanovich	chief elder of the Society of Merchants and Industrialists (Interregional)
Davletova, Lyudmila Yelmatovna	president of the Union of Manufacturers of Light Industry Goods
Dygay, Anatoliy Illarionovich	president of the Agrarian Union of Reserve Officers
Zverev, Aleksandr Konstantinovich	executive director of the Russian Investors' Union

Ipatov, Vasilii Petrovich	president of the Interregional Association "Yevropeyskiy sever" [European North]
Kivelidi, Ivan Kharlampiyevich	chairman of the Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship under the Government of Russia
Konovalov, Andrey Leonidovich	president of the All-Russian Union of United Cooperative and Other Nonstate Forms of Ownership
Kuznetsova, Vera Antonovna	director of the Russian Fund To Develop and Support the Entrepreneurial Activity of Komi
Medvedkova, Yelena Markovna	general director of the International Association of Trade Companies
Nakhapetov, Marlen Aleksandrovich	chairman of the Entrepreneurs' Forum of St. Petersburg
Pankin, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich	president of the Moscow Central Stock Exchange
Ponyavin, Vladimir Nikolayevich	general director of the Economic Association "Molodaya Rossiya" [Young Russia]
Skachkov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	chairman of the ispolkom of the Conference of Entrepreneurs' Unions of Russia
Soziyev, Aleksandr Sergeyevich	president of the League of Industrialists and Commodity Producers of Russia
Khakamada, Irina Mutsuovna	vice president of the Economic Freedom Foundation of Russia
Chernyy, Ernst Isaakovich	chairman of the Union of Independent Fish Industry Workers

Members of the Agroindustrial Union of Russia

Grinev, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich	chairman of the Agroindustrial Union of Russia
Bayder, Aleksandr Borisovich	general director of the Proizvoditeli govyadina [Beef Producers] Joint Stock Company
Vasilyev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	chairman of the Association of Exchange Structures of the Agroindustrial Complex
Gulyuk, Georgiy Grigoryevich	chairman of the governing board of the Tsentrinzhelstroy [Central Agricultural Engineering Construction] Concern
Demakin, Vyacheslav Grigoryevich	first vice president of the Agrotrakh [Agricultural Insurance] National Agroindustrial Company
Dontsov, Gennadiy Ivanovich	president of the Rosavtodor [Russian Highways] Russian Joint Stock Company
Dudin, Ivan Vasilyevich	president of the Rosstroygazifikatsiya [Russian Gasification Construction] Joint Stock Company
Kazakov, Anatoliy Borisovich	general director of the Agrotekhnologiya [Agricultural Technology] Joint Stock Company
Kazakov, Mikhail Ivanovich	general director of the Zveroprom LTD [Hunting Industry, Ltd.] firm
Kalinin, Eduard Aleksandrovich	first vice president of the Avtoselkhoz mash-kholding [Agricultural Automotive Machinebuilding Holding] Joint Stock Company
Krivosheyev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	first deputy chief of the Selektrisetstroy [Rural Electrification System Construction] Association
Loginov, Vladimir Pavlovich	president of the Rosselkhozvodstroy [Russian Agricultural Water System Construction] Joint Stock Corporation
Fedin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	deputy general director of the Svinoprom [Hog Industry] Joint Stock Company
Chernov, Stanislav Pavlovich	president of the Spetsialnoye mashinostroyeniye i metallurgiya [Special Machinebuilding and Metallurgy] Joint Stock Company

Members of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

Volskiy, Arkady Ivanovich	president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Vaynberg, Lev Iosifovich	president of the Association of Joint Ventures of International Associations and Organizations
Kalinina, Nadezhda Georgiyevna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Krasnaya zarya Leased Production-Trade Association
Kirpichnikov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich	editor in chief of the editorial office of the newspaper DELOVOY MIR
Kolpakov, Serafim Vasilyevich	president of the International Metal Workers' Union
Kotov, Yuriy Ivanovich	president of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Kremenetskiy, Izrail Yakovlevich	chairman of the governing board of the Moscow Industrialists' Guild
Kuzmin, Boris Aleksandrovich	chairman of the governing board of the Association ["Assotsiatsiya"] of Printing Industry Enterprises, Associations, ["obyedineniye"] and Organizations
Lipman, David Natanovich	president of the Timber Merchants' Union of Russia
Piskunov, Vladimir Venidiktovich	president of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia
Porshnev, Anatoliy Georgiyevich	president of the Union of Joint Stock Companies of Russia
Turov, Igor Stanislavovich	president of the Sodruzhestvo Intersectorial Association
Fomin, Boris Mikhaylovich	president of the Russian Interregional Union of Entrepreneurs of the Textile and Light Industries
Shulyatyeva, Nadezhda Aleksandrovna	president of the Union of Small Enterprises of Russia

Members of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees of Russia

Bunich, Pavel Grigoryevich	president of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees of Russia
Gaysinskiy, Grigoriy Yakovlevich	director of the Parfyumflakon [Perfume Bottle] Closed-Type Joint Stock Company
Lukashov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	general director of the Olf Closed-Type Joint Stock Company
Patrikeyev, Vladimir Petrovich	president of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees of Moscow Oblast
Sergeyichev, Aleksey Aleksandrovich	president of the Association of Leased Enterprises of Samarelektro [Samara Electrical System] City Electric Grids
Stukalov, Vladimir Dmitriyevich	general director of the Russian-Finnish Joint Venture AMT (limited partnership)

Representatives of Commercial Banks Which Are Members of the Association of Russian Banks

Boyko, Oleg Viktorovich	chairman of the governing board of the Natsionalnyy kredit Commercial Bank
Bukato, Viktor Ivanovich	president of the Moscow Joint Stock Bank for Assisting Entrepreneurship, Mosbiznesbank
Gusinskiy, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	president of the Most-bank Commercial Bank
Driker, Petr Davidovich	first vice president of the Stolichnyy Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Dubenetskiy, Yakov Nikolayevich	chairman of the governing board of Promstroybank Rossii Joint Stock Investment Commercial Industrial-Construction Bank
Zdrayevskaya, Tamara Pavlovna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Biznes Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Ivanov, Arkadiy Pavlovich	chairman of the governing board of Ipotechnyy aktsionernyy bank [Mortgage Joint Stock Bank]
Kapinos, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	chairman of the governing board of the Morbank Moscow Joint Stock Bank
Kisilev, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	vice president of the Russian National Commercial Bank
Kolbayev, Vladimir Petrovich	president of the Mezhekonomsberbank International Joint Stock Bank of Savings Banks
Kolpakov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	chairman of the governing board of the RF Foreign Trade Bank, Vneshtorgbank
Korniyets, Sergey Leontyevich	chairman of the governing board of the Innovation Bank for Providing Credit for Developing Production and Supplying Output of the Defense (Machinebuilding) Industry, Mashbank
Kostina, Natalya Yuryevna	deputy chairwoman of the governing board of the Optimum Commercial Bank
Kuzmenko, Marina Nikolayevna	acting chairwoman of the governing board of the Maib Moscow Joint Stock Innovation Bank
Mazayev, Ivan Sergeyevich	president of the Commercial Joint Stock Bank of the Chemical Industry, Khimbank
Malkin, Vitaliy Borisovich	chairman of the governing board of the Rossiyskiy kredit Commercial Bank
Malyshev, Aleksandr Ivanovich	president of the Investkredit Interbank Investment Association
Orlov, Dmitriy Lvovich	chairman of the governing board of the Moscow Joint Stock Commercial Bank, Vozrozhdeniye
Pisemskiy, Nikolay Georgiyevich	chairman of the governing board of the Joint Stock Conversion Bank, Konversbank
Plotnikov, Igor Borisovich	vice president of the Moscow Bank for Development of Science and Technology, Tekhnobank
Rappoport, Andrey Natanovich	chairman of the governing board of the Alfa bank Innovation Commercial Bank
Redko, Nikolay Vitalyevich	president of the Joint Stock Company Mezhsbankovskiy finansovyy dom [Interbank Finance House]
Rodin, Vladimir Borisovich	first vice president of the joint stock bank, Russkiy transportnyy bank [Russian Transport Bank]
Sudakov, Vladislav Borisovich	chairman of the governing board of International Moscow Bank
Surovtseva, Valentina Ivanovna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Faber bank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Sukhotin, Igor Vladimirovich	chairman of the governing board of the Atlant Commercial Bank
Timakov, Valentin Dmitriyevich	president of the Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Development of the Textile and Light Industries, Effektkredit
Frantskevich, Mikhail Ivanovich	chairman of the governing board of the Aviabank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Tsarkova, Margarita Andreyevna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Interregional Commercial Bank for Development of Communications and Information Science, Svyaz bank
Tsvilling, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	chairman of the governing board of the Montazhspetsbank [Special Installations Bank] Commercial Bank
Cherneyev, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	first deputy chairman of the governing board of the Joint Stock Commercial Agroindustrial Bank, Agroprombank
Khabitsov, Boris Batrbekovich	chairman of the governing board of the Ironbank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Shalashov, Albert Nikiforovich	chairman of the governing board of the Moscow Interregional Commercial Bank

Shemyakin, Oleg Mikhaylovich	chairman of the Moscow City Commercial Bank of the Construction Materials Industry, Moskovskiy bank promstroymaterialov
Yuryev, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich	first vice president of the Joint Stock Commercial Geological Bank, Geolbank
Yakunin, Viktor Konstantinovich	president of the Intersectoral Joint Stock Commercial Bank for the Development of Wholesale Trade, Tokobank
Yashin, Oleg Vladimirovich	president of the RF Joint Stock Commercial Savings Bank, Sberbank RF
Representatives of Other Organizations	
Bednov, Sergey Sergeyevich	vice president of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Bezmyanny, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	president of the BIVM firm
Butov, Arnold Geogiyevich	chairman of the Beekeepers' Union of Russia
Vinogradov, Sergey Viktorovich	general director of the Oboldinskiy Joint Stock Company Lakokraska [Paint and Varnish]
Volovik, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	president of the Bi-Gas-si Financial-Industrial Corporation
Denisov, Igor Sergeyevich	general director of the Ekspotsentr [Expocenter] Joint Stock Company
Izotova, Galina Sergeyevna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Sokolbank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Klepikov, Nikolay Alekseyevich	cochairman of the Moscow Union of Young Entrepreneurs
Prokopenko, Nikolay Andreyevich	general director of the Belkon firm
Ivanov, Viktor Nikolayevich	director of the municipal enterprise, Valuyev Health Resort Complex
Ilyukhin, Sergey Nikolayevich	first deputy chairman of the governing board of the Imperial Joint Stock Company
Kiselev, Oleg Vladimirovich	chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy under the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
Kozyreva, Aleksandra Mikhaylovna	president of the Tveruniversalbank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Komkov, Sergey Konstantinovich	chairman of the All-Russian Education Foundation
Loginov, Viktor Fedorovich	chairman of the Russian Federation Trade Union of Workers in Physical Culture, Sports, and Tourism
Mironova, Nina Yakovlevna	vice president of the national committee of the World Assembly of Small and Medium-Sized Business
Mishov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich	vice president of the Inkombank Joint Stock Bank
Nesterov, Kirill Andreyevich	chairman of the Television Workers' Trade Union of Russia
Novikov, Oleg Ivanovich	chairman of the governing board of the Moscow Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises
Pashkin, Mikhail Petrovich	chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Internal Affairs Workers of Russia
Petrov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	chairman of the State Investment Corporation
Rodomanov, Sergey Ivanovich	cochairman of the Republic Entrepreneurs' Union
Sarzhin, Aleksandr Sergeyevich	general director of the Moskva Joint Stock Company
Sinyakova, Aleksandra Grigoryevna	member of the governing board of the Eleksbank Joint Stock Bank
Sedykh, Yuriy Olegovich	chairman of the republic committee of the Collection Workers' Trade Union
Teplov, Yuriy Georgiyevich	first deputy chairman of the governing board of the Commercial Bank for Development of the Automotive Industry, Avtobank
Fedorov, Boris Mikhaylovich	chairman of the presidium of the Association of Free Trade Unions of Russian Small, Leased, Collective, Cooperative, and Other Enterprises and Organizations, Makkip
Shamanov, Anatoliy Vladimirovich	general director of the Ays-Fili Joint Stock Company Firm
Sharygin, Viktor Igoryevich	director of the Ekonomicheskoye Soobshchestvo [Economic Commonwealth] Company
Shirokov, Arkadiy Stepanovich	chairman of the Trade Union of Air Defense Workers and Employees
Galeyev, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	chairman of the Independent Trade Union of ITAR-TASS Workers
Kuzichev, Valeriy Polikarpovich	chairman of All-Russian Elektropfsoyuz [Electricians' Trade Union]
Markov, Yevgeniy Manuilovich	president of the Russian Federation Union of Small Cities

12 May 1994 Moscow, the Kremlin Large Kremlin Palace
Vladimirskiy Hall Start at 1400 Hours

Managers of Sports Organizations

Person	Post
Mashin, Yuriy Dmitriyevich	deputy chairman of the Coordinating Committee for Physical Culture and Sports under the president of the Russian Federation
Smirnov, Vitaliy Georgiyevich	president of the Olympic Committee of Russia

Managers of All-Russian Sports Federations

Aleshin, Gennadiy Petrovich	president of the All-Russian Swimming Federation
Akhmedshin, Igor Gennadyevich	president of the All-Russian Armwrestling Association
Balakhnichiev, Valentin Vasilyevich	president of the All-Russian Track and Field Federation
Bystrov, Boris Mikhaylovich	president of the Ski Racing Federation of Russia
Bychkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	president of the Fencing Federation of Russia
Vargashkin, Rostislav Yevgenyevich	president of the Bicyclists' Union of Russia and honored master of sports
Zhukov, Valentin Vasilyevich	president of the All-Russian Volleyball Federation
Kozhukhov, Aleksandr Borisovich	president of the Handball Players' Union of Russia
Koloskov, Vyacheslav Ivanovich	president of the Russian Soccer Union
Kopylov, Yuriy Petrovich	president of the Baseball and Softball Federation
Korobov, Anatoliy Nikolayevich	president of the Triathlon Federation of Russia
Maslennikov, Igor Borisovich	president of the Sports Press Federation of Russia
Milchakov, Anatoliy Prokopyevich	president of the Union of Russian Ski Federations
Morozov, Petr Valentinovich	president of the Russian Basketball Federation
Piseyev, Valentin Nikolayevich	president of the Figure Skating Federation of Russia
Polikanin, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	president of the Shooters' Union of Russia and honored master of sports
Seleznev, Lev Nikolayevich	president of the All-Russian Federation of Physical Culture and Sports for Disabled Persons of Russia
Fradkov, Yakov Samuilovich	vice president of the Sports Gymnastics Federation of Russia
Yarygin, Ivan Sergeyevich	president of the Wrestling Federation of Russia, honored master of sports, and two-time Olympic champion

Managers of Russian State Organs of Administration of Physical Culture, DSO [Voluntary Sports Societies], Departments, and Other Public Organizations

Gorokhova, Galina Yevgenyevna	chairwoman of the Russian Sportsmen's Union and honored master of sports
Guseva, Valeriya Aleksandrovna	manager of the training methods and medical center of the Olympic Committee of Russia
Drobinskiy, Viktor Mikhaylovich	general director of the Olimpiyskiy Sports Complex
Kiselev, Aleksey Ivanovich	chairman of the Russian Sports Students' Union
Kotov, Stanislav Serafimovich	chairman of the RS VFSO Dinamo
Lagovskiy, Stanislav Mechislavovich	chairman of the sports committee of the Russian Federation MO [Ministry of Defense]
Milovanov, Sergey Artemyevich	president of the Karate-do Federation of the City of Moscow
Mishin, Viktor Maksimovich	general director of the Olimpiyskaya lotereya [Olympic Lottery] Joint Venture
Namestnikov, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich	first deputy chairman of the TsS [Central Council] of the Russian Defense Sports-Technical Organization
Ozerov, Nikolay Nikolayevich	chairman of the Spartak RS [possibly Russian Sports] Society
Pavlov, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich	president of the international karate center, Dzendo
Panteleyev, Vladimir Sergeyevich	chairman of the Committee on Physical Culture and Sports of the Moscow Oblast administration
Polkovnikov, Anatoliy Nikolayevich	chairman of the TsS FSO [Federation of Sports Organizations?] Urozhay of Russia
Smirnov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	president of the Association of Tai Kwan Do Clubs of the Armed Forces of Russia
Tikhonov, Aleksandr Ivanovich	vice president of the Foundation for Social Support of Sportsmen imeni L. I. Yashin

Fedorov, Boris Vladimirovich	vice president of the National Sports Foundation
Khotochkin, Viktor Alekseyevich	first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on Affairs of Youth, Physical Culture, and Tourism
Sheyanov, Vyacheslav Pavlovich	first deputy chairman of the RS FSO Yunost Rossii
Shibayev, Gennadiy Nikolayevich	chairman of the TsS FSO of Trade Unions Rossiya
Yurin, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich	deputy chairman of the Committee on Physical Culture and Sports of the government of Moscow

Veterans of Sports

Bolotnikov, Petr Grigoryevich	Olympic champion
Lagutin, Boris Nikolayevich	president of the B. N. Lagutin Foundation and Olympic champion
Muratov, Valentin Ivanovich	Olympic champion
Netto, Igor Aleksandrovich	Olympic champion
Petruseva, Natalya Anatolyevna	trainer of the Committee on Physical Culture and Sports of the Russian Federation Government and Olympic champion
Polozkova, Lidiya Pavlovna	deputy chairwoman of the central committee of the Russian Federation Trade Union of Workers in Physical Culture, Sports, and Tourism and Olympic champion
Press, Tamara Natanovna	deputy chairwoman of the TsS FSO of Trade Unions Rossiya and Olympic champion

Managers of Youth and Children's Organizations

Akatov, Nikolay Alekseyevich	member of the coordinating council of the Federation of Russian Orthodox Scouts
Andreyev, Vasily Borisovich	chairman of the united adolescents' clubs
Antonova, Irina Nikolayevna	first deputy chairwoman of the council of the Union of Pioneer Organizations-Federation of Children's Organizations
Artyukhov, Igor Demyanovich	executive director and authorized representative of the Russian Youth Federation of Kick Boxing
Bausov, Yuriy Nikolayevich	president of the Association of Disabled Youth Organizations
Braterskiy, Maksim Vladimirovich	chief of the international programs department of the Russian Sociopolitical Center and vice president of the Russian Scientific Foundation
Bogdanov, Andrey Vladimirovich	chairman of the governing board of the Derzhava Charity Youth Foundation
Vernigorova, Tamara Prokofyevna	deputy chairwoman of the coordinating council of the Shkola demokraticheskoy kultury [Democratic Culture School] Association
Gaba, Oleg Ivanovich	chairman of the coordinating council of the People's Union To Protect Monuments to Fallen Defenders of the Fatherland (Union of Search Squads)
Gavrilov, Yuriy Ivanovich	chairman of the sociopolitical college of the Union of MZhK's [Youth Housing Complex] of Russia
Galkin, Sergey Viktorovich	chairman of the Union of Parachuting Clubs for Adolescents imeni V. F. Margelov
Gorbulina, Irina Vyacheslavovna	president of the International Association of Young Journalists, ASMO-press
Dodonov, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich	president of Yuristy XXI veka [Jurists of the 21st Century] Association
Yevchenko, Igor Veniaminovich	chairman of the governing board of the Fund To Develop Culture and Sports for Youth
Zarubin, Sergey Aleksandrovich	president of the independent Youth League
Zakharov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich	deputy chairman of the Molodyye respublikantsy [Young Republicans] Union
Igonin, Yuriy Ivanovich	vice president of the Youth Navy League
Ilyinskiy, Igor Mikhaylovich	director of the Institute of Youth, city of Moscow
Kafanov, Viktor Fedorovich	cochairman of the political party Molodezh za progress [Youth for Progress]
Kirillov, Albert Anatolyevich	executive director of the Union of Rural Youth
Komarov, Mikhail Nikanorovich	general director of the culture and sports center, Mir puteshestviy [World of Travels]
Kopyev, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich	president of the Russian Youth Chamber
Korneyev, Sergey Alyevich	general director of the Fund To Support Youth Entrepreneurship
Kosinnarov, Aleksey Yuryevich	chairman of the governing board of the All-Russian Movement Budushchiye lidery novogo tyasyacheletiya [Future Leaders of the New Millennium]
Kremenetskiy, Aleksandr Arkadyevich	general secretary of the Union of Youth of the Republican Humanitarian Party
Kryakov, Viktor Sergeyevich	president of the Russian Youth League Budushcheye-XXI vek [Future-21st Century] and member of the Social Chamber under the president of the Russian Federation

Kuzmin, Dmitriy Vladimirovich	chairman of the governing board of the Union of Young Literary Figures, Vavilon
Lashchevskiy, Vyacheslav Viktorovich	first secretary of the central committee of the Russian Union of Youth
Layko, Mikhail Yuryevich	national secretary of the Association of Students Studying Technical Specializations, AISTI
Malyarov, Igor Yuryevich	executive director of the Association of Young Disabled Persons, Apparel
Musayev, Magomed Khalilulayevich	president of the Russian Federation Association of Medical Students
Novikova, Tatyana Viktorovna	president of the Public Charitable Youth Fund (Molodezh za Rossiyu [Youth for Russia] Fund)
Obruchnikov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich	director of the Fund for Scientific-Technical Innovative and Creative Activity of Youth of Russia
Pavlenko, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	secretary of the central council of the Yuristy XXI veka Association
Rozhdestvenskaya, Nina Antonovna	secretary of the journalist organization, editor for the department of literature and art, and member of the editorial board of the newspaper PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA
Serebrov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	president of the All-Russian Aerospace Society, Soyuz
Titov, Igor Valentinovich	vice president of the Molodezh vybirayet budushcheye [Youth Choose the Future] Foundation
Tyulyubayev, Andrey Yuryevich	chairman of the council of the Federation of Children's Organizations of Russia
Fedorenko, Yelena Yuryevna	cochairwoman of the Association of Young High School Students, Sodruzhestvo
Khodakova, Svetlana Viktorovna	chairwoman of the central council of the Agrarian Union of Youth
Chernykh, Vyacheslav Yevgenyevich	president of the Russian Union of Scouts
Shkolnik, Aleksandr Yakovlevich	president of the Small Press League
Yazykova, Valentina Spiridonovna	vice president of the international charitable foundation, Biznes i deti [Business and Children]

Managers of Tourist Organizations

Laptev, Ivan Ilyich	president of the Russian Association of Public Tourism
Malinin, Vladimir Anatolyevich	president of the Evraziya [Eurasia] Association of Tourist Agencies
Nikiforov, Valeriy Ivanovich	president of the Association of Tourist-Excursion Enterprise Workers
Remizov, Viktor Vladimirovich	president of the Russian Association of Tourist Agencies
Skobkin, Sergey Sergeyevich	vice president of the National Tourist Association

Managers of Women's Associations

Babukh, Larisa Vladimirovna	president of the Raduga Women's Association
Baranov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	president of the International Foundation To Protect the Health of Mothers and Children
Bardina, Marina Mitrofanovna	president of the Materi za mir [Mothers for Peace] Public Association
Volynets, Viktoriya Arsenyevna	editor in chief of the newspaper MOSKVICHKA [Woman of Moscow]
Galkina, Galina Nikolayevna	first deputy chairwoman of the Women's Union of Russia
Grebesheva, Inga Ivanovna	general director of the Russian Planirovaniye semyi [Family Planning] Association
Grosheva, Margarita Prokofyevna	chairwoman of the Women's Credit Society
Guzov, Igor Ivanovich	president of the Podderzhka materinstva [Motherhood Support] Association
Dragunkina, Zinaida Fedorovna	president of the Blagovest People's Aid Center
Yemelyanova, Raisa Ivanovna	director of the Moscow Center for Handicrafts for Women
Yershova, Yelena Nikolayevna	chairwoman of the Russian International Women's Center, Gaya
Zaytseva, Yekaterina Mikhaylovna	chairwoman of the governing board of the Lyubava Center for Social Aid to Families with Many Children and Single-Parent Families
Zeleranskaya, Tatyana Solomonovna	editor in chief of the independent women's radio station, Nadezhda
Ivanova, Eleonora Matveyevna	president of the Association of Women of the Defense Industry, Konversiya i zhenshchiny [Conversion and Women]
Komissarova, Tatyana Alekseyevna	codirector of the Network of Educational Centers for Women
Koroleva, Irina Sergeyevna	general director of the independent women's radio station, Nadezhda
Krylova, Zoya Petrovna	editor in chief of the journal RABOTNITSA [Woman Worker]
Logunova, Nataliya Dmitriyevna	president of the Femina Charitable Foundation
Malyutina, Tatyana Grigoryevna	president of the Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Russia

Matviyevskaya, Ninel Davydovna	executive director of the Social-Education Charitable Foundation, Mariya-XXI vek [Mariya-21st Century]
Sillaste, Galina Georgiyevna	president of the Zhenshchiny i razvitiye [Women and Development] International Association
Ochirova, Aleksandra Vasilyevna	president of the International Women's Center, Budushcheye zhenshchiny [Future of Women]
Poplavskaya, Yevgeniya Yuryevna	president of the Order of Charity and Social Protection
Romashko, Olga Olegovna	president of the Association of Women of Russia with University Education
Ryabikina, Tatyana Anatolyevna	president of the Tvorchestvo [Creativity] Association of Women
Ryabicheva, Tatyana Vasilyevna	director of the Center for Legal and Social-Psychological Aid to the Population, Vasha semya [Your Family]
Savelyicheva, Vera Leontyevna	director of the Social-Psychological Center, Vera
Khotkina, Zoya Aleksandrovna	member of the coordinating council of the Moscow Center for Gender Research
Chugunova, Emiliya Yefimovna	president of the Foundation for Women's Employment and Aid to Entrepreneurship
Shvetsova, Lyudmila Ivanovna	president of the Zhenskaya iniciativa [Women's Initiative] Foundation

Significance of 'Civic Accord' Agreement Weighed

944Q0387A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 18-19, May 94 [Signed to press 10 May 94] pp 4-7

[Article by Kronid Lybarskiy: "The Agreement [dogovor] on a Separate Peace"]

[Text] And so the race with the elaboration of the "Agreement [soglasheniye] on Accord" [soglasie], which later, to the satisfaction of linguistic purists, was transformed into an "Agreement" [dogovor] has now been successfully completed. On 28 April the first 245 signatures were put under the agreement. The pompous act for some reason took place in the Georgiyevskiy Hall of the Kremlin, which symbolizes Russian military glory, although for the declaration of a civic accord, probably, a more peaceful place would have been more suitable.

After the "Georgiyevskiy [Hall]" celebrations there were also other ones—on a smaller scale.

But of greater significance than any symbolism is the essence of the matter: What precisely was signed, and who precisely signed the agreement.

The Kremlin Has Come Closer to Moncloa

It is necessary to say that during the several weeks that have passed since the time of the development and publication of the first variant of the draft agreement it has changed very substantially. The first thing that should be noted in comparing a number of intervening variants of the text with the final one is the fact that the very structure of the document has changed drastically. It has become more "addressed" [adresnyy], as they say now. In this sense, it has come to resemble much more the pacts of Moncloa.

In the original variant, all responsibility and all obligations were equally divided between all the participants of the agreement. A sort of collective security was established. For example, it was provided that all future signatories—from the Seventh Day Adventists to "Women of the Navy"—obligated themselves "not to allow" either "a reduction of the defense ability" or "an

irreversible technical lag", and expressed complete readiness to carry out "budget compensation to the regions."

In the signed variant there is already nothing of this. The obligations of the parties are formulated sufficiently precisely and clearly, above all in what concerns the government and the Federal Assembly. Besides that, the points of the agreement to a significant degree lost poetic vagueness and began more to resemble political obligations.

It is especially clear now what the Federal Assembly needs to do. Almost in every part of the agreement a lengthy list of legislative acts is cited which the Council of the Federation and the Duma obligate themselves to adopt, moreover, some of these laws are quite concrete. This is important, for in the meanwhile the new Russian parliament has worked utmost ineffectively: Upon the expiration of the parliamentary "100 days" it was discovered that the deputies have not adopted a single substantial law, but only laws regulating and "guaranteeing" their own activity.

The Federal Assembly now promises to adopt at last a constitutional law on the government, civil and land codes, a new Codex of Labor Law, laws on free economic zones, on banking activity, on the securities market, and on the subsistence wage. Also envisaged is the adoption of laws "aimed at the perfection of the taxation system." The parliamentarians have also promised, however, to adopt at last the budget for the current year—for this alone one should give thanks to the "Agreement on Accord."

Also quite concrete are the obligations of the Federal Assembly in connection with the laws on local self-government. In other spheres of lawmaking they were formulated in much more general form.

The promises given in the agreement by the executive authority sooner have the character of establishing aims: Reduction of inflation, increase of investment activity, overcoming the structural deformations of the economy, an active social policy, etc. For the time being it is not

very clear in what manner the government intends to carry all this out. It is not that the budget for 1994 presented to the Duma exactly during the period of the preparation of the agreement contradicted the government obligations in the agreement—both of these documents simply exist independently of one another, one outside the other.

We will hope that the government has nevertheless some thoughts concerning ways of executing the obligations it has taken upon itself. However, for the time being these hopes are not too great. Here it is worthwhile to remember that even the economic obligations of the Moncloa Pact, assumed in conditions of a much more favorable situation, were by no means fully carried out.

Moreover, the executive authority, one must suppose, realizes this. Not by chance, literally during the last days before the signing of the agreement, a cautious reservation was made to the government obligations: They will be carried out by the government only "on the basis of the legislation of the Russian Federation and within the limits of its powers." Thereby the success of the actions of the executive is closely linked to the preparedness of the parliament to cooperate with it and with the powers it will succeed in receiving.

By comparison with the original text, the removal of the idea of "an economic conference" from it must be recognized as a reasonable change. According to the original idea of the authors, such a conference was to have worked out "coordinated proposals in the sphere of economic policy." It was proposed to include representatives of both the executive and the legislative power, as well as trade unions and entrepreneurs. The parties, too, made known their claims to participation in the economic conference. One can imagine to what paralysis in the course of economic reforms the creation of such an organ would lead—an evident next "talking-shop."

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning one circumstance here: On the whole, in their majority, the government economic obligations are in the channel of market reforms. The authors of the document succeeded in resisting the pressure which, without a doubt, was exerted on them in the direction of the "socialization" of the agreement. Thereby the agreement fixes the attained political-economic level of the reforms and does not permit restoration tendencies, which, evidently, also made it unacceptable to the "red" opposition.

This is very important. Any accord must nevertheless have some central point, a base foundation, which is not called into question by either one of the sides. Today, the recognition of the fact that a change in the social system has taken place in our country can be and has actually become such a foundation. Already this alone makes the "Agreement on Accord" an important document.

The obligations of the trade unions reduce themselves, in the main, to the promise not to strike, except for concrete economic reasons. The entrepreneurs pledge to do what any entrepreneur who has not lost his faculties and

is not a swindler would do: Not to stop production without necessity and to fulfill his obligations to suppliers and buyers.

The role of the remaining participants of the agreement, evidently, comes most of all to the moral support of the main acting parties.

The Results of Trades

From a substantive, not a structural, point of view, the agreement underwent the most important changes in the past few weeks in the part devoted to the federative structure, which was previously called "Regional Politics." A whole series of fundamentally important provisions were deleted from it.

Thus, it was originally proposed that "the subjects of the Federation agree to the repudiation of the change of their constitutional statuses within 2 years." Now there is no such provision. Likewise missing from the agreement is the promise that "the constitutions, statutes and other legislative acts of the subjects of the Federation will be brought into conformity and newly elaborated in strict conformity with the federal Constitution." As far as is known, the main opponent of this restriction was the Tatar president, Mintimer Shaymiyev, who not so long ago defended the right of Tatarstan to its own constitution, which does not entirely link up with the federal one.

The bilateral agreement with the federal authorities concluded by Shaymiyev, evidently, also induced the remaining subjects of the federation, the republics first of all, to insist on the withdrawal, from the text of the agreement, of the moratorium on the signing bilateral agreements about the delimitation of the subjects of jurisdiction and powers between the federal and regional organs of power.

All this is the evident price that had to be paid for the regions' support of the agreement on accord. Has the price been raised too high and to what extent—still remains to be seen. For the time being there are rumors to the effect that even the president of Chechnya, Dudayev, is examining the possibility of joining the agreement—rumors that appear not completely improbable and sooner speak in favor of the concessions that have been made. Nevertheless, the resistance of the regions even to potential restrictions of their rights should serve as a serious warning to the federal government: The support on the part of the regions will not come automatically.

Another significant difference of the original and the final variants of the agreement concerns questions of security. The original variant put emphasis on reform of the army and navy and, in the final analysis, on the transfer of the armed forces to a professional basis. In the final text there already is no mention of anything like that. The question of the army as a separate subject in general is virtually absent in the agreement. Only the necessity is proclaimed of "strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of the activity of the power structures."

but, judging by the context, here they sooner have in mind the so-called "law enforcement organs."

This is supported also by another place of the agreement. Still on the eve of the signing, the draft retained the obligation of the Federal Assembly "during the current year [as per text] to create the necessary legislative basis . . . for the execution of reforms of the law enforcement organs." At the very last moment, the word "reforms" was replaced by the word "strengthening." It is not clear to what degree "the organs" are responsible for this important change, but the impression has been created that it was to a considerable degree.

Thus, in the lack of desire to reform themselves the "power structures" manifest touching unity.

Some innovations in the agreement clearly represent "address" concessions, such as, for example, the promise of the government "to create acceptable economic conditions for the operation of the agroindustrial complex." This promise is among those that were put into the text literally at the last moment—at the obvious demand of the "landowners" [agrarii]. One must suppose, the hopes that the "landowners" as a result of such a concession will nevertheless sign the agreement were retained to the very last moment, for the promise in the agreement was retained, in spite of the splendid absence of the "landowners" among the signatories.

With satisfaction it needs to be noted that they judiciously removed from the final variant the demand, addressed to "every member of society", to "tirelessly confirm" religious values, as well as "to propagate the primordial spiritual and moral traditions of Russia." Thereby the next draft "on the introduction of like-mindedness in Russia," fortunately, was not carried out.

Also omitted was the obligation of the parties "not to utilize the assessment of the events of August 1991 and September-October 1993 as grounds for intensifying confrontation and resistance." Evidently, however, it was clear that any such assessments of these events call forth a confrontational reaction with one side or another—the memory of them, which has by no means receded into the past, is too fresh. So that to be silent about these events in this situation was the only way out.

It would have been a good thing also to remove from the text the strange passage about "simplified and insulting assessments of the past"—for the same reason. Our recent past is too dismal to take it under such high protection. I would like to find out from the authors of the text: What assessment of that past precisely would they consider "insulting?" Self-pardon is not the best method for overcoming the past.

Reality or Illusion?

In completing the signing ceremony, Yeltsin said that henceforth the "Civic Accord Agreement" has become "a reality of Russian life." I am afraid that the desirable is here given out to be the real.

I think that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy was not right when he called the agreement harmful. The leader of "Yabloko" suggests that the present forcing of events will prevent the president in the future, when this will really become possible and necessary, to conclude such an agreement again—there are steps which cannot be taken twice.

There is, of course, no harm from the agreement. Moreover, it can entirely exert a certain beneficial influence in the direction of mollification of the political nerves. The central idea of the agreement—the necessity of civic peace—is indisputable, the majority of words in it are correct. The repetition once more of good wishes cannot bring any harm. It appears that the very process of the development of the text of the agreement has led to some rapprochement of the positions of its participants—thus, for example, the balanced conduct of Ivan Rybkin, who overcame heavy pressure from his party comrades, calls forth unquestionable respect.

What is worse is something else. Most likely, already in the near future the passions in regard to the agreement will be forgotten, as the agreement itself will happily be forgotten. This is already now clearly indicated by the reaction of society to the triumphant event: According to the results of a public opinion survey, immediately after the signing of more than 52 percent of those surveyed regarded it with indifference or did not have an opinion of their own.

Such a reaction is understandable. The "Civic Accord Agreement" can become "a reality of life" only when it fixes trends that have really ripened in society. They indicate that society has grown tired of confrontation. But tiredness is not yet accord. All agree that "to live in this way is impossible," but unity about how for all that people should live, unfortunately, has not yet come into being.

Thank God that the strange idea of Shakhrai—to adopt the Agreement on Accord" as a federal law—was not accepted. If this had been done—the agreement could not escape becoming the double of the sadly famous resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers" with their endless "to pay special attention", "to intensify," and "to concentrate." As if accord can be planted by order from above, like a potato! Or like corn.

The agreement will be useful if it does not give rise to unjustified hopes and, following them, bitter disappointments. Disappointed politicians are inclined to make inadequate decisions that strike society with pain.

Sometimes a Protocol on Differences Is More Useful

In the light of what has been said above, a list of names of the signatories or of those who refused to sign, is certainly not so important. The real conduct of these or those will hardly be determined by the presence or absence of their signature under the agreement. And nevertheless the position of the parties [to the agreement] represents a certain interest.

Without a doubt, a significant factor is the refusal of the communists to join the agreement. Personally Zyuganov, who has already tasted the sweetness of the corridors of power and who has internally prepared himself to find a niche for himself in the system, possibly, would also have signed the agreement. He already repeatedly gave signals that he is prepared to transform himself into a social democrat of the parliamentary type for the sake of admittance into the Areopagus of the decision-makers. But the party, which has brought him into the Duma, decided differently, and to resist it Zyuganov, in contrast to Rybkin, did not have enough spirit. However, Zyuganov could not act otherwise—he understands that outside his party he represents a political zero.

The decision of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has clearly determined its place in the Russian political spectrum—next to the National Salvation Front and Anpilov's Working Russia members. The Communists refuse to accept in the agreement the fact which is basic in it—the recognition of the reality of the change of the social system in Russia. They cannot reconcile themselves to this. Thereby they have determined their political future: Either to continually secure their influence through confrontation, or to disappear from the political scene. For Russian politicians to forget about this would be foolish.

In fact, a sort of "protocol of differences" precisely setting forth the positions of the parties [to the agreement] was signed. Such a "protocol" is also useful, as the understanding of political reality is always useful. By contrast, games of the appearance of accord in the absence of a real will to it are extremely dangerous.

Accord cannot be unlimited. Otherwise it is transformed into unprincipledness.

Several days prior to the signing of the "Accord Agreement, on 23 April, an, in my view, extraordinary event occurred in Russian political life, which nevertheless passed completely unnoticed. On this day, the newspaper IZVESTIYA published a verbose article by Zhirinovskiy, with an exposition of his political program. I shall recall that by decision of the last congress of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], the leader of the party was given extraordinary powers, and, henceforth, the statements of Zhirinovskiy are not the opinion of a private individual, but the official position of the party, which has now adopted the name LDPR-PZH [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—Party of Zhirinovskiy]. And so, among the many pearls of this programmatic party article, which I am not inclined to examine here, is the following: "It is necessary to 'close' down the autonomous republics, oblasts, etc., and immediately reestablish the guberniya headed by a governor. And in so doing not hold any discussions. Quickly, rigidly, by means of a corresponding edict, dispatch the sovereign presidents who do not want to become transformed into governors to suburban Moscow dachas for a 'discussion.' Let them rest, eat smetana [sour cream], watch television, only don't let them leave the territory

of the dacha in the interest of their security. After a couple of years they will leave—it will already be a different country. And without a drop of blood."

Well, as far as blood is concerned—that we have already heard: Vladimir Volfovich intends to make his way even to the Indian Ocean on tanks without a single drop of blood, proceeding from the "realistic" assumption that no one will start to resist him. But here in essence the procedure of "dispatching to dachas" described by Zhirinovskiy is called the internment of leading statesmen, and the passage as a whole is a call to a coup d'etat.

The act of Zhirinovskiy, committed by him on 23 April, clearly qualifies according to Article 70 of the Criminal Code of Russia: "Calls for the forceful change of the constitutional order." According to Article 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia is a democratic federative law-governed state with a republican form of rule: Through the "closing down" of the republics, the constitutional federative basis of the state is fully destroyed. Internment—quickly, rigidly, and without discussions are an unequivocal act of force.

Thus, the leader of the second largest parliamentary party group in the Duma, endowed by his party with the powers to formulate its policy personally, in the heat of the discussion of the final variant of the "Civic Accord Agreement," declares his intention to carry out a coup d'etat in the near future. And the only reaction of society in so doing is the limp answer in that same IZVESTIYA of Otto Latsis, ridiculing Zhirinovskiy, like Khlestakov!

The procuracy is silent, which in its time under pressure of the public had instituted proceedings against Zhirinovskiy in the matter of the propagation of war, but now is clearly trying to have this case disappear in the sand.

Also silent are the other parties and election blocs, the "colleagues" of the LDPR-PZH in the Duma are not conducting indignant parliamentary inquiries and are not declaring protests. Mr Gaydar, the defender of democracy, Mr Shakhrai, the defender of federalism, how are we supposed to interpret your silence? Or do you also share the view that all this is only inoffensive shameless bragging to which one cannot but call attention? But then, what reasons do you have to expect that people will take seriously the parliament, where you sit next to Zhirinovskiy?

Silent are the "sovereign presidents", the very same who intend to intervene, and, not even having wiped off the spittle from their face, place their signature under the "Accord Agreement" next to the signature of Zhirinovskiy? This is difficult to fit into consciousness.

And after this you want society to place hopes on such an agreement? In such a situation the accord looks like connivance.

Zhirinovskiy does not conceal his ultimate political ambitions. In his dreams he already sees the longed-for

moment prophetically described by A. K. Tolstoy in the unforgettable "Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiyskogo" [History of the Russian State]:

"And, having climbed up to the place of Boris, this impudent fellow, out of joy with the bride, he began to dangle his feet."

If this, God forbid, will happen, then not civil peace, but full-scale civil war will become the reality of Russian life. In the grown-up Russian society, forces are announcing themselves that no longer under any circumstances will resign themselves either to the railway cars for dissidents "to Taymir, the last stop—tundra", or to the "b'oodless" dashes to the south. Closing the eyes today to the appeal on the part of political adventurers, we are sowing the seeds of tomorrow's civil war.

The country really needs civic accord. And not for two years. To secure it, not demonstrative, but realistic and principled actions are necessary. It is impossible to allow for political deluge to begin "after us."

P.S. A number of days ago, appearing on radio with commentaries concerning the signing of the agreement, I expressed the opinion about the dangerous game set forth above, which the leader of the LDPR-PZH is playing. Soon after this, I received a call from someone who called himself "colonel of the tank forces" from the "army in the field" and promised that in the near future I will be "crushed" (by a tank, one must suppose?).

We are not talking about me—I am an elderly person who has long since ceased to be afraid. But then what about civic accord? Not invite to the signing of the "Accord Agreement" also the "forces" who killed Ayzderdzis? It goes without saying, having amnestied them beforehand.

ZAVTRA on Election Violations

944F0744A Vladimir ZAVTRA in Russian No 14,
Apr 94 p 1

[Report by DEN Security Service: "Agents of Influence in the Duma. Russian Watergate"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission report on the parties and coalitions' campaign spending in the 12 December elections to the Duma has been sent to the State Duma chairman. An extremely interesting document!... Having perused it, we, the voters, have a right to say:

"Russia's Choice and Yabloko [Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc] deputies, surrender your mandates and leave the conference hall! You were elected to the Duma with the help of foreign capital!

"Lukin! Whose 10 million did you bring from America?

"Chernomyrdin! Your ministers have been bought by Western companies!"

Russia's Choice spent 2 billion rubles[R] on the election campaign. Yabloko—R400 million. (For comparison: the communists—R100 million, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]—R100 million).

List of legal entities with foreign participation that contributed the money:

TO RUSSIA'S CHOICE

Privately-held joint-stock company [AOZT] with foreign investment Akar; AOZT with foreign investment Iberika; Soviet-Turkish SP [joint enterprise] Rosintex International—R3 million.

Russo-British SP AOZT Sky Lane. Founder: Greenfield Trade Consultants Limited (Great Britain)—R20 million.

Publicly-held joint-stock company [AOOT] Olbey-Diplomat. The founder: AOZT Olbey Concern, one of whose founders is the Soviet-American SP Interkoys [as transliterated]—R130 million.

Joint-stock commercial bank Stolichnyy. Founders: innovation-commercial NKP-Bank (Kharkov), cooperative bank Galitskiy (Lvov)—R154.8 million...

TO YABLOKO

AOZT Viamond Ltd. Founder: Viamond Group S.A. joint-stock company—R30 million.

AOZT Torgovlya i Kredit. Founder: Intercore Company (United States) trade enterprise—R10 million.

Joint joint-stock company Inotek (Russian Federation), whose founders are the Orion-System science and production center of the Soviet-Austrian SP Orion; Soviet-American SP Lyubava; the Mundus company (Australia); Sinus Technologies company (United States)—R10 million.

Joint-stock commercial bank Optson. Founder: Soviet-Singapore SP Solaz—R10 million...

The proteges of foreign capital in the Duma: Yavlinskiy, Petrakov, Igrunov, Adamishin, Averchev, Shostakovskiy, Gaydar, Chubays, Filatov, Poltoranin, Bunich, Avin, Yushenkov, Danilov-Danilyan, Denisenko, Saltykov, Nuykin, Yakunin, Shabad, Sidorov, and other less "well-known" deputies from Russia's Choice and Yabloko.

As a reminder: Article 32 point 3 of the "Statute on the Elections to the State Duma in 1993" says:

"...Contributions from foreign states, organizations and individuals, Russian legal entities with foreign participation, as well as international organizations and international public associations, are not permitted."

Approved by Edict No. 1557 of the President of the Russian Federation on 1 October 1993.

Kryuchkov on Security, Opposition

944F0744B Vladimir ZAVTRA in Russian No 14, Apr 94 pp 1, 2

[Dialogue between former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and ZAVTRA Editor in Chief Aleksandr Prokhanov; place and date not given: "Vladimir Kryuchkov: 'National Security Is at Zero Point'"]

[Text] [Prokhanov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, in my perception you are one of the last Soviet statesmen for whom the collapse of the Soviet Union was a personal tragedy. At the stages immediately preceding the destruction of the great power, you began to actively and openly voice your position. In August 1991 you undertook a last desperate attempt to avert this disintegration—an unsuccessful attempt, for which you paid with a year and a half of incarceration, suffering, humiliation, and political ostracism.

You must sense the existence of a certain design aimed at the destruction of the Soviet Union. There are conspiracy models, a plot theory circulating in our patriotic circles. In part, it appeals to me, although I understand very well that it is difficult, for instance, to draw up a blueprint of a superplot sometime at the beginning of our century and then consistently, methodically implement it. Of course, there was a general trend of efforts aimed at the destruction of the Soviet Union, and within it there existed numerous doctrines, micro-projects, and merely operations of our opponents. Some were successful; others collapsed after encountering our ability to defend ourselves.

Speaking in the language of mythology rather than intelligence or political science: There existed a certain design for destroying the USSR. It included such tasks as, for instance, squeezing the Soviet Union out of global zones of confrontation: Africa, Asia. It contained a score of programs aimed at weakening our geopolitical belts in Central and East Europe. It definitely included the weakening of our military potential, removing parity status through unilateral disarmament, and absolute military collapse. It also had built into it the destruction of state structures, in particular the military.

Very little is known about the Soviet Union's withdrawal from East Europe, how the communist pro-Soviet regimes collapsed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, and about the unification of Germany. Its unification was accompanied by propaganda slogans based on so-called "universal human values." In my opinion, however, unification in Germany more than anything else potentially holds a tremendous danger for the Europe of the 21st century, including Russia. Did Gorbachev and the State Security Committee take into account the potential consequences of this unification; and generally, how did the Soviet Union leave East Europe?

[Kryuchkov] Looking at the conspiracy model you described, in reality everything was simpler and at the

same time more complex. More complex in the sense that we did not sort out right away the deep-seated internal and external factors that led our country to tragedy. And simpler because plans to destroy our Union have indeed been developed and implemented, because the West saw a danger to itself in the existence of such a powerful state.

Strictly speaking, the West did not conceal these plans. Moreover, there are our own, domestic figures who only recently were bragging that they had something to do with it, and that they contributed to what has happened. Seeing the latest events in the country, they became less vocal, though, because now the moment of reckoning is coming. I think the time will still come when these people will be held to answer.

I remember my conversation with former CIA Director Gates, which took place in Moscow in 1990. He said then: "Mr. Kryuchkov, would you like me to give you a very interesting report, from which you will learn what will be happening in your country in the year 2000, at the point of transition to another century?" I said: "Of course." He promised to send me the materials, and I promised in return to put on paper my perception of global problems. He never sent the materials, but, as I learned later, among other things the report said that in a year or two the Soviet Union would no longer exist.

When the head of state security gets this kind of information firsthand, it tells you a lot. Our intelligence officers also reported that it was commonly expected in the West that the plan to break up the Soviet state would succeed in the near future. And our own analytical evaluations as well led us to sad conclusions. As KGB chairman (and before that, chief of foreign intelligence for almost 15 years), I openly told Gorbachev in 1989, 1990, and 1991 of the impending danger.

The trouble was that this man never told the truth. He hedged, dodged, and agreed: "Yes, yes." But no measures were taken, and everything was sliding into an abyss. Moreover, some of his actions did not fit with the notion of actions expected of a statesman, whose responsibility it was to take care of society and to try to forestall tragedy. The country was going through a succession of failures, but instead of holding the defense, and occasionally going on the offensive, all we did was retreat, retreat...

The events that took place in the heart of Europe at the end of 1989 are something we will long remember. Even in the West the reaction to them was not at all uniform. In December 1989, President of France Mitterrand came to the GDR on an official three-day visit. And this at a time when the GDR already was falling apart; groups of youth from West Germany were attacking the building of the Ministry of State Security, and rallies had been held in some cities for the unification of West and East Germany.

Of course, Mitterrand was well informed of the current events, but he wanted to demonstrate his goodwill stance toward the German Democratic Republic. The point is that neither France nor England were ready to see the GDR absorbed by West Germany. They thought it would be a slow process, within the framework of general

European integration, in a form that would not affect its future in any way. Because both France and England know what a powerful unified Germany means...

I cannot say that the processes were totally unexpected for us. The unexpected part was only that they rolled in so swiftly and that the leadership of the Soviet Union completely resigned themselves to it. I do not want to say that I was not related to it at all. I raised these questions. If you dig into documents you will find very alarming KGB memoranda addressed to Gorbachev, in which we warned of what could happen.

As to Gorbachev, they valued him tremendously in Germany; he was later declared a "No. 1 German" in West Germany. By the way, Helmut Kohl said these notable words at the time: Germans should not miss the chance of unification, and that chance is a result of the fact that Gorbachev is at the helm of the Soviet Union.

You know, this was not just surrendering positions—it was a real capitulation that happens only in the most serious defeat. We fled not only from the GDR but also from other countries, without a thought about our short-term interests. We welcomed German unification—in reality, the absorption of the GDR—without attaching any conditions to it. We abandoned our property; we abandoned our friends, who had been with us for 40 years, on whom we drew for support and who helped us; because it is hard to tell who gave more over the last few years: we to the GDR or the GDR to us.

Then came the arrests of intelligence officers and statesmen. Erich Milke, minister of security and Hero of the Soviet Union, is in jail now—a man who put his entire life on the altar of internationalism, the altar of Soviet-German friendship. Some other friends from the Ministry of State Security are in jail on charges of horrendous crimes; and in general, many GDR statesmen are in prison for allegedly committing crimes against Germany. While all they did was carry out their duties as citizens of the completely independent state of the GDR—recognized in the world and, among others, at the United Nations... I think this is not the end of it all; there will be more. Because Germany already has revised the outcome of a world war once, and it cost us alone 27 million human lives...

The story of the GDR is an ignominious page in our history, a shameful page, possibly with far-reaching consequences. If we continue to remain so unwise, this may do tremendous damage to our vital interests. You know how we lost many friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and many other places...

I am not saying that Germany will definitely go in a direction fatefully detrimental for us. This depends on many factors. But if we continue to remain in our current state, whether we want it or not this will whet the appetite of other countries. And we should not expect altruism in this respect.

[Prokhanov] It so happened that I went to Germany the day an aircraft carrying the ill Honecker was leaving for the Soviet Union from the same airport. He was coming to our country for treatment, but in reality he was flying there to a future of captivity, disgrace, humiliation, and arrest, perhaps knowing deep in his heart that this is exactly what awaited him. Gorbachev betrayed his trust—as he did with other allies, effectively surrendering them to enemies and tormentors.

This is what I am thinking about, though. In 1945, when the Russian Army entered Berlin and Europe was still smoldering in the ashes of war, Stalin, together with the other leaders of victorious countries, carved up Europe, established borders, and accomplished a change of a social system in the countries of East Europe. What immense, if perhaps tragic for the population, measures were implemented across the entire enormous expanse from the Baltics to the Black Sea! A geopolitical design was implemented which, as rumor goes, had existed even before the war in the mind of Tarle, who read Stalin his treatises, his essays on a pan-Slavic union in Europe by the end of the 20th century...

What I am saying is that after the war a superorganizational design was implemented, the result of which was the emergence of a pro-Soviet Europe. So why have all these efforts—military, economic, geopolitical—been nullified overnight? After all, there was already an entire generation of Czechs, Poles, and Germans with values and a psychology that the West Germans, for instance, still cannot grind out...

One would think that such failure can be sustained only as a result of a strike, a crushing military defeat—of the kind that happened, for instance, to the Germans in 1945. We were fleeing from there as if we were under the fire of nuclear cannons and a strategic bombers' strike! As it turned out, however, it all happened after one or two trips by Gorbachev—one to Reykjavik, another to Malta. Somebody said a few words to somebody; somebody promised something to somebody; somebody shook somebody's hand in the quiet of an office; guarantees were given; perhaps an immense amount of money was paid, some immense promises made to Gorbachev...

Why did one word of Gorbachev's all of a sudden prove stronger than the entire huge mega-machinery of the Soviet presence in Europe? What was it that they whispered to him, promised him? For me, as a writer, this is a mystery and a subject for a plot. What do you think?

[Kryuchkov] There is one factor I would like to start with in answering. As you know, in 1990-1991 the system of governing our country, the decisionmaking mechanism, was changed. When we had Article 6 of the old Constitution, which formalized the leading role of the party, the most important issues, including those of foreign policy, were decided exclusively in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. When we rejected the leading role of the party, we needed to replace the Politburo with

another organ rather than leaving complete control over everything to one person—the president, no matter how much of a genius he might be. And Gorbachev was not such a person anyway. This gave Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and other persons the opportunity to make decisions without the support of legal norms and collective will.

At the end of the war, when we were drained of our lifeblood, had lost tens of millions of people, East Europe, changed from a territory hostile to us to a friendly one. And when the processes of forming states with a new sociopolitical system began, there was no opposition. In the years following the war we quickly restored the ruined economy. This was a brilliant victory, perhaps as great in significance as the victory in the Great Patriotic War. In 1948-1949 we already reached the prewar level, and in 1950-1951 we began to bring on line plants, entire industrial complexes, electric power stations. The nation returned to life. We again became a great power the world had to reckon with. This said that the socialist system had not exhausted its possibilities but had just begun to approach them. We took the road that promised peace in Europe, and people understood this very well.

I think that by all these deeds and accomplishments we built at the time a very serious margin of security for many decades and made good use of this margin. Our state had a huge safety margin. Our gold bullion alone amounted to 2,500 tonnes in 1953. Ask how much gold we have now. You will get an answer that is simply demeaning for us.

We should look for answers to far-reaching questions in two directions. First, in our system, in our governing mechanism, the national leadership—that is, objective things. Second, we should give subjective factors their due. First and foremost the procedures for electing our presidents, evaluation of the possibility or impossibility of placing authority in their hands. This is a very important issue, and many countries have long insured themselves against all sorts of flukes. We, unfortunately, left a multitude of loopholes for these accidental things, and will pay for this more than once.

[Prokhanov] Being a writer and a free artist, by a certain logic I found myself plunged into a journalistic battle when an all-out campaign began against the Soviet Army. I was amazed at how an army that has established control over half the world, is capable of sending aircraft carrier groups into every ocean and sending global control orbital stations into space, found itself defenseless against those who were destroying it in front of our very eyes! I remember: All of a sudden a theory was advanced that the Soviet Army is a source of thermonuclear threat, and the entire population was horrified by the possibility of the start of World War III, while the military was seen as the devil incarnate. I remember how it came out that the army was being called an army of parasites; when all our economic troubles, the insufficient percentage of protein in our nutrition, were being blamed on it: That it

had allegedly exhausted our economy and eaten up our development potential. The military was accused of cruelty, of propagating ruthless, antihuman, almost brutal customs...

I jumped into this battle, tried to explain that the military is the concentrate of statehood, the guarantor of world stability, and if we have no world wars it is only because the Soviet Army is strong. I tried to show that a Soviet officer, with his ethics based on sacrifice and service to the people, is the standard of public service to the country... A lot of insults were heaped at me at the time.

One of the latest phases associated with the collapse of the Soviet Army were the so-called "set-ups." The army was sent into zones of internal interethnic conflicts, in particular, Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius, while at the same time a certain dual policy was conducted.

One originated at the center, in particular, from Aleksandr Yakovlev, and encouraged in every way nationalist movements in the republics; people's fronts were springing up; our party leadership secretly met with their leaders and coddled them in every way. These people's fronts were a force that strived to seize power from the republic parties, from the republic leadership, and very serious conflicts were arising on these grounds.

Another one was when the same center sent troops into the zone of conflict to suppress this unrest. First a wound was inflamed; then the steel probe of the army was sent, the wound was stirred up even more, and the result was a nationalist explosion. Use of force is very traumatic for the population; it incites them. An entire nation would rise up against the central military leadership. Then the military was called back and, having first established order, it withdrew in humiliation.

The reputation of the military both in the republics and the Union was dropping to zero; commissions were set up, like Sobchak's, or the one with the participation of the writer Vasilyev. The military was traumatized, it was demoralized, and the winners were regionalism and separatism.

Could you, as a person associated with intelligence, security, get a feel of all these mechanisms at the time? What was your perception of all these conflicts: Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius? Who was the "architect" of this tragedy?

[Kryuchkov] I remember very well how you fought for our military. I greatly appreciated your efforts then, and remember them now with gratitude.

In 1990 Academician Arbatov began to say that our military budget considerably exceeded that of the United States. This was an outright lie. The U.S. budget at the time exceeded \$300 billion, while ours was 70 billion rubles [R], but even then the dollar and the ruble were not comparable in weight. The attacks on the military pursued a single purpose: to knock out one of the most

important pillars of the state. Of course, not everything was ideal in our military—there were a lot of shortcomings...

At the same time, the military-industrial complex already in 1990 produced up to 100 percent of the output of certain categories of civilian products, in particular, television sets and washing machines; that is, even then it was not a burden to the state. In 1990 the Soviet Union accounted for more than one-third of global arms sales. Currently the United States' share is 38 percent, while quite recently it was only 18 percent. See who we have surrendered to?!

Attacks on our military were being conducted in all directions, and I think that those who set as their goal to destroy it have achieved this to a considerable extent. In the level of combat readiness our current armed forces are hardly capable of deflecting any aggression. This is very serious.

This "setting up" of the military began under Khrushchev. Remember the Novocherkassk events? Later, whenever a difficult situation arose, military units were moved to forward positions.

In 1988-1989 events were brewing in the Caucasus, and again military units were activated there. Then came Karabakh, Lithuania, Baku, and so on.

In Tbilisi, for instance, the army was cleverly set up in the interests of certain circles. Georgian forces were fighting for power. In order to avoid doing this themselves, they drew the armed forces into the conflict. I am fully convinced that this was not done without the knowledge of the highest leadership of the party and the state.

In January 1991 the situation in Lithuania heated up so much, taking such an unpredictable turn, that it came to direct clashes on a massive scale. The forces that came to power took a position against the constitution of the USSR of the time and of the republic itself, and took a course on secession from the Union in a way not envisaged by the law. And the forces that wanted to prevent the violation of the constitution, that supported the Union, were subjected to direct persecution and repression. They had a moral right to defend themselves. Then the military units stationed in Lithuania decided to ensure minimal order, to forestall potential bloodshed. They were carrying out only protective functions.

I remember very well the materials of the investigation. It followed from them that the casualties were killed and wounded not by the military but by other persons who were in the crowd, who were provoking the unrest, which was used by the reactionary forces in the republic as a pretext to start more active actions and as a result achieve their goals.

The subsequent development of events in Lithuania fully confirmed this. I think that A. Yakovlev's trips to these republics at the time also played their role. Every time

they were followed by an explosion of actions against the center, against the constitutional order. It is apparent that his hand showed in this, too.

I once wrote in one of my articles about the actions of certain individuals who were beginning to destroy our Fatherland, and I will not take back a single word. I think that in terms of destructive force, in terms of exerting a corrupting influence on many aspects of our life, the main credit should go to A. Yakovlev. I cannot tell what drove him in the beginning: strictly personal traits, vanity, or something else, but in any case many of his actions were not in any sense in the interests of our state.

[Prokhanov] I think that the history of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the current post-Soviet history are replete with mystery. History in general is a hierarchy of mysteries, most of which never come to the surface. Among the mysteries of the last decade is mentioned, for instance, the disappearance of the so-called party—essentially, state—gold. It is believed that there is still information on the highest leadership of the Soviet Union kept in secret safes that tells of their recruitment and their connections with secret, closed Western organizations.

One such version, circulating to a very limited extent in intellectual circles and very cautiously mentioned at seminars and symposiums, concerns a certain German project nurtured in the Soviet leadership, involving an infusion of a large quantity of capital into West Germany and concealing this capital from the public. This capital allegedly was accumulated by German business and controlled by people from the Soviet Union for the contingency of post-Soviet history, when it is to be returned here, to our space, to nurture a new authority, a new generation of statesmen on the basis of a Russian-German alliance.

Allegedly, already then a certain convergence of economies, of future financial systems, and future policy had begun. And one can see a trend toward rapprochement with Germany in today's convulsive political process. Among patriots, for instance, some are anti-German, while the others are pro-German. For instance, Zhirnovskiy openly proclaims a Russian-German alliance. Behind all these statements—speeches, hints, innuendoes—one can detect the formula of that early Soviet-German project.

Do you know anything about this, have you heard about it?

[Kryuchkov] I think your question is based to a certain extent on reality, but this is also a fruit of mythology. The actions of U.S. politicians are driven by one set of interests; our politicians are guided by other interests—if they are pro-Soviet, of course; the French have their own, the Chinese and Japanese—their own... These interests engender both certain alliances of forces, and their lobbying. Under Stalin, any lobbying was out of

question. Sometime in the 1960's, however, under Khrushchev, we gradually began to practice a rather broad system of lobbying.

It is time to tentatively identify our lobbying groups, without bringing up actual names at this point. I think that we have a pro-German lobby, a pro-American, pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, and pro-European one; then there are branches of the above that do not play a significant role.

[Prokhanov] The only lobby we do not have is a pro-Russian one.

[Kryuchkov] Speaking of what you have in mind, I think that such a pro-Russian lobby is undergoing a revival today; it is getting stronger and broader. I believe that in a very near future it will proclaim itself loudly.

Our lobbying does not operate by the same rules as in the West. The pro-Japanese lobby in the United States, for instance, spends enormous sums of money, makes major investments in economic sectors that are interesting and profitable for Japan. Our lobbies operate gratis. I am deeply convinced that the Germans, Americans, and others do not invest billions in lobbying in order to realize their ideas. On the contrary, they are pumping money out of our country. Because the aid that goes to Russia and some CIS countries—if one can call these crumbs aid—is generated through the theft taking place in our country. Tens of billions flow abroad, and at best only a few million come back.

I have heard of this Soviet-German myth, and I am convinced that all this is not true. The Germans may, of course, spend some money to support the German communities in our state, to develop some or other sectors in our industry, to set up some training. But there is not and will not be powerful support for our pro-German lobby or billions in investment.

Where have our reserves and wealth disappeared? A very simple thing is happening in this respect: At some stage we engaged in self-consumption. We permitted industrial production to decline, permitted inflation. Since the 1990's corruption has been spreading rapidly. In the past we had a foreign trade monopoly; today this would be our salvation. So why is our oil today sold by private individuals? Should not the state be doing this? What is happening is real squandering, real theft...

As to the party money, I will tell you: Had there been, let us say, massive embezzlement of party money, a massive outflow of the party gold to a foreign country, I can assure you that the KGB certainly would have heard something about it.

[Prokhanov] In your communications you constantly contemplate the problems of security, formulating its concept in classic form, creating a hierarchy of different levels of security, including cultural and intellectual. Its foundation, however, is still geopolitical security, the balance of world powers. Russia cannot be considered

today a certain subject in a geopolitically finished form—this is meaningless. Today's Russia cannot formulate its security without measuring itself against, identifying itself with, neighboring Ukraine. It cannot formulate its security without the sense of its presence in Kazakhstan all the way to the Chinese border, without a perception of its historical and geopolitical unity with Belarus, which pushes the border of Russia's defense to the Polish border.

What is your opinion of Russia's strategic interests?

[Kryuchkov] To my great regret, I have come to the conviction that today's Russia is essentially not vital as a state. We have never been in such a grave situation with respect to security. We are currently vulnerable literally from all sides.

Take our borders. Finland, the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China, Japan, the United States... It so happens that our borders have become disputable—at least we hear such voices from the other side of our borders. Before 1985 nobody raised such issues. The Soviet Union was a mighty superpower. Now all of a sudden everybody has simultaneously started voicing claims on our territories; even the Baltic countries have raised this issue. It has reached the point of direct provocations at borders.

When there was a great Soviet Union, we could security defend one-sixth of the world's territory. First, our population comprised almost 300 million; second, we had strong industry and science. Our positions in East Europe, Asia, Africa, and some Latin American countries permitted us to be certain of our security. Nobody touched us. I think we could be "busy" with peaceful labor for another 50 years. Generally speaking, nothing and nobody threatened us. Now the situation has changed.

Look to the east. Japan lays claim to Kuril Minor range. This is a serious claim, and the Japanese stand firm on it. They do not say that they will resolve this issue by force. But under certain circumstances the situation may become very unfavorable for us, and we will be helpless to do anything.

We have reasonably good relations with China now. But China has never said that it does not have any territorial claims against us. Moreover, not the entire border is marked. Therefore, while giving due credit to the sensible policy of the current leadership of China, can we be sure that its next generation will hold the same course?

Take the West. I think that the Germans would be well served if they do not forget the lessons of history and remember Bismarck, who understood the significance of Russia for Germany and nothing cast a shadow on our relations. But there also were two world wars. History has a peculiar trait—it repeats itself. If certain forces in Germany return to a militarist policy, is there someone

to keep them from taking ill-considered steps? Moreover, there may be some who are interested in channeling Germany in a certain direction. I cannot understand the United States and the British, who are aware of this danger but so far remain silent.

Our south also is very dangerous. We had strong positions in Afghanistan, but the situation has changed. There are countries with which we absolutely have to be friends. I mean India—our natural geopolitical ally, which has a stake in good relations with us. There is a large group of countries in Asia which we can regard with great optimism. These are so-called minor countries that already play an important role—South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines...

We had strong positions in Africa, and some used to say: What are we doing; why are we there? But let us think about it once again. Our expenditures there were minimal, while we did derive a certain profit. In addition, this was where the struggle was conducted for political positions at our remote outposts. Now we are approachable—almost to the heart of Russia...

We also had good relations developing with a number of Latin American countries. We had active military cooperation with Peru, and due to this factor alone we were receiving up to \$1 billion of net profit. And generally, Latin America is a very promising continent from the standpoint of our geopolitical situation.

Unless there is sharp progress in the very near future in relations with CIS countries, unless we take the road of close integration, the situation will become very difficult for all of us. Still, I am an optimist and I believe that this process will begin, and Russia, together with parts of the former Soviet Union, will create a society, a state entity, that will ensure our collective security.

There is currently a certain imbalance in the world: Some countries are coming to the forefront, some are receding, but sooner or later everything will stabilize. We would be ill-advised to believe that all of this will happen on its own. Nothing of the sort! Without human will, without the will of the leadership of certain countries, this is not going to happen.

[Prokhanov] And what about such a problem for Russia—and many other countries as well—as the Jewish problem? The Jewish factor played an enormous role in foreign and domestic policy in the former Soviet Union and in today's Russia. At certain times it went under the surface, took on a coded form, and then at some point it would suddenly become a priority, and entire political groups mulled over it. Sometimes the Jewish problem held the threat of a global catastrophe—as it did during the Arab-Israeli wars in the Near East.

Today the Jewish problem is delineated by an internal drama, the Russian-Jewish conflict at ideological, cultural, and ethnic level, as well as the drama of the Russian choice in the Near East. Traditional groups of Arab countries still see us as a potential ally who

betrayed them at a crucial moment. Israel, on the other hand, is the strategic ally of the United States, with which today's Russia has established long-term relations of partnership. This mysterious triangle, or if you wish, polygon, today grips human passions and destinies. Enormous energies are being burned in this regard, and completely unproductively.

How do you see the Russian-Jewish issue, the political factor of Russia and Israel in the context of 20th century history?

[Kryuchkov] This question does have peculiar aspects. The explanation to them is in the history of the Jewish people, their difficult road in the struggle for survival. For thousands of years Jews were a relatively small nation in a far from friendly environment. They not only survived, but increased their numbers and in the end achieved the formation of an independent state. In a historical sense, Russia has long been a motherland for a considerable number of Jews. According to the 1897 census, half the world population of Jews lived within the borders of tsarist Russia.

Over the last couple of decades not everything was smooth in relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. Problems arose with respect to Jewish emigration, and this gave rise to arguments, confrontation, and misunderstanding. Currently this problem has been removed. And I do not see any other problems that could somehow seriously damage Russo-Israeli relations.

At the same time I believe that a society cannot consider itself healthy if it produces, for instance, anti-Georgian, anti-Ukrainian, anti-Belarusian, or anti-Jewish attitudes. But this is a two-edged process.

Over the past few years we have had no direct anti-Jewish manifestations. I remember that when I was KGB chairman we received warnings of potential anti-Jewish pogroms. We checked them out and never found anything to them. Apparently what we are dealing with is not some anti-Jewish manifestations but simply disagreement with some or other aspects of Israeli policy toward, for instance, Arab countries. In my opinion, it has not been optimal. Lately, history has demonstrated that there are healthy forces in Israel; there are smart people who understand that it is necessary to move into a broad front of development of Arab-Israeli relations. And this viewpoint now prevails.

I do not think that Jews in the Soviet Union are in a position of an oppressed ethnic group. Nothing of the kind. They hold decent positions in all spheres of administration, industry, agriculture, medicine, science, etc. Moreover, I think that there are certain extremes in this, too, but this is happening for the reason of certain special traits of their character and partly because of the complacency of Russians.

I think that some persons of Jewish nationality are making a serious mistake. They frequently go too far in labeling some or other political figure an anti-Semite.

This is not always so. For instance, speaking against certain aspects of Tel Aviv's policy does not mean one is an anti-Semite. Speaking against certain actions of persons of Jewish nationality here does not mean one is an anti-Semite, either. In the same way one can speak against Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Belarusians, but this does not mean that this person is anti-Kazakh, anti-Ukrainian, or anti-Belarusian.

I think that the process of creating a better atmosphere for the development of relations between Russia and Israel must proceed from both sides. Israel and Russia have serious reasons to speak of the compatibility of certain interests in the geopolitical structure of the world. And in this respect we absolutely cannot orient ourselves toward individual persons of Jewish nationality. I, for one, will never judge the position of all Jews by the actions and deeds of, for instance, Minkin, Plutnik, and some others.

This is far from full compatibility, of course, but it would not be in the interests of either country to disregard it.

[Prokhanov] I propose that we come down from geopolitical heights back to our sinful earth.

On one hand, it seems to me that the current regime, having gone through phases of crises, in a way has suddenly come to its senses and begun to take steps towards stabilization in Russia. Attempts are being made to stabilize the sociopsychological atmosphere by all these charters of reconciliation, through state regulation of the economy. There are attempts to stabilize the situation at the border. There is talk about military development, increasing military orders. We, people of the opposition, should appraise all this positively. Hurt and insulted, remembering all the wounds and traumas dealt us by the regime, we still should not reject outright all these actions aimed at stabilization.

On the other hand, against this background, which to a large extent is only being proclaimed, we see again some steps towards destroying the remnants of Russian statehood. This involves the system of security, everything that used to be called the ministry of security and now has become the Federal Counterintelligence Service. People come to me from these agencies, people who have left, been fired, have fled, been thrown out—they are horrified at what is being done to this last bulwark of Russia's security.

What is your opinion of what is happening in your former domain, the Committee for State Security, and what this organism is being turned into? What does this mean for the state and the country?

[Kryuchkov] Yeltsin's latest steps, aimed at reaching an accord, were manifested impulsively earlier as well, in the form of occasionally dropped phrases, because you cannot keep threatening and act only by enforcement methods. I think the explanation is simple: The regime

has found itself in a very difficult situation; many see it as hopeless, and therefore they undertook such steps in the interests of survival.

But I also think that those to whom this accord is being offered would be wrong not to use this opportunity to ease the hardship of life for our people. It is another matter what the proposal will be. We have to look at it.

Problems related to state security are closer to me. I could anticipate and have anticipated many things, but what has happened in our Fatherland has exceeded my worst expectations. In August 1991 the first reorganization of the KGB took place; at the end of 1991—the second; then the third... I have lost count. We need to organize not just reliable security but also make it economical. Everything that is being done currently is not economical. Because these organizations have not become smaller numerically—they have simply been dispersed into different corners. There is no system now in dealing with security problems, and this is impermissible. There are apparently considerable means allocated to it, considering the disastrous state of the country, but the entire system of security—and this is the tragedy—is subordinated not to the interests of the state but those of a certain individual. How long can this go on? A year, two, three... Sooner or later it will all collapse anyway. Intelligence has been separated; counterintelligence, communications, protective units, technical services, border troops have been taken out of the total structure of security; that is, everything is fragmented.

Until August 1991 everything was a single mechanism; we were at a level necessary to deal with problems of security associated with the country as a whole. Now this does not exist. We know that thousands of skilled personnel have left the organs; new ones have come, poorly trained—they have different selection criteria there now: apparently loyalty toward the regime rather than professional skills. In the past the most important thing for us was attitude towards the Motherland, this was a sacred notion. In the past, we had duty—another sacred notion. Now everything has shifted and lost shape. The system of security—broken up, dismembered, drained of its lifeblood, stripped of cadres—is unable to deal with the tasks it is facing. Those who will inherit this component of our statehood, or rather its bits and pieces, will find themselves in a very difficult situation.

How do we solve security problems? We have to work on this fast, because intelligence operations against our country continue, the drug business is growing, international organized crime is active, smuggling is running wild, our secrets are swimming away... There are some secrets that are worth billions of dollars, and they are being taken from us almost for free. While the organs, drained and destroyed, are expected to fight all this.

[Prokhanov] The country is living through, as we say, a systemic crisis. This is the crisis of the socium in all its manifestations. Among the directions in which it is

developing there is a power dimension. We are living through a crisis of authority. In normal constitutional societies this is resolved by changing the cabinet, leadership, course. The losing team gives way to another one through constitutional forms.

In our country this is apparently precluded. All crises since 1991 have been resolved by methods of force. I have a feeling that this power crisis, as it grows rather than diminishes, must produce a cascade of similar power catastrophes. It is not accidental that the whole society was traumatized by rumors of a state coup. Society did not treat it as another canard because the idea of coups is hanging in the air. We are waiting for them and practically inviting them.

Does your experience, your intuition, tell you that these coups are becoming a norm in our troubled times?

[Kryuchkov] I think we are dealing here with a very troublesome phenomenon which perhaps no other country has had to face. Efforts are being made to make our public, our people, get used to everything that is unusual in normal life, even unnatural, impermissible. For instance, a change in a social system occurs either as a result of a revolution or with the consent of the entire nation. In our country one sociopolitical system has been changed or is about to be changed without asking anyone. Moreover, we had a referendum on 17 March; we had a Union—they simply broke it up. Also, without asking anyone. Force is being used in dangerous dimensions. Last year will go down in history by its October tragedy, during which hundreds of totally innocent people died. We had one coup, then a second, a third... Now there is talk of the probability of another coup. One gets the impression that there is a group of people trying to find a way out of the crisis by the same method of force.

I do not think that Yeltsin necessarily is the source; there are other people. They want us to get used to the idea that an enforcement structures' strike against the forces that allegedly are plotting a coup is a logical thing to do. This is the most dangerous method of resolving the problems we now face. And at the same time they exhort us to reach a peaceful accord...

I would like very much for Russia to get rid of such cataclysms, and look for a constructive way out of the crisis situation. But I am afraid that interested forces may provoke an attack against those who do indeed stand for order.

ZAVTRA Holds Opposition Gathering

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14 May 94 p 3

[Article by Viktor Khamrayev: "Opposition Leaders Once Again Demanded Unity: General Makashov Offered His Services to Our Lord"]

[Text] Unity will be finally nailed down in the end of May by convening a "national assembly;" the State Duma will support "our guys;" the working class, having discovered the unpaid wages, will wake up from its hibernation and, forming a solid union with the peasants, intelligentsia, and Barkashov's confederates, will walk out on a general strike, the crowning of which will be restoration of the power of the soviets and the fall of the regime of "Judases and Pilates." This was the main theme of the literature and arts evening held on Thursday by the ZAVTRA newspaper at the Izmaylovo indoor complex.

The evening began with declamation of poems, spiritual canticles, and folklore collectives' performances, which formed an integrated musical-poetic composition and was over while the spectators continued to fill the 4,000 floor and bleacher seats in accordance with purchased (at 500-2,000 rubles [R] each) tickets. The soundtrack of tolling church bells announced the beginning of the official part, and a large group of leaders of right and left, radical and centrist opposition, whose speeches made up the contents of the evening, walked up to the podium. The master of ceremonies was Aleksandr Prokhanov.

The first production number was Aleksandr Rutskey. The former vice president informed viewers that the disparate forces of the opposition have been brought together not by thirst for power but thirst for a decent life. Mr. Rutskey expressed his pain for Russia, which has lost its status of world power because of "Kozyrev and Yeltsin's foreign policy course," which Aleksandr Vladimirovich, with an apology to the listener, called "bastardly." Then he emphasized once again his desire to celebrate the next 9 May under Soviet power, which, in Mr. Rutskey's conviction, will represent people's power in the 21st, 22d, and 23d and all subsequent centuries."

Communist Party of the Russian Federation leader Gennadiy Zyuganov complained that over the years of reforms the communists were left "without leaders, without money, and without office space;" noted that "the communist idea is the Russian idea;" and informed the audience that "we have hundreds of newspapers, our own administrative and economic managers," and insistently demanded of all other leaders that they complete mutual consultations before the end of May and convene a "national assembly," which will work out a program of joint action.

In the opinion of Aleksandr Nevzorov, one can clearly see that "we definitely have a majority in the State Duma." In the deputy-reporter's words, three-quarters of the Duma members will shed a tear "at the sound of the Soviet Union's national anthem." The only ones who continue to support the enemy camp are the "dem-schizophrenics," whose typical representative is Gleb Yakunin.

The only woman among the speakers—nun Angelinya from Serbia—exhorted Russia: "Wake up!" Being

"God's bride," the nun insisted on turning "the secret was between Americanism and the Slavs, between Zionism and Orthodoxy, into an open war."

Albert Makashov brought his own unique flavor to this evening of literature and arts; he was introduced by Mr. Prokhanov as the author of "Suvorov's expression": "...neither mayors, nor sirs, nor herrs [peckers]." Drawing a historical analogy between the October events of last year and the Kronshtadt and Tambov rebellions, the organizer of the storming of the mayoralty and Ostankino said no agreements on any accord with "Ye-Be-eN" [Yeltsin's initials, which, when spelled this way, form the Russian equivalent of "fucking"] are possible. Then, having dashingly rapped out: "Yes to the Russian government! Yes to the Russian economy!"—Mr. Makashov moved on to the spiritual sphere, imparting on the audience his prayer to the Lord "to kick out of the Kremlin the crooks, prostitutes, thieves, cosmopolitans, and other scum." "And if you are too busy, Lord," he continued his tale, "then let me do it!" Albert Makashov volunteered to give "his knowledge, his strength, and his rank" to the leader who will be able to unite the entire opposition. In conclusion, the general informed the audience that he "has the honor" and "serves the Soviet Union."

Others who voiced their support for the idea of a unified opposition with a unified ideology and one leader included Ilya Konstantinov, Sergey Baburin, Cossack Captain Viktor Morozov, the amnestied "minister of defense" Vladislav Achalov, the "glorious GKChP member" Vasilii Starodubtsev, and Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, who sent to the gathering his written address. According to Aleksandr Prokhanov, words of solidarity were received from Aleksandr Barkashov, who could not attend for reason of poor health; Valeriy Zorkin, who "probably was delayed by a traffic jam;" and others.

The final coda was delivered by Viktor Anpilov. The RCWP [Russian Communist Workers Party] leader announced the precise date for the all-Russia general strike—it has been moved to 21 September—and proposed to hold a "primary round of presidential elections" by distributing among the population the list of candidates from all opposition parties and movements. The winner, in Mr. Anpilov's design, will become the sole candidate from the unified opposition at the official early presidential elections.

With this, they parted. The spectators leaving the Izmaylovo indoor complex were offered at the door the purchase for R1,500 of ATTACK—the first issue of the first Russian nationalist magazine with a swastika on the cover. The magazine, according to those selling it, is intended "only for Aryans" and those "in whom the lack of Aryan blood line is compensated for by great-power spirit." "Black shirts" were offered a R200 discount.

Party Roots of Extremists Viewed

944F0738A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
20 May 94 p 2

[Article by Ernst Chernyy, member of the Civic Chamber under the Russian Federation President, expert for the Association of Independent Professionals and candidate in geographical sciences: "On the Hobby-Horse of Nationalism One Can Ride Only Into the Abyss"]

[Text] Anyone who wanted to could, and probably even now still can, buy on the street a copy of the newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK (No. 9, 1 December 1993-January 1994) and learn from it that point 5 of the "code of honor" of the Russian National Unity provides that: "A fellow brother-in-arms, being a full-fledged representative of the Russian Nation, is obligated to restore justice in regard to the Russian people through his power and his weapon, *without appealing to judicial and other institutions*" (here and henceforth the italics are mine—E. Ch.). Point 6 of this same code explains: "The brother-in-arms resolves any questions guided only by national legal consciousness in accordance with the powers and authorities granted to him by the Chief Brother-in-Arms, and *is not subject to any other laws*." The most remarkable Point 3 of the code states: "Any encroachment on the honor and dignity of a brother-in-arms is a *crime* against the Russian nation." So there you have it! What is this—megomania or someone's angry will, which wants to turn the country into a theatre of military operations? Point 14 of the code declares: "A brother-in-arms is obliged to always remember that *Russia has no friends*. One who forgets this becomes a traitor." This is medieval blackness... Yet it is so similar to that which the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the KGB [Committee for State Security] were in their time able to do with our country, turning it into an enemy of the whole world! On the next-to-last page of this newspaper, from the text of this oath which appears very much like a military one, we may learn that a brother-in-arms is obligated to keep military, *national* and state secrets. A national secret—this is something altogether new. We did not experience such a thing even under the leadership of the CPSU and the KGB. And since there are national secrets, then, naturally, we must "have a cautious attitude toward all persons of other faiths and toward foreigners." In short, it is a textbook of hate. And this at a time when the United States has put an end to racial discrimination, and when the last country of classic apartheid, the Republic of South Africa, has embarked upon the path of racial conciliation. In our country, along with the outward fascists, it is the communists who have taken the national idea into their arsenal.

The formation of pro-fascist organizations began as early as the mid-80's, with the blessings of gorkom [city committee] and raykom [rayon committee] functionaries. The CPSU and KGB began to formulate groups

which had the outward appearance of different directionality, and on which they could subsequently rely. When the appointed hour struck, the confusion of the true CPSU and KGB leaders was short-lived. All went to their pre-arranged "apartments"—the various parties, movements and fronts. They scattered, like some animal from a fantastic fairytale which breaks into many miniature copies of itself at the moment of danger. Perhaps only the main headquarters of this party and the levers of control are hidden from prying eyes. However, it is unlikely that this evokes any doubt among attentive observers regarding the existence of a well-managed system. The strong anti-democratic communist-nationalist newspapers have also been preserved: SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, PRAVDA, ZAVTRA and many other smaller ones.

Very indicative was the emotional phrase of GKChP [State Committee for Extraordinary Situation] Oleg Shenin (former CPSU Central Committee member), upon the announcement of cessation of work at the last session of the court: "The USSR shall be restored!" As they say, they will not haggle over the price. And the effort to unite the former Soviet republics will be similar to the effort to bring all the powderkegs to one place—closer to the bonfire.

Without troubling themselves over the reasons for the disintegration of the USSR, the national-communists, finding their scapegoats in the democrats, essentially never understood why the country fell apart. Yet A. Solzhenitsyn knew about this even 40 years ago, and not only knew, but wrote about it in the "Archipelago" [Arkhipelag GULAG] which, unfortunately, not that many of our fellow countrymen have read. (Otherwise, perhaps, the elections last December would have gone quite differently.) Aleksandr Isayevich wrote the following: "Rulers change. The archipelago remains. It remains because this state regime could not stand without it. Disbanding the Archipelago, it would itself cease to exist." (Arkhipelag GULAG, part 7). The prophecy has come to pass: First they liquidated the terrible archipelago, and the rest collapsed by itself. The foundation disappeared. No, it was not Yeltsin who tore down that old building. It could exist only on the foundation of fear and camps. So, for a normally thinking person, the consequences turned out to be quite predictable.

The loud national-communist pseudo-patriots are calling Russia not to the future, but to the past—to the musty world of totalitarianism of reaction and terror. Yet Russia is a country just like Germany or France, except that it had fallen behind them by some 300 years due to the Mongol yoke and the extended feudalism which was associated with it, whose chains were broken only 130 years ago. It is easy to understand that mutual guarantee and communal land ownership were necessary to the feudal lords in order to keep people who had no rights under submission. When the bolsheviks came to power, they merely resurrected feudalism in a somewhat different form, replacing the landowners with numerous

party furers, and the commune with kolkhozes. Today the national-communists assure us that this is the "Russian way." That means they must again turn the people into a mindless herd which they can drive to conquer world supremacy, which the Zhirinovskiy followers need so much.

For this it is necessary to have enemies, both domestic and foreign. In order to find them, the musty national thesis is once again dragged out, remarkable in its primitiveness and maliciousness, as is, we might add, also the approach to the freedom of conscience—the intimate relationship of man with God, a sphere where considerable progress has been achieved in recent years. From the standpoint of the new specialists on freedom of conscience, the nationalists: "Freedom of activity of religious confessions, religious communities and individual cleriks will be provided only in that measure in which it strengthens the spiritual powers of Russians and those living in Russia."

Yet in pre-revolutionary Russia, the national question as such did not exist on a background of religious inequality. Today, in connection with the weakening of religion over recent decades, the ethnic torch is being fanned. We will note that among the irreconcilable active Russian nationalists we may find also the half-breed Zhirinovskiy, and this leads us to think that the fanning of the nationalist flames is primarily a political matter, and only at the lowest level—the level of the lumpenized masses—does it take on a primitive nationalist coloration.

Primitive because it would be laughable to speak of the purity of a nation where even the emperor and the nobility were not ethnic Russians. The lower strata of society were also not ethnically pure in a complete sense—the 300-year Tatar yoke stirred everything up. Those whom we today call Russians are a mixture of Eastern and Western Slavs, Mongols and Ugro-Finns, Khazars and persons of Scandinavian extraction, native residents of the North and Siberia and persons of Baltic extraction. There is a bit of everything here, and this, we must believe, is not a shortcoming, but rather an advantage. And so for this very reason, we should hardly seek out ethnic purity today among the citizens inhabiting Russia, even in the newspapers ZAVTRA and RUSSKIY PUT, and moreover prohibit mixed marriages and consider them a crime, as the RNE [Russian National Unity] program calls for. At the same time, it seems that one of the forms of racism—anti-Semitism—in many cases is still a definite means of achieving mercenary political goals. One such example is Zhirinovskiy. However, he is not the only one. Entire organizations such as the Russian National Council, the Slavic Council, the Union of Russian Communities, and the Front for National Salvation, not to mention the openly fascist organizations, are shamelessly exploiting Russian nationalism for their own political purposes.

Those who are busy searching out domestic enemies can divide citizens into those who are more and less Russian.

Therefore, today we should fight not for the rights of nations, but for human rights. This approach is broader and guarantees protection for all. The tendency of slipping into the protection of rights by national or linguistic principle will more often hinder than help.

Nevertheless, the president and the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] as represented by Kozyrev and its other leaders are ever more often following the lead of numerous nationalistic organizations in speaking of the rights of the Russian and the Russian-speaking population, and not about the protection of human rights, as is directly provided by the Constitution. The protection of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens must be the specific case of protection of human rights everywhere, wherever they are violated. The success of international and national rights protection organizations and their actions has always been associated with the emphasis of attention on general human rights.

Ultimately, we must admit that the idea of statehood on an inter-ethnic basis is movement ahead, while the idea of national limitation is obvious backward movement, as proven by world experience.

In conclusion, here is one more quote from the "code of honor" of the Russian National Unity, which emphasizes the extremely aggressive character of the principles of this organization, excluding it from the political sphere and relating it to the number of openly terrorist organizations: "Persecution of foreign and domestic enemies of the Russian Nation, no matter how far beyond the boundaries of Russia they may be found, is a matter of honor for the brother-in-arms." We may draw our own conclusions. But who must be the first to draw them? And where, ultimately, are our wonderful laws which are called upon to defend civic peace in the country?

Freedom and democracy have come to us over difficult roads. Can it be that our imprudence, carelessness and irresponsibility will force them to leave our boundaries?

Shakhray's Political Moves Viewed

944F0738B Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
 in Russian 20 May 94 p 7

[Article by Aleksandr Protsenko: "Once Again, One Less Shakhray..."]

[Text] We may already compose proverbs about the resignations of Sergey Shakhray. Something like: "May has come—Shakhray has gone." This is because two years ago, also in May, Sergey Mikhaylovich had already submitted his resignation from the position of deputy chairman of the government.

At that time he left for the president's circle, to engage in the creation of the GPU [expansion not given], and returned to the government only after a year-and-a-half and "through the Caucasus," where he tried to smoothe

over the sins of another deputy chairman of the government, trying to somehow extinguish the fire of the Osetin-Ingush conflict.

Sergey Mikhaylovich recalls that voluntary resignation without any satisfaction. He says, "I demonstrated that I did not have a death grip on the minister's portfolio. And what did I have to gain? Only a sense of my own moral satisfaction from the fact that I showed character." There is some logic in this: When you answer for some serious matter, stop and think how your personal ambitions will be reflected in this matter. But quite recently, last December, Shakhray was once again deprived of the post of deputy chairman of the government, and this time not through his own will. (Chernomyrdin was ready to take him into his renewed command only in the rank of minister), and Sergey Mikhaylovich agreed, justifying his decision, among other things, by his desire simply to remain on the political scene: "If one expects a political future, one cannot absolutely distance oneself from power."

Five more months went by—and again a resignation. Again a voluntary one. "In connection with the appointment of a new minister for nationalities affairs and regional policy even without a formal consideration of the opinion of the deputy chairman of the government who deals with national and regional policy, I ask to be relieved of my duties as deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government."

So, think what you like about these politicians. He had just achieved Chernomyrdin's recognition, gotten back the deputy chairmanship, and was introduced into the Security Council. It is true, they deprived him of the minister's portfolio, but three other "deputies" also do not have one—Oleg Soskovets, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, and Yuriy Yarov. Yet Nikolay Travkin, who had just been brought into the government as who knows what, agreed to the position of "minister without a portfolio." Meanwhile, Shakhray retained relations with the mass media on the government line (the dream of any politician—to be in charge of the press!), interaction with public organizations and parties (i.e., the full opportunity to strengthen his own PRES [Party for Russian Unity and Accord] at state expense), and also no one removed Sergey Mikhaylovich from treatment of questions of national and regional policy.

"When they dismissed me from the deputy chairmanship, I stayed on to work because I had in my hands a ministry which is becoming a real instrument for implementation of regional and national policy," explained Shakhray. "For the first time the ministry had in its hands real levers—money—7.3 trillion rubles (R) for food to be brought into the rayons of the Far North, R40 billion for aid to Germans in Russia, R20 billion in budget funds for the national-cultural rebirth of the peoples of Russia..."

All of this was "hammered out" by Shakhray. And suddenly this was "all" given to someone else. And not

just to anyone, but in essence to his political rival—the head of administration of Krasnodar Krai, Nikolay Yegorov, with whom Shakhrai had long “not formed relations.” In such a situation, how can the deputy chairman of government be in charge of a minister if the minister occupies “an independent place in the structure of state power” (that is the status that Shakhrai was also “hammering out”), and who must even replace his own curator in the President’s Council on Cadre Policy—a position defined at Shakhrai’s request as being ministerial “in duty,” but not falling under the deputy chairman of government. In other words, now there are no real levers for influencing events in the country. It is true, there is a broad field of activity for political intrigues. Vladimir Shumeyko, for example, had been in such a situation and emerged from it with a large gain. And what about Shakhrai—did he become insulted?

“My resignation does not mean a departure to the opposition of the president and the government,” Shakhrai explained to journalists. “It also does not signify any personal insult, although I am also a human being and react to the situation as any normal person would.”

Here we should note in parentheses that the PRES leader did not coordinate his decision either with the party or with the party’s faction in the Duma. Even that Tuesday morning, Sergey Stankevich announced to journalists that the faction’s council had decided to forbid Shakhrai from leaving the government. At the same time, Shakhrai himself was already submitting his resignation to the chairman of the government. Which, it seems, did not make Chernomyrdin very happy. Although Viktor Stepanovich had to know what Shakhrai’s replacement with Yegorov in the ministerial post might mean. But...

“From a constitutional standpoint, the appointment and dismissal of ministers is the prerogative of the president. He can do so only at the written nomination of the chairman of government. These formalities were upheld, but no more than that,” Sergey Mikhaylovich explained certain details of his resignation from the ministerial post, clearly hinting that Chernomyrdin “was not to blame.” Then who was?

“I would like to hope that the appointment of a new minister is not associated with my directive regarding a financial investigation within the system of the former Goskomsever [State Committee on the Socioeconomic Development of the North], just as it is not associated with pressure by various groups in Krasnodar Krai and their representatives in Moscow,” Shakhrai stated in his supplemental announcement regarding the reasons for his resignation. This phrase can also be called nothing other than a hint. Especially its second part—about the “Moscow representatives of Kuban,” of which Vladimir Shumeyko is deservedly considered the leader (and, we might add, a long-time patron of Nikolay Yegorov). He has repeatedly announced that Boris Yeltsin “consults on cadre questions” specifically with him.

Then again, Sergey Mikhaylovich has a number of ill-wishers also in the president’s administration, which would itself like to manage and direct the policy in relations with the regions. Shakhrai believes that the presidential administration’s management of work with the territories must move away from petty patronage of the regions and concentrate on the development of political decisions, but... Even the chief of this administration, Nikolay Medvedev, who was recently removed at the demand of the governors, has once again been appointed as acting chief of this same administration. And the edict on appointment of a new minister in Shakhrai’s place was approved by Sergey Filatov, with whom Shakhrai recently waged a stubborn struggle over the conditions of agreement with Chechnya and over who, Filatov or Shakhrai, should head up the Russian delegation at the negotiations.

“In principle I never became one of the president’s own men,” Sergey Shakhrai said almost two years ago, after that first resignation. “They reconciled themselves with me, admitted that sometimes I would give sound advice and propose fairly good draft laws. But on a personal plane, I annoyed many...” We will add to this that Sergey Mikhaylovich “annoyed,” as a rule, not so much his enemies as the people whom he should have considered “his own,” people from the presidential command, from the governmental command. Even at the very beginning of his joint work with Boris Yeltsin, when there was a full opportunity to select the “lawful” Shakhrai as first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, he did not get to become even Yeltsin’s deputy, “and not without the ‘help’ of Yeltsin’s closest advisors” (Shakhrai’s own words).

Even later, working within the make-up of the Gaydar and Chernomyrdin governments, he often saw (or felt?) what steps were being taken by his supposed comrades in arms to move the competitor away from the president or the chairman of government. “It is not only the jealousy which exists in the apparatus that is unpleasant. It is much more unpleasant to encounter those methods which the apparatus is ready to use under the influence of this jealousy...”, admitted Shakhrai. But he did not go into detail, did not divulge the secrets of the “kitchen.” “I know everything—I will say nothing!”, he once waved reporters away at one of the press conferences.

Of course, politics has its secrets, and one who has “sold” them will later be shunned both by his own and by others. Yet one cannot help but ask: What is this “Kremlin kitchen,” if Shakhrai, who even in the Caucasus was more or less able to get along with the mutually hostile sides of the Ossetin-Ingush conflict, could not find even long-term partners in Moscow, in the “circles close to the ruling circles.”

It is true, he was not the only one. A recent study conducted by the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] Sociology Institute regarding the fates of the old nomenclatura in the current echelons of power showed how the “old tried and true cadres” are invariably returning to

their circles, and how the new ones are being forced out. Already today among those surrounding Yeltsin there are only 10.5 percent of the people who came to power with Yeltsin himself or during his time. Thirty-seven percent are still holdovers from the Brezhnev era, and 39 percent—from Gorbachev's. Even two years ago the picture was entirely different. But today there is a definition about the "newcomers" as being "democratic flies who have gotten bogged down in the thick soup of autocracy." Although by a large account, even among the "new flies" far from all are "democrats."

We might add that even quite recently the views of Sergey Shakhrai himself, with only a big stretch, could be called "fully democratic." It is enough to remember at least the draft law prepared by him in January of '92, "On Ensuring the Effect of Russian Federation Legislation," with its specific responsibility for actions contradicting the edicts of the president and the interests of the Russian Federation. "Under this law, if it were adopted now, one could today expand whatever one liked, political and physical annihilation of the opposition," the then-Minister of Justice Nikolay Fedorov said in horror, and ultimately persuaded the president to recall this draft law.

In Spring of that same year, Shakhrai prepared an analytical paper for the president, in which he proposed to Boris Yeltsin that he announce the possible declaration of a state of emergency in the country, although, it is true, in the most extreme case. A year later these recommendations became the basis for the famous OPUS [Osoboye Poryadok Upravleniya Stranoy—play on word "opus", meaning "work"]. And only now, it seems, has Sergey Mikhaylovich's militancy declined, and his desire to reach national and social reconciliation has increased.

Announcing his resignation, Shakhrai advised the president and the government to first of all "activate the Agreement on Civic Accord so that it would not remain merely on paper, so that the coordinating commission which is being created would force everyone who signed this agreement to really work..." Having listed several other points of the program of action which the authorities should have implemented "even yesterday," Shakhrai predicted that otherwise...

"...In July—the first wave of discontent in the defense industry collectives and the demonstrations by part of the military servicemen and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. The problem, it is true, will resolve itself thanks to vacations and summer in general."

"But as of August the situation may go into the next phase, under which Viktor Chernomyrdin will have to retire. Moreover, he will himself have to announce his retirement so as to diffuse the situation in society as a whole and in the State Duma in particular. Efforts at coordinating the Duma of the new prime minister—and there are only three real candidacies: Luzhkov, Soskovets and Skokov—these efforts under conditions when

the Duma will be "revving up" in opposition to the president, will lead to activation of the scenarios for disbanding the Duma with an effort to announce new elections. Or more precisely, to put off the elections altogether in view of the low activity of the population."

"But suddenly it will turn out that the Duma does not intend to disband itself. The Federation Council, upon change of the role of the government and the relationship between the government and the president, will go over to the president's opposition. And the October-December scenario, when the radical opposition will act under the principle of "the worse it is, the better," raising up the people to a social riot, may repeat the worst variant of October of last year..."

This is what Sergey Shakhrai predicted, stipulating, it is true, that this is the "blackest" of all possible scenarios, that the president, government and parliament will not allow such a thing. He personally remains an optimist and even intends to go on his scheduled vacation.

Until August?

Skokov Appeals to Independent Deputies

944F0738C Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 May 94 p 7

[Article by Oleg Zhironov: "Skokov Shows His Cards"]

[Text] On Tuesday, the former secretary of the Security Council, and currently the chairman of the Federation of Goods Producers of Russia, Yuri Skokov, made a secret visit to the State Duma.

His hour-and-a-half long speech to the members of the deputy group, "New Regional Policy," about which only this group had been given confidential notification, was presented behind closed doors, without "outside" deputies or journalists.

Perhaps that is for the best. Skokov's evaluations of the other Duma factions and the lower chamber as a whole were rather unflattering. The State Duma is as yet "not a parliament, but a party club," a mechanical conglomerate of party factions which "are not accountable to anyone." On the contrary, the NRP ["New Regional Policy"] group, in Skokov's interpretation, is the bulwark and hope not only for parliament, but to a certain degree for all of Russia. Reminding them that he "took an active part in the stage of formulation of the group," Skokov called it the "nucleus, the beginnings of the structure of representative power in the entire country."

Such complementary interpretations ran through Yuri Vladimirovich's entire political philosophy and program of action. The fact is that he has a rather low opinion of the party system of current-day Russia in general. In his opinion, parties do not have serious programs and principles. They are created "under surnames" for the purpose of realizing the political ambitions of these "surnames." Therefore, there is no sense for Skokov, as any

rational and responsible politician, to build yet another party on the basis, for example, of the Federation of Goods Producers. Rather, it is necessary to create a "system of interaction" between deputies who share a single mandate and who have ties in the regions, with the representative and executive powers of the territories, the regional unions of the Federation of Goods Producers, and with the local intellectual and professional elite. This is the "non-governmental, non-state" technocratic—in opposition to the party—system, which can organize the country's emergence from its historic dead end. In the name of its development, Yuriy Skokov offered the deputies his cooperation "in any form," specially stipulating that it should not be limited to the field of lawmaking.

Having understood the sense of the proposed deal, the parliamentarians stopped to think. Despite the attractiveness of the proposal, despite the respect which they had for the name of the speaker, the "regionalists" were clearly concerned by the problem: What does Skokov actually represent in the political plane? Yuriy Vladimirovich, who previously expressed his readiness to run for president, this time avoided responding to the question of whether he sees himself as a future leader of the country. Then at least they would like to know what his "hosts and home fronts" are!

Skokov gave a rather detailed listing of the collective members of the Federation of Goods Producers which he heads up, noting that he includes in this category "all persons at the local sites who create material wealth." However, in response to the specific question of whether he has a group of persons capable of working with the NRP on the formation of a socio-political movement, he gave an expansive answer from which it followed that, in general, he does not have such a group. "Only individual persons are emerging." On the whole, however, the cadre problem is the most complex, and that is why he has appealed to the "regionalist" deputies.

It seems that after the "secret meeting," the parliamentarians understood what was wanted of them, but never did understand who stands behind Skokov. Is it only his legendary humility which explains the fact that he stubbornly stays in the shadows? Did he not rush to the deputy group as his last hope? Or, in fact, is this a leader who only needs some link, some Archimedes key, to turn Russia upside down?

In any case, it is obvious that Skokov has seen in the "New Regional Policy" more than simply a duma faction. Perhaps he has seen a sort of "micro-soviet of the Federation" in the State Duma, a channel of power for emergence into the regions which he lost when he left the post of head of the Security Council and did not find in the Federation of Goods Producers, which he currently heads up. And so he decided to make use of the actual and imagined potentials of the deputy group.

There are varying opinions about these potentials. Some believe that the NRP is a "union of unattached persons."

Others believe it to be a powerful government lobby in parliament. If the latter is true, then Yuriy Vladimirovich has presented his listeners with a serious choice. It is not overly disposed to the current government and its head, and criticizes it not only for its failures in the economy, but also "from personal positions." The Federation of Goods Producers long ago proposed that Chernomyrdin sign the "agreement on interaction," and even the president had a "rather positive" attitude toward this. However, the "government is silent." Therefore, Skokov, for his part, does not want to sign the Agreement on Civil Accord.

Thus, it has been suggested in cautious form that the Duma "regionalists" define themselves. It is hard to say how difficult this choice is for them in the ideological plane, since in any case it is not a choice in favor of "classic democracy." Because while Viktor Stepanovich embodies the power of the "director-privatizers" in the eyes of many, the outline presented by Yuriy Vladimirovich is a second variant of the "nomenklatura renaissance," which casts off as being unneeded the inalienable attribute of democracy—the leading role of the party in the political process.

And finally. Is it by chance that Yuriy Skokov's blitz-visit to the Duma coincided in time with the news of the resignation of Sergey Shakhray, a long-time rival of Yuriy Vladimirovich in the field of regional policy? Among the "regionalists" in the Duma, Shakhray enjoyed the authority of being a practical man who helped to solve specific questions of the territories. "With Shakhray one could discuss the problem of the 'norths.'" Now Shakhray is gone. Do you know this problem? One of the deputies asked Skokov. "I know it very well," he accepted the challenge.

RF Urban Population Polled on Political Leaders' Popularity

944F0754A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
26 May 94 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Shokarev, VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion]: "If We Were To Elect the President Tomorrow, It Would Be Yeltsin; Yavlinskiy and Zhirinovskiy Are Breathing Down His Neck"]

[Text] According to the data of VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion], obtained in the course of a survey of the urban population of Russia at the request of the newspaper SEGODNYA, if the early presidential elections were to be held next Sunday, approximately one-fourth of the votes would be distributed as follows:

Yeltsin	14%
Yavlinskiy	8%
Zhirinovskiy	7%
Rutskoy	5%
Gaydar	3%

The list given to the respondents also contained the names of other political leaders, which may be united into three groups:

First—the populist-democrats: Mikhail Gorbachev, Gavriil Popov, Nikolay Travkin, Anatoliy Sobchak and Svyatoslav Fedorov. 7 percent of the respondents were ready to vote for them.

Second—the pro-government leaders: Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergey Shakhrai and others. They collected 5 percent.

Last—the leaders of the irreconcilable opposition: Sergey Baburin, Gennadiy Zyuganov and Aman Tuleyev. Their supporters numbered 3 percent.

The other politicians collected an insignificant number of votes.

Around 15 percent of the respondents declined to answer the question.

Boris Yeltsin leads in practically all the socio-demographic groups. The only exception is managers, specialists, students and the unemployed. In the first group, Aleksandr Rutskoy is in first place, and in the next two Grigoriy Yavlinskiy is the leader, while unemployed persons give preference to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. This represents an alarming symptom, considering the possible sharp increase in unemployment already this year.

Among several of the groups, the leader of the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] edges out Grigoriy Yavlinskiy from second into third place. Thus, he is

preferred by men as a whole, blue-collar workers, persons with little education, as well as those with per capita monthly income below 50,000 rubles (R).

The former vice president is in stable fourth position, but among white-collar workers and students he is more popular than Zhirinovskiy. They place him in the third position, as do persons with per capita monthly income of from R100,000 to R149,000. We must add also that in such an important region as Moscow, Aleksandr Rutskoy is in second place, attracting the sympathies of 7 percent of Moscow residents. However, the positions of Boris Yeltsin are strongest in the capital—here 22 percent of the respondents are ready to vote for him.

Yegor Gaydar makes it into the top three only in groups of entrepreneurs and among persons with income above R150,000.

Table 1 presents the results in greater detail.

For the present day, the president maintains the leading positions among urban residents, yielding them in groups with low level of adaptation. Moreover, the democratically oriented "unadapted" persons choose Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, while Vladimir Zhirinovskiy wins out among those who have found themselves in the worst situation. These two politicians aspire to second place in the presidential race. Their chances of winding up in a hypothetical run-off are equal. Aleksandr Rutskoy, who was right behind the leader, i.e., the president, up until September of last year, has fallen behind and has been unable to regain the second position in the months following the day of dismissal. Yegor Gaydar has practically no chance to enter the finals. Even among those who voted for the "Choice of Russia" block in December of 1993, 40 percent gave their sympathies to Boris Yeltsin, and only 11 percent would vote for the leader of the block.

Table 1.

	First position	Second position	Third position
SEX			
men	Yeltsin 15%	Zhirinovskiy 10%	Yavlinskiy 7%
women	Yeltsin 13%	Yavlinskiy 10%	Zhirinovskiy 5%
AGE			
under 25 years of age	Yeltsin 10%	Yavlinskiy 7%	Zhirinovskiy 7%
from 25 to 40 years of age	Yeltsin 16%	Yavlinskiy 10%	Zhirinovskiy 9%
from 40 to 54 years of age	Yeltsin 13%	Yavlinskiy 10%	Zhirinovskiy 6%
over 55 years of age	Yeltsin 15%	Yavlinskiy 7%	Zhirinovskiy 6%
EDUCATION			
higher	Yeltsin 14%	Yavlinskiy 11%	Zhirinovskiy 6%
secondary	Yeltsin 13%	Yavlinskiy 10%	Zhirinovskiy 6%
lower secondary	Yeltsin 16%	Zhirinovskiy 12%	Yavlinskiy 6%
TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT			
entrepreneurs	Yeltsin 18%	Yavlinskiy 11%	Gaydar 9%
managers	Rutskoy 13%	Yeltsin 10%	Yavlinskiy 9%
specialists	Yavlinskiy 14%	Yeltsin 12%	Zhirinovskiy 5%

Table 1. (Continued)

	First position	Second position	Third position
white-collar workers	Yeltsin 11%	Yavlinskiy 6%	Rutskoy 6%
blue-collar workers	Yeltsin 10%	Zhirinovskiy 12%	Yavlinskiy 8%
students	Yavlinskiy 11%	Yeltsin 5%	Rutskoy 5%
pensioners	Yeltsin 15%	Yavlinskiy 8%	Zhirinovskiy 6%
unemployed	Zhirinovskiy 13%	Yeltsin 11%	Yavlinskiy 4%
INCOME			
under R50,000	Zhirinovskiy 10%	Yeltsin 10%	Yavlinskiy 7%
R51,000-R99,000	Yeltsin 17%	Yavlinskiy 10%	Zhirinovskiy 8%
R100,000-R149,000	Yeltsin 13%	Yavlinskiy 9%	Rutskoy 6%
over R150,000	Yeltsin 15%	Yavlinskiy	Gaydar 6%
TOTAL	Yeltsin 14%	Yavlinskiy 8%	Zhirinovskiy 7%

'The land was plentiful, but there is simply no order...'

Table 2 presents the structure of values which respondents consider to be the most important for Russia and its future. The first column presents the responses of all the population, the second gives the responses of those who at the hypothetical elections would vote for Boris Yeltsin, and so forth (see table). As we can see, the overwhelming majority of the respondents consider the most important thing to be "law and order and legality." This demand unites all the groups, with the exception of the supporters of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. If we consider that the latter put the need for a "strong leader" in first place, evidently they believe that if there will be such a leader (Zhirinovskiy), he will bring about order. Ranking second is the "social protection of the population," whose importance evokes practically no doubt in anyone. Here again, the supporters of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy comprise the exception.

The demand for "strong authority, a real leader," which is ranked third in importance, fully reflects the paternalistic tendencies retained in society. Then again, no one wants to reject such a concept as "adherence to human rights and freedoms," which 10 years earlier was no more than a "figure of speech."

We must remember that the proposed responses represent a certain stamp, but their meanings vary depending on the values of the respondent. The most obvious example of this is the attitude of supporters of Boris Yeltsin and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, on one hand, and those of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Aleksandr Rutskoy on the other to the concept of a "hard, freely convertible ruble." While the former believe that a convertible ruble may be achieved only under a "free market economy" (for them it is always more important than the "ruble"), the latter understand the "convertible ruble" as a ruble which is ordered to be convertible—a set ruble exchange rate and fixed prices. The concept of a "free market economy"

does not even enter into the top ten priorities for supporters of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Aleksandr Rutskoy.

Behind the concept of "good neighborly relations with other countries and peoples," there is hidden the well-known expression, "just so there is no war." It is interesting that the supporters of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and especially Aleksandr Rutskoy, are ready to part with such relations for purposes of "restoring the USSR and Soviet power."

One thing that draws attention to itself is the fact that the supporters of the leader of the LDPR—the only ones out of all the groups—believe such a concept as a "Russian national state" to be important. They have ranked it in fourth place, while for the others it is not even in the top ten priorities.

Summarizing all of the above, we may say that the proponents of one or another political leader are quite similar to their chosen candidate. Their collective portraits appear approximately as follows:

The "Yeltsinists"—compared with the population as a whole or with the proponents of other leaders—are more pro-market and pro-democratically oriented. The "Yavlinskiists" are rather similar to the proponents of Yeltsin, although for them "social fairness" is more important than "social protection of the population." In other words, they are populists to a greater degree than are the "Yeltsinists." The "Zhirinovtsy" are supporters of a firm hand and a Russian national state. However, they cannot be considered "red" in the same degree as the supporters of the former vice-president. On the other hand, Aleksandr Rutskoy is specifically the leader of the "reds," at least for the present moment.

The survey was conducted at the request of the newspaper SEGODNYA from 14 through 18 May, using a representative sampling of the urban population of Russia. A total of 1,620 persons were polled.

Table 2.

	POPULATION	Yeltsin	Yavlinskly	Zhirinovskly	Rutskoy
1	law and order and legality	law and order and legality	law and order and legality	strong authority, a real leader	law and order and legality
2	social protection of the population	social protection of the population	social fairness	law and order and legality	social protection of the population
3	strong power, a real leader	adherence to human rights and freedoms	social protection of the population	convertible ruble	strong power, a real leader
4	social fairness	strong power, a real leader	adherence to human rights and freedoms	a Russian national state	social fairness
5	adherence to human rights and freedoms	social fairness	strong authority, a real leader	social protection of the population	convertible ruble
6	convertible ruble	good neighborly relations with other countries	a true democracy	adherence to human rights and freedoms	restoration of a unified state within the boundaries of the former USSR
7	good neighborly relations with other countries	free market economy	free market economy	social fairness	restoration of Soviet power
8	free market economy	convertible ruble	convertible ruble	restoration of a unified state within the boundaries of the former USSR	adherence to human rights and freedoms
9	a true democracy	a true democracy	good neighborly relations with other countries	restoration of Soviet power	good neighborly relations with other countries
10	restoration of a unified state within the boundaries of the former USSR	restoration of a unified state within the boundaries of the former USSR	restoration of a unified state within the boundaries of the former USSR	good neighborly relations with other countries	restoration of a plan economy

Head Author Podberezkin on 'National Doctrine of Russia'

94P50151A Vladimir ZAVTRA in Russian No 16, Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Aleksey Podberezkin, head of the author's collective of the "National Doctrine of Russia" by Olga Sapozhnikova, date and place not given: "The 'National Doctrine of Russia'"]

[Text] This is the title of the voluminous work, prepared and published very recently by the RAU-Corporation. The president of this well-known scientific research organization and leader of the authors' collective Aleksey Podberezkin answers the questions of our correspondent Olga Sapozhnikova.

[Sapozhnikova] What basic factor influenced the publication of your book at such a complicated time?

[Podberezkin] In Russia today all the problems are closely intertwined: There cannot be economics without spirituality, there cannot be military security without ecological security and so on. The contemporary Russian idea with an answer to these questions should find its expression in the formulation of a national doctrine. (The Russian idea is more than a geographical concept—it reflects the interests of all citizens living on the territory of contemporary Russia and within the boundaries of the former USSR.) Our work

is an attempt to bring together and to show in its interdependence a strategic conception of the development of our state at the current time.

[Sapozhnikova] The "Russian idea" is a claim to a definite ideology. In the title of the book there are the words "National Doctrine." One recalls immediately the lexicon of American presidents. What is the genre of your book?

[Podberezkin] If one proceeds from the fact that a doctrine is an aggregate of officially adopted views toward common national goals and the ways to achieve them, then, of course, it is not an official document because it was prepared by non-official structures. It is more a practical attempt to inspire the process of forming a national doctrine.

[Sapozhnikova] What can representatives of the political establishment find in a book entitled "The National Doctrine of Russia?"

[Podberezkin] In our book the key feature is the development of the factor of spirituality as a condition for resolving all the remaining problems. To establish the priority of the problems, having determined them and analyzed their situation today, and to give some hardly inarguable variants for resolving them—that is our task.

[Sapozhnikova] Society in our country today is seriously splintered. How can your book influence this situation?

[Podberezkin] One of the most important tasks of our work is to show realistically this problem of society's splintering and possible prospects for overcoming it. The nation faces a choice: either we will develop according to the Georgian scenario, where the sides cannot come to an agreement and sooner or later a violent confrontation will begin, which acquires its own internal logic and in the end everyone forgets who fired first; or we will not have civil war. It is necessary to do everything so that the first variant does not develop. This requires serious efforts on all sides. Here the main difficulty is how and to what degree to arrive at a compromise.

[Sapozhnikova] A national doctrine begins with the fact that a nation forms for itself an ideal of development. You call spirituality such an ideal. But we are also split over the question of spirituality. There are forces who consider that Russia is an uncivilized country and that it is necessary for us to be integrated into "world civilization." And there are those who are actively seeking the ideal of spirituality in the 15th-16th centuries. As long as society will not achieve agreement regarding an ideal of development, the remaining problems will bear a secondary character.

[Podberezkin] Problem number 1 is the achievement of an agreed-upon spiritual ideal. We are Eurasian. From a geopolitical point of view we are located in the center of a continent, unique in its historical, geographical and cultural features, and we should work out our own model of development, our own world view. In it the primary role belongs to the spiritual factor, which is completely unrecognized by the supporters of the Western model of development. Our mentality will be formed on the basis of our historical and cultural traditions...

[Sapozhnikova] The "new Russians" don't think so.

[Podberezkin] A large part, but not all of the "new Russians" support the comprador model of development. These people take for themselves the values, let's say, of Austria or Holland. If it works out for one of them to become Austrian or Dutch, which, frankly speaking, I doubt, then good; if it doesn't work out, which I am to a greater degree convinced of, that person, whether there or here will be a foreign body.

The spiritual and ideological factors form the basis of the development of our state both in the future, and in economics.

If we use both of them, we will come to the unavoidable conclusion that we can solve economic and social problems. But now these factors are simply not taken into account. Financial culture, education, science, the current tax system—these are the destruction of the nation's spirituality, the destruction of the factor which can lead society out of the crisis.

[Sapozhnikova] A national doctrine is an all-society agreement. It presupposes the presence of a conscious group of interests. We have still not formulated them, the social structure of our society is changing: there are

the "new Russians," the criminal associations...How to move society toward a realization of its common interests?

[Podberezkin] An original conclusion from this situation was proposed in our work. If we view the political party spectrum according to its interests, we see that agreement is practically impossible. The interests of these strata are varied and it is very difficult to find a social-political basis on which to unite them. If we try to look at society according to a different spectrum, dividing it into a system of priorities of all-national interests, having removed the party factor of personality and ambition, society will be divided into two camps. The first are the state patriots, seeing their Russia as a strong great power with a developed economic structure, intellectually and economically independent. Therefore in this camp there will be some supporters of the president, of parliament, and followers of your newspaper.

In the second camp are the compradors. What Russia will be is all the same to them.

[Sapozhnikova] How did the work on preparing "The National Doctrine of Russia" proceed?

[Podberezkin] The first version of the work, presented as a document on the strategy of national security was conceived and completed in two weeks.

After the book was printed and we began to get reactions it became clear that the work was not finished. In the course of a month we produced its expanded version. Nearly 300 people, leading specialists in their areas, to a greater or lesser degree participated in preparing the final text (the creative collective directly). These experts are well known and recognized not because they have big titles or because they often appear on television, but first of all they are respected in their professional field. Among the authors is Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, a star of the first magnitude, and other well known names.

[Sapozhnikova] Did "Group Most" finance the work?

[Podberezkin] Not completely. The work was done on an equal footing, since our corporation took upon itself a large part of the financing. "Group Most" paid for printing. Without financial support we would not have been able to publish the book—there was not enough money.

Local Officials Raise Newspaper Delivery Costs

944F0738D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 May 94 p 1, 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent: "A Quarter Kopek for a Heifer, Transit for a Ruble; Some Heads of Administration Do Not Want the Public To Know Its Rights?"]

[Text] According to the presidential edict, all legislative statutes, government decrees and documents signed by the president become effective upon publication in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. That means free access to our newspaper is one of the inalienable civil rights. The censorship of the department does not exist today, but a

barrier which has arisen between the newspaper and the reader is the censorship of the pocketbook, which may also be administratively controlled.

The newspaper does not get to the reader by itself. It is delivered by mail. And in addition to the subscription price, the postal service sets its price for delivery. While the editors of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA determine the first price, the second is determined in each region independently. The 9,000 rubles (R) for half a year set by the editors does not cover expenses for maintaining and publishing the newspaper (a ton of paper today costs R780,000, and no one knows what it will be in 6 months). However, the post offices have a special methodology for computing the price to cover their expenditures.

Then what explains such sharp variations today? For example, in Samara Oblast (where K. Titov is head of administration) they charge R15,600 for delivery of RG, while nearby in Saratov Oblast (head of administration Yu. Belykh) it is R10,396. Since, according to the methodology, transport expenditures are among the primary components of the price for delivery, we can only assume that in Saratov Oblast the roads are better and shorter, and the gasoline is cheaper than in the neighboring oblast. Which is absurd if we remember Griboyedov's address in the "sticks" and the presence of well-developed oil processing and local gasoline in Samara Oblast. And how can we explain that in the neighboring Penza Oblast (head of administration A. Kovlyagin) they charge R4,500 for six months of delivery of our newspaper, but for the same operation with the "ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Collection" they already charge R30,000?

One more inexplicable difference is in the delivery to individual subscribers versus organizations. In Kaluga Oblast (head of administration A. Deryagin), offices are charged as much as R23,400 for the newspaper, while in Belgorod Oblast (head of administration Ye. Savchenko) they charge R12,000. According to V. V. Gogoleva, department head of the Federal Postal Service Administration, the newspaper is delivered to organizations with the aid of the GSP [city postal service] system, which is about two times more expensive than the ordinary mail. But why more expensive by different amounts? Viktoriya Viktorovna believes that prices are higher where the ordinary population is subsidized at the expense of organizations.

And here we must go from the postmen to the heads of administration. Since, in view of the open-field system of postal price lists, it turns out that, in places where prices are low, the administration knowingly subsidizes the delivery of a newspaper which publishes documents and commentaries which are of vital importance to all of Russia. We may say this about Bryansk Oblast (head of administration V. Karpov), where delivery costs R2,760; about Krasnodar Krai (recent head of administration N. Yegorov)—R4,668, and about Tuva (president Sheritool Oorzhak) and Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (Council of

Ministers Chairman V. Khubiyev). And in those regions where prices are high, the administration, frightening the public away from subscriptions, is facilitating the breakdown of all-Russian ties and in practice conceals from the citizens the federal laws and decrees, leaving them in the field of arbitrary activity of local authorities. That is what they do in Vologda Oblast (head of administration N. Podgornov), where the price of delivery is R18,510, in Mordovia (Council of Ministers Chairman V. Shvetsov)—R11,046, and in Moscow (Mayor Yu. Luzhkov)—R8,800.

However, the most pleasant thing is that in the places where the local authorities are truly active in a positive way, there no barriers are set for the governmental newspaper. Without any prompting, benefits have been introduced for subscribers in Kabardino-Balkariya (President V. Kokov), while in Kaliningrad Oblast, an isolated little island of Russia, they even solve the problem of employment with the aid of benefits. At the decision of the oblast administration (head of administration Yu. Matochkin), delivery is half as expensive for those newspapers which are printed in Kaliningrad itself.

We might add, about the press. We are even published in Cheboksary. However, there they charge both citizens and organizations the same for delivery—R22,800. Moreover, the price is the same for rural residents and for city residents living within 100 meters from the printing-house or the post office. While in Chelyabinsk, for example, the city price is R9,200, while in the oblast it is R15,594.

Government Officials' Pay, Privileges Examined

944E0829A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 May 94
Evening Edition p 2

[Interview with Valeriy Katukov, manager of the Department for Organizational-Technical Support of the Activity of the Government of the Russian Federation, by Yuriy Mikhaylov; place and date not given: "Privileges Have Ended. Forget About Them!"]

[Text] [Mikhaylov] It is known that the government staff has been reorganized. But what has happened to the traditional nomenklatura privileges of the current civil servants? We have fought for so long and fiercely against them that, in principle, we were supposed to have abolished privileges a long time ago...

[Katukov] If you will permit me, first about the reorganization of the staff of the Government of the Russian Federation. In our view, the staff has become more compact and significantly more efficient. A number of subdivisions have been eliminated, and now the staff of the Government of Russia consists of 17 departments and three directorates (juridical, organizational-technical, and record-keeping directorates) and the secretariats of the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and his deputies.

As for "privileges," let us agree on terms. Take a computer, typewriter, or a dictaphone for a journalist—are these privileges, or instruments that are necessary for work? It is generally recognized that "privileges" are a certain kind of additional or above-norm advantages or benefits, if you wish, that have nothing to do with the nature of the work. This relates in different degrees to a worker, a farmer, and an office employee, including a government official. Everything a government official needs, depending on the volume and nature of the work he performs, is stipulated and described in special documents.

[Mikhaylov] Telephone apparatuses with special communications were always the pride of the former party nomenklatura. As far as I know, they have not vanished even now. Who has the right today to use "secure government communications" with the state seal on the dial disk?

[Katukov] With respect to special communications, the circle of persons who have the right to use it is regulated by the "List of Positions of Managerial Workers of the Russian Federation That Are Furnished Governmental Communications."

[Mikhaylov] But precisely what is this kind of communications?

[Katukov] Precisely telephones of the government ATS [Automated Telephone Station] that are commonly called "secure government communications," which guarantee confidentiality in conversations both within the bounds of the city of Moscow and between cities (PM-communications—government long-distance).

[Mikhaylov] What are the staff salaries of senior government officials now?

[Katukov] Staff salaries are established by an authorized staff schedule. In accordance with this document, a federal minister has a salary of 312,000 rubles [R]. The rest of the existing percentage additions to position salary are for difficult and special work regimes and an addition for length of service similar to that which exists in other state institutions and enterprises.

[Mikhaylov] And what are the salaries of the president and the prime minister?

[Katukov] The staff salary of the president of the Russian Federation is R467,900, and of the chairman of the government—R422,400. Practically no government makes a secret of this, and ours is no exception.

[Mikhaylov] To whom in the Government of Russia is a personal car now available?

[Katukov] In answering your question, I would like to note immediately that the question concerns official motor vehicle transport exclusively. On the staff of the Government of the Russian Federation this right is possessed by chiefs of departments and directorates, managers of the secretariats of the chairman of the

Government of the Russian Federation and his deputies, and assistants (advisers) of the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Mikhaylov] And the ministers?

[Katukov] Federal ministers and the directors of other federal departments of the Russian Federation also have the right to use official motor vehicle transport year round in accordance with the nature and volume of their work. As a rule, this is a Volga GAZ 3102 or GAZ 31029.

[Mikhaylov] But some ride in Mercedes? I wonder who?

[Katukov] Still fresh in our memory are the times when an enormous number of government ZIL's and Chayka's—which the people called "member-carriers" [chlenovoz]—were driven around Moscow. The picture is different today. It is no secret that the operation of that same armored government ZIL is not comparable to the financial costs of the foreign make that you mentioned and is not in the domestic limousine's favor. The assignment of a Mercedes to higher staff personnel is made through special decisions. This decision was made in the Government of Russia with respect to the first deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and the managers of federal, commonly so-called "power," ministries and departments: Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

[Mikhaylov] And who is supposed to have a security guard?

[Katukov] Guaranteeing the safety of senior government officials also presupposes a security guard for the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, his deputies, and the managers of the "power" ministries and departments mentioned above.

[Mikhaylov] What is happening now with the former fourth Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health? At one time its splendid polyclinics served the party elite. And now?

[Katukov] If you have no objection, I would make a correction—not only the "party elite" but also workers of the central staffs of the former CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.

At the present time it is the Medical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation that serves the workers of the central staffs of the Federal Assembly, the president's office, the government, and the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Court of Arbitration, and, also, as before, a number of institutions of culture, science and education, and specific individuals whose services were especially noted by the state.

[Mikhaylov] But what about government dachas? Who is now supposed to get a year-round suburban dacha?

[Katukov] The existing "Statute on Procedure for Granting Accommodations for Rest in Dacha Communities and in Pension and Rest Homes" provides for year-round paid use of dachas. This right is given to those officials who also get an official vehicle. The exception are assistants (advisers) to the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation who are granted rest accommodations in the summer period.

[Mikhaylov] And ministers?

[Katukov] Ministers and managers of federal organs of the executive branch also have the right to year-round use of dachas that are within the jurisdiction of the administration of affairs of the president of the Russian Federation, but their deputies do not.

In addition, the area granted is in accordance with the size of the family, and payment is in cash.

[Mikhaylov] What is the situation now with distributors for special clientele? I have in mind special food rations, special sections in GUM [state department store], and special shops.

[Katukov] Let us ask ourselves the question: "What is the feasibility of maintaining special clientele distributors, given existing real life in Moscow? After all, practically everything can be bought now in a regular store. There are no longer any kind of special food rations and special sections. The network of shops, it is true, remains. You can have whatever you like made for yourself, but for your own hard-earned money. For example, to have a two-piece suit made costs a client R180-200,000 on the average, regardless of the official's position.

[Mikhaylov] Does it not seem to you that for a majority of government officials all these telephones, vehicles, and dachas also give genuine meaning to their activity and are a measure of their success in life?

[Katukov] I would not be sincere even with myself if I did not answer unambiguously. Unquestionably, a layer of such civil servants remains on the staff, nevertheless, the main part of the staff of the Government of the Russian Federation consists of respectable people, professionals. For these people, all the things we have talked about are only an instrument in their work—the government communications telephone, the presence or absence of an official motor vehicle, or a dacha, never was and never will be a criterion of their success in life. They could have left a long time ago for "big money" and specifically for the "benefits" that exist in other jobs with their numerous "privileges." It seems to me that what "holds" them here is a feeling of duty, inculcated by years of state service, and an understanding of the fact that their experience and knowledge are necessary now as never before.

As for state employees who live with other categories and values in life, the present day indicates that with the

emergence of new and increased demands in their work, people like this do not last, and they leave.

[Mikhaylov] Do you consider that a government staff employee position is a profession?

[Katukov] Actually, this is so. Moreover, I am convinced that this is one of the difficult professions. If for no other reason than that everyone has to master its ABC's on the job; after all, we do not have diplomaed state civil servants, and higher educational institutions do not train them.

And, by the way, my first specialty is military doctor. What I am engaged in now in the service is a result of daily training in the school of the government staff over several years. I do not consider it a disgrace to learn and exchange experiences among one's colleagues.

[Mikhaylov] What do you think is paramount in this profession?

[Katukov] Veracity, a sense of duty, and a sense of obligation.

Draft Criminal Code General Section Examined

944F0710A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
 18 May 94 p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA writer Yuriy Fefofanov: "Who Will Be Judged for What in Russia"]

[Text] As a general rule, criminal codes consist of two halves: "General Part" and "Special Part." The first half gives the basic principles of criminal legislation; this is its philosophy. The second part enumerates the criminally punishable acts and the punishments corresponding to them. We shall now discuss the "General Part" of the draft Criminal Code—it was developed by the Ministry of Justice and the president's State Legal Administration.

Will discussion in parliament get around to this draft? It is hard to say. The Criminal Code in general is having a hard time. The 1960-model code, which is still in effect, is obsolete. A draft appeared in 1991—it was published in the journal ZAKON. It was never even discussed. And here is a new draft.

Doctors of Jurisprudence S.G. Kelina and I.M. Galperin helped in the expert assessment of the draft Criminal Code.

What Is Crime?

Criminal law must first of all answer this "simple" question. How is it to be distinguished from the host of human actions which, although they may be of a negative nature, do not warrant jail and certainly not "the noose"?

The Criminal Code now in effect:

"A crime shall be deemed to be a socially dangerous act (action or inaction) specified by criminal law which threatens the social structure of the USSR, its political

and economic systems, socialist property, the individual, and political, labor, property, and other rights and freedoms of citizens...."

It is interesting to compare this with the draft of the 1913 Criminal Code, which was not adopted either.

"A crime shall be an action or inaction specified by the present code that is dangerous to the socialist state of workers and peasants or the socialist law and order established in it." Protection of the individual is not mentioned at all—only the "state of workers and peasants" is protected.

And what does the present draft have to say about crime?

"A crime shall be deemed to be an act prohibited by criminal law under the threat of punishment. Socially dangerous shall be deemed to be an act that causes or creates the possibility of causing harm to objects protected by criminal law."

In the first three definitions of crime there are the "society" and the "state," which inevitably politicizes the point of departure of all criminal legislation. But do the society and state have to protect themselves. Undoubtedly. But then is it possible to avoid "politics"? It seems to me that this was done in the draft of the 1991 Criminal Code which never reached the point of discussion.

It seems that the authors of the draft managed to enclose the definition of a crime within a purely legal framework and yet it is fairly exhaustive.

So is it worthwhile to give a very great deal of thought to such a "simple" thing as the definition of a crime; to weigh everything on the most precise scales so that in the list of specific acts and punishments there will be no loophole for arbitrariness. "Theoretical" imprecision in practice leads to derailing the proceedings of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on the Administration of State Property and justification of political violence. The Roman principle "nullum crimen sine lege" (there is no crime unless it is indicated in the law) proclaimed by the compiler of the draft of the Criminal Code must be upheld to the end in all its purity...

The Death Penalty for the Firm

Criminal liability of legal entities is something new and unusually for our law. That is, not living people but organizations may be sentenced to criminal punishment. It seemed to me that this breaks away from the general principles of criminal law.

CHAPTER 16. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF LEGAL ENTITIES

Article 106. Grounds for criminal liability.

(1) A legal entity shall be subject criminal liability for acts specified by criminal law if:

a) the legal entity is guilty of failing to fulfill or fulfilling improperly a direct prescription of the law, which establishes the obligation or prohibition to conduct certain activity;

b) a legal entity is guilty of conducting activity that does not correspond to its constituent documents or declared objectives;

c) an act that caused harm or created the threat of causing harm to an individual, the society, or the state was committed in the interests of the given legal entity or was allowed, sanctioned, approved, or used by an organ or individual performing the functions of management of the legal entity.

2. The criminal liability of a legal entity shall not preclude the liability of the individual for his commission of a crime.

Article 107. Types of punishment.

(1) As basic punishments it is possible to impose fines, prohibit engaging in a particular kind of activity, or liquidate the legal entity.

(2) As additional punishment it is possible to prohibit a particular activity or confiscate property.

"Is the innovation of criminal liability of a legal entity not flouting the very foundations of criminal law? An individual and not the organization is responsible for the act. Only the Nuremberg Tribunal accused an organization of a crime. Is that not so?"

"No," says the person with whom I was talking, "the legal systems of many countries stipulate the liability of legal entities: England, America, France. And we have an extreme need for this. Take ecological crimes—it is not enough for only the officials to be responsible. Or legal violations regarding taxes. And all the 'Panama affairs' with checks, auctions, and deposits. Or the mass media: Certain newspapers are directly calling for violence and war. The measures specified by civil legislation are clearly inadequate."

"But will individuals who are guilty of crimes not hide behind legal entities? Remember our recent sanctions? The enterprises easily paid the fines and continued to destroy nature."

"But the liability of the legal entity does not remove the blame from the individual. Unfortunately, the parties mainly to blame have always escaped responsibility. The guilt of the collective subject established by a court, the sentence of this court—the sentence that declares the organization's actions to be criminal—in the present chaos will help to single out legal business, even if it is with an element of risk, from criminal business into which entire firms are sometimes drawn."

Criminal liability of legal entities will certainly evoke disputes. Still, the basic postulate of criminal law—the

actually liable person is responsible—does not fit completely into the innovation. I personally am bothered by one thing: Will it not turn out that the sentence for the organization will save the organizers from a sentence.

Justified Risk

The draft Criminal Code, it seems to me, proposes a very important and typical market norm which will give a person the "right to a justified risk."

Article 45. Justified risk.

(1) It shall not be a crime to cause harm to legally protected interests when there is an objectively justified risk for achieving a socially useful goal.

(2) The risk shall be deemed justified if the goal that has been set cannot be achieved by actions that do not involve risk and the individual who has taken the risk has taken the necessary measures to prevent harm to legally protected interests.

(3) Risk shall not be deemed justified if it was known to involve the threat of an ecological catastrophe or social disaster.

That would be a legal form for the recent command-administrative times! Do not count "commanders of production, as they were called at the time, who would take literally a fatal risk to do something useful for the people in spite of stupid prohibitions. At that time there was only one principle: Do the absurd, but according to Marx; push unmarketable products but fulfill the plan; throw seeds onto frozen ground but do not disobey the raykom [rayon committee]. Some brave souls departed from the absurd and spent the rest of their days in jail. Yes, much has receded into the past. Nonetheless enterprisingness, innovation, the achievement of a legitimate advantage have always involved risk. There is no business at all without risk. But is it right, for example, for the board of a joint-stock company to risk the stockholders' money for their own sake? Is a risky operation allowable if the patient has agreed to it but it is not envisioned by medical canons? Life is always presenting us with situations that do not appear in the textbooks. And our law has not tried to regulate them.

Is an Order the Law?

What should a soldier do if he has received an order that is more or less clear? And what should a bookkeeper do if his direct superior orders him to distort the reports. And who will go to court if the subordinate has carried out a legal order?

Article 46. Execution of an order

(1) It shall not be considered a crime if harm is caused to legally protected interests by an individual who is acting to execute an order that is mandatory for him or any other instruction given according to the established procedure and in compliance with the proper form.

(2) Causing harm to legally protected interests as a result of the execution of an illegal order or other instruction shall not entail liability if the individual was unaware of its illegal character. In this case the liability for the act committed in execution of an illegal order or instruction shall be born by the individual who issued this order or instruction.

(3) Execution of an order or other instruction that is known to be illegal shall entail criminal liability but there can be mitigating circumstances.

(4) Failure to execute an illegal or criminal order or other instruction shall not involve criminal liability.

Article 8 of the Regulations of the Nuremberg Tribunal: "The fact that the accused was acting on instructions from the government or an order from his superior shall not relieve him of responsibility."

Our popular semi-proverb "the order of the superior is the law for the subordinate" harbors a very deep contradiction.

During war time the absolute nature of the order for the subordinate was formulated clearly in the Regulations: It was to be carried out without questioning whether it was criminal or not. Do it! All responsibility lay with the individual who gave the order. The draft Criminal Code proposes a different norm: It shall be a crime to execute a criminal order. But how is the subordinate to determine which order is legitimate and which is criminal? Can the call from the country's vice president to storm the city facilities be regarded as an order? What were the tank drivers who were given orders to open fire on the parliament supposed to do?

There is no doubt that such a norm of law places each follower of orders in the face of a serious problem of choice. How is the "switchman" supposed to recognize the legality or illegality of an order?

The legal experts with whom I was speaking answered: The "switchman," of course, is always the fall guy; but he does control switches; he is capable of diverting the train; but ultimately he is a "homo sapiens" and not an automaton for which the leaders do the thinking.

Obviously, in these norms the law corresponds very closely to morality and a sense of justice plays a decisive role in the selection of possibilities of behavior. So it would be possible to exclaim after the poet: "Where there is no morality, what good are useless laws?" But still the attempt on the part of the authors of the draft Criminal Code to legally regulate precisely these complicated, nonstandard, extraordinary situations seems useful.

Confiscation

When you read the draft Criminal Code offered for discussion you get the impression that in many respects it has held to a position somewhere between the old and the new. I think this is especially clearly seen in the inclusion

of confiscation of property as a separate punishment (Article 55). The people with whom I was speaking commented somewhat enigmatically: "That is an old question."

Article 55. Confiscation of property

(1) Confiscation of property shall be forced removal of property to state ownership of all or part of the property owned by the accused.

(2) Confiscation of property shall be prescribed for crimes that are grave, especially grave, and exceptionally grave committed with a selfish purpose and may be imposed only in cases stipulated by criminal law.

(3) Property needed by the accused or his dependents shall not be subject to confiscation...

Yes, perhaps it is old, like Chernomor's. In Rus for ages the property of guilty parties and falsely guilty parties "has been confiscated by the state," especially if there was something to confiscate. At the beginning of the last century Aleksandr I declared confiscation to be a separate punishment. Soviet rule, having made pillage the norm of life, soon promoted it to a norm of law as well. Since that time confiscation has been in all the codes as an independent punishment. The crime may not have been related in any way to the criminal enrichment—still, according to the sentence, everything was taken except what was needed to survive.

Yes, what has been criminally gained, if this is proven in court, must be taken away; there is no question about that. But this must be clearly documented. It is not enough to make mention of a crime "committed with a selfish end." It is necessary to indicate unequivocally what is subject to confiscation and when.

The draft Criminal Code contains much that is new, and a good deal has been clarified. The norms of the "General Part" of the draft code lay the foundations for sanctions against organized crime, they strengthen punishments for repeat offenses (cumulative punishments), they introduce life imprisonment, and they clarify the liability of repeat offenders. The draft takes a large step from the "socialist" criminal law now in force to a legal Criminal Code.

but here is the question: Will the parliament adopt the new Criminal Code? In 1991 the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation developed a draft Criminal Code which corresponded to market relations. It was not even discussed. Now the draft with which we have familiarized the readers has been submitted. But the parliament is busy patching up the old, socialist code. And the question arises of its own accord: Are they not expecting times like 1939? If so, I have the draft Criminal Code from that time in front of me. Perhaps it should be proposed to the parliament.

Decree on Mandatory Workplace Certification

944F0712A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 May 94 p 4

["Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 485, Dated 6 May 1994, City of Moscow": "On Mandatory Certification of Permanent Workplaces at Production Facilities, of the Means of Production, and of the Equipment for Means of Collective and Individual Protection"]

[Text] In accordance with the Fundamentals of Russian Federation Legislation on Labor Security, the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. To entrust responsibility to the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor for the organization and conduct, during the period 1994-1998, of efforts to effect the mandatory certification of permanent workplaces at production facilities so as to conform with the requirements of labor security. This work is to be accomplished jointly with federal oversight organs, other concerned federal organs of executive authority, and organs of executive authority of Russian Federation entities.

The conduct of efforts to effect mandatory certification of the means of production and the equipment for means of collective and individual protection so as to conform with the requirements of state standards according to the Russian Federation Law "On Certification of Production Output and Services" is carried out by the Russian Federation Committee on Standardization, Metrology, and Certification.

2. The Russian Federation Ministry of Labor and Russian Federation Committee on Standardization, Metrology, and Certification shall:

annually confirm, beginning in 1994, the listing of permanent workplaces at production facilities subject to mandatory certification so as to conform with the requirements of labor security, and the listing of means of production and the equipment for means of collective and individual protection so as to conform with the requirements of state standards;

present for confirmation within eight months the appropriate Regulations for the Conduct of Certification of Permanent Workplaces at Production Facilities Subject to Mandatory Certification To Effect Conformance With the Requirements of Labor Security, as well as the Regulations for the Conduct of Certification of Means of Production and the Equipment for Means of Collective and Individual Protection To Effect Conformance With the Requirements of State Standards, with registration of the certification results in mind when determining withholding amounts to the labor security funds.

3. Federal organs of executive authority, the organs of executive authority of Russian Federation entities, and the directors of enterprises, organizations, and institutions, regardless of form of ownership, shall:

determine the appropriate structures and officials responsible for the organization and conduct of certification of permanent workplaces at production facilities;

conduct the certification of permanent workplaces at production facilities proceeding from the results of attestation evaluation of the workplaces according to labor conditions;

develop a package of measures for accomplishing the certification of permanent workplaces at production facilities, means of production, and the equipment for means of collective and individual protection.

[Signed] Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin

Decree on Geographic Name Standardization

944F0712B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 May 94 p 4

["Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 417, Dated 3 May 1994, City of Moscow": "On Measures Regulating the Use of Geographic Names of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] With the aim of organizing and implementing a unified approach to the naming of geographic locations and regulating the use of geographic names, the Russian Federation Government **decrees**:

1. To form the Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names.

To appoint N.D. Zhdanov, director of the Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography, as chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names.

To confirm the attached Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names and the composition of the commission.

2. The Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names shall analyze the condition and application of legislation on questions concerning the naming of geographic locations and the use, registration, and retention of geographic names as an integral part of Russia's historical and cultural heritage, and shall present suitable proposals in this regard in 1994 to the Russian Federation Government.

3. Ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, enterprises, institutions, and organizations are guided in the use of geographic names by normative documents approved in accordance with established procedure by the Russian Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Government V. Chernomyrdin

Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names

1. The Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names (henceforth referred to as the Commission) is a permanently functioning organ which effects intersector coordination of the activity of formulating a unified approach to the naming of geographic locations and regulation of the use, registration, and retention of geographic names, as an integral part of the Russia's historical and cultural heritage.

2. The Commission is guided in its activity by the Russian Federation Constitution, laws of the Russian Federation, resolutions of the houses of the Federal Assembly, edicts of the Russian Federation president, decrees and directives of the Russian Federation Government, and by this Statute.

3. The main tasks of the Commission are as follows:

to regulate the use of geographic names;

to draw up proposals on the formulation and implementation of a unified approach to the naming of geographic locations in territory of the Russian Federation and outside its borders;

to develop fundamental principles in naming geographic locations with the aim of ensuring the unified and stable use of geographic names in the Russian Federation;

to examine questions of normative and procedural efforts in the collection, establishment, and cataloguing of geographic names, the naming and renaming of geographic locations, and the writing of geographic names in accordance with the norms of the state language of the Russian Federation;

to effect interaction with foreign organizations, including the group of United Nations experts on geographic names;

to coordinate efforts on the establishment and maintenance of the state catalogue of geographic names, including its computer version;

to supervise the compilation and publication of glossaries of geographic names by countries and regions, and the preparation of normative documents regulating the use of geographic names in the Russian Federation.

4. With the aim of accomplishing the tasks entrusted to it, the Commission:

organizes efforts to analyze and generalize the experience accumulated in our country and abroad with respect to the naming of geographic locations and use of geographic names, and determines those matters that require top-priority resolution;

examines proposals on the naming and renaming of geographic locations in Russian Federation territory, on

its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, in the World Ocean, and in Antarctica, and formulates conclusions in this regard;

effects interaction with the organs of state authority of Russian Federation entities and organs of local self-government on questions regarding the naming of geographic locations;

examines and presents for confirmation by the Russian Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography instructions, manuals, and other normative documents on matters dealing with geographic names;

presents conclusions on draft legislative and other normative acts of the Russian Federation on matters concerning the use of geographic names;

exercises supervision over timely accomplishment of the effort to compile the state catalogue of geographic names;

prepares materials for Russian representatives participating in the work of conferences conducted by the United Nations and other international organizations, at which matters concerning geographic names are examined; effects the exchange of information on geographic names with corresponding organizations of foreign states;

examines matters related to supervision of the implementation of legislative and other normative documents on geographic names;

submits proposals to the Russian Federation Government on matters requiring its resolution.

5. The Commission has the right:

to obtain from federal organs of executive authority, organs of state authority of Russian Federation entities, and organs of local self-government, as well as from institutions, organizations, and responsible officials, materials necessary for the accomplishment of its activity on matters falling under Commission jurisdiction;

to form expert and working groups in Commission spheres of activity, comprised of the representatives of state and nonstate organizations and institutions, as well as individual specialists.

6. Organizational-technical support of the activity of the Commission is provided by the Russian Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography. Expenses related to the support of Commission activity are specified within federal budget funding allocated for the accomplishment of topographic, geodesic, and cartographic work.

7. Decisions adopted by the Commission which fall under its jurisdiction are implemented on a mandatory basis by ministries, departments, and institutions represented within the Commission, and by enterprises and organizations operating within the sphere of jurisdiction

of the above-mentioned ministries and departments. Procedure for the adoption of decisions is determined by the Commission.

8. Sessions of the Commission are conducted on a regular basis in accordance with a work plan approved in Commission session and confirmed by its chairman.

Sessions of the Commission are deemed to have a quorum for the conduct of business if at least half the Commission membership is present.

Composition of the Interdepartmental Commission on Geographic Names

N.D. Zhdanov—director of the Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography (Commission chairman)

A.I. Volgin—Russian Federation deputy minister for nationality affairs and regional policy (Commission deputy chairman)

A.A. Drazhnyuk—deputy chairman of the Russian Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography (Commission deputy chairman)

B.A. Yatskevich—deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Mineral Resources (Commission deputy chairman)

A.S. Sudakov—chief editor of the administration of the Russian Federal Service for Geodesy and Cartography (Commission executive secretary)

Yu.N. Vasyunkin—deputy director of the information and analysis service of the Russian FSTR [expansion unknown]

Yu.A. Vedenin—director of the Russian Scientific Research Institute for the Cultural and Environmental Legacy

S.L. Gromov—deputy chairman of the Russian Committee on Land

V.N. Dyadyuchenko—deputy chairman of the Russian Hydrometeorology Service

G.V. Yershov—department chief, Russian Ministry of Justice

Yu.N. Karaulov—director of the Russian Language Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences

G.V. Kozlov—deputy minister of Science and Technical Policy of the Russian Federation

V.A. Konorov—director deputy chairman, Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs

V.M. Kotlyakov—director of the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences

A.G. Kunchenko—deputy chief of administration of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

N.L. Makarenko—director of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Geodesy, Aerial Photography, and Cartography

S.M. Natalchuk—deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee for Water Management

S.V. Palekhov—department deputy director, Russian Ministry of Transportation

Ye.M. Prokhorov—department director, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

V.A. Polyakhov—general director of the Federal Postal Service of the Russian Ministry of Communications

V.A. Solodov—deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense

A.G. Chernenko—deputy chairman of the Russian Committee on the Press

B.K. Fillmonov—deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Forestry Management

Decree on Support for Education System

944F0712C Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 18 May 94 p 4

["Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 407, Dated 28 April 1994, City of Moscow": "On Priority Measures in Support of the System of Education in Russia"]

[Text] With the aim of extricating the system of education in Russia from its crisis state, the Russian Federation Government **resolves**:

1. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance shall:

pay off within one month the debt for 1993 and the first quarter of 1994 that is owed state educational institutions with respect to wages, stipends, and other payments to students, and shall undertake measures to liquidate the indebtedness of state educational institutions with respect to expenses for heating, energy supply, and municipal services;

provide for the regular, reliable allocation of funds to finance educational institutions.

2. That the Russian Federation State Committee on Higher Education and Russian Federation Ministry of Education shall:

develop jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, and other concerned ministries and departments, proposals on amending the procedure and terms governing the provision of stipends and other forms of social support for students at educational institutions of high

school and higher-level vocational training and education, and the draft Statute on Personal Social Educational Credit, and submit these within three months to the Russian Federation Government;

examine jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry on Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of the Aftereffects of Natural Disasters, the possibility of supporting the educational system through the use of a portion of those funds that have been directed towards the elimination of emergency situations, and to envisage the introduction into the education process of vocational training programs in the sphere of vital-activity safety, effective the 1994-1995 academic year, with financing within the limits of funding as specified in the Federal Special-Purpose Program "Establishment and Development of the Russian System for Provision of Warning and Actions During Emergency Situations";

submit jointly with the Russian Federation State Committee on State Reserves, within two months, proposals on the provision of resource support to educational institutions;

submit, with participation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, Russian Federation State Committee on Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, and the Russian Federation State Customs Committee, the following proposals within three months:

on exempting from taxation in 1994-1995 the funds of juridical and physical persons directed towards educational institutions on a gratuitous basis;

on exempting from the payment of customs duty and value-added tax: training and scientific instruments, equipment, manuals, and materials imported into customs territory of the Russian Federation which are being acquired by budget-financed institutions of grade school, high school, and higher level vocational training in support of the training or scientific process, or such instrumentation, equipment, and other materials received in the form of a gift from juridical or physical persons;

on exempting budget-financed educational institutions from mandatory sale of a portion of their hard-currency earnings obtained from the sale of licenses and the export of scientific-technical and educational production output (work, services).

3. That the Russian Federation State Committee on Higher Education and Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, with participation of the federal organs of executive authority that oversee institutions of higher education and the organs of executive authority of republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, shall submit to the Russian Federation

Government, within three months, proposals on regulating the system of educational institutions for higher-level vocational training and their departmental affiliation.

4. That the Russian Federation State Committee on Higher Education, Russian Federation Ministry of Education, Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technology Policy, and Russian Federation Ministry of Economics shall develop and implement, jointly with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the organs of executive authority of republics within the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, a system of measures on utilization of the scientific and technical potential of educational institutions of grade school, high school, and higher-level vocational training in the development of small and mid-size entrepreneurial activity, and on the training and retraining of business personnel in the sphere of innovational activity.

5. That the Russian Federation State Committee on Higher Education, Russian Federation Ministry of Education, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, and Russian Federation Ministry of Economics shall develop in the second quarter of 1994 and submit to the Russian Federation Government proposals on a system of preferential rates and the accounting procedure to be applied for provision of heating, energy supply, and communal services to educational institutions.

6. That the Russian Federation State Committee on Higher Education, Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, and Russian Federation Ministry of Education shall develop, with participation of the Russian Union of Rectors, proposals on the advisability and peculiarities of privatizing state and municipal educational institutions, and present these proposals within two months.

7. To recommend that the organs of executive authority of republics within the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg:

determine the share of expenditures of their corresponding budgets which will go towards the development of regional systems of grade school, high school, and higher-level vocational training;

extend their decisions with respect to the establishment of preferential rates for heating, energy supply, and municipal services for municipal institutions and organizations of the social sphere so as to apply to federally subordinate educational institutions.

8. To permit state educational institutions of grade school, high school, and higher-level vocational training:

to accomplish the training of specialists and skilled workers on a contract basis with payment by juridical or

physical persons above the quotas established for the acceptance of students for training out of federal budget funds;

to independently establish the amounts of payment for dormitory lodging, public utilities, and municipal services not directly related to the training process, while maintaining the existing procedure for allocating budget funds for the maintenance of facilities of the social sphere and the organization of health-improvement efforts and treatment at sanatorium health resorts for students of all levels.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Government V. Chernomyrdin

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Tatarstan Bank Chief Views Current Tasks

944F0752A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 28 May 94 p 5

[Interview with National Bank of Tatarstan Chairman Yevgeniy Bogachev by RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN correspondent Ye. Taran; place and date not given: "Yevgeniy Bogachev: 'Emergency Measures Are Needed'"]

[Text] [Taran] Yevgeniy Borisovich, at the recent conference held by the president, in the press, and at the latest session of the republic Supreme Soviet the issue of nonpayments has been raised many times. It is assumed that this problem will receive priority attention in the anticrisis program currently being drafted by the government. It is obvious that the nonpayments crisis is a Russia-wide phenomenon. Still, can this problem be resolved at least partially at republic level? How can the National Bank of Tatarstan help?

[Bogachev] At the National Bank's initiative, the republic government adopted a decree and prepared on its basis a statute on mutual clearing between producers, processors of agricultural products, and trade organizations. You understand that the nonpayments problem cannot be solved in one strike, overnight; therefore, on an experimental basis we intend to untangle this knot first in the sectors that supply the population with foodstuffs—bread, milk, meat, confectionery items, etc.—and trade. For these enterprises and organizations we introduced the so-called file No. 2. We established a payments schedule for them. First they settle accounts with the budget (pay taxes into it), then the pension fund, and then with producers and processors of agricultural products.

[Taran] That is, the file means that if the enterprise received money into its account in the bank, it is...

[Bogachev] ...transferred to pay taxes to the budget, to the pension fund, and then—to pay for agricultural

products delivered to them. If there is not much money, not much will be paid. But it will get paid instead of the money just sitting there!

How were things before this decree? For instance, a rayon food trade administration receives money from stores, pays taxes to the budget, pays into dozens of various funds, pays out wages, and disposes of the rest of the money at its discretion. If it wishes, it uses it to buy imported candy or sausage, or, if it wishes, it will pay the Zarya factory or the meat combine... Now if a trade administration or food processing enterprise attempts to violate the procedures set by the decree, the banks will not allow it to do so. They will withdraw money from the account and send it where it is supposed to go. Otherwise we will not be able to get the money to the countryside—it will constantly be diverted along interim stages of the chain.

[Taran] If the chain links kolkhozes and sovkhozes with the trade sector and, in the final analysis, with the republic population, and is located inside Tatarstan, then you can probably attempt to untangle the knots using both the command methods envisaged in the decree and economic levers. What about enterprises whose suppliers and consumers are in Russia and other CIS countries? Or how do you settle financial relations between the AO [joint-stock company] Tatneft and Nizhnekamskneftekhim?

[Bogachev] Speaking of Nizhnekamskneftekhim, it is actually owed a lot of money by many CIS enterprises, while inside the republic it owes money to many suppliers. Some chains, wherever possible, we cut short by a bill of exchange or so-called barter applied to debt. For instance, the Nizhegorodskiy oil refinery pays the AO Tatneft for oil with gasoline; this gasoline goes to the Tatneftprodukt association, and we count it as payment by the oil producers' to the budget. By the way, the National Bank already has set up a commission that will look more closely at these chains of nonpayments and, if possible, shortcut them, apply mutual clearing, even extending to Russian enterprises and CIS countries.

I can even give you an example of how we untangled such a chain. A Chisinau tractor plant owed money to the Nizhnekamskneftekhim association for products shipped. We came to an agreement that Moldova would deliver spare parts for tractors to Tatselkhoztekhnika, and we would count this as Nizhnekamsk producer payments into the budget.

Most often, however, credits are needed in order to accomplish mutual clearing. We will be allocating resources to the extent possible, especially if insignificant amounts are needed, in order to complete mutual clearing.

Not everyone agrees to such mutual clearing, however. For instance, the Novomoskovsk plant, which produces gasoline, owes a substantial amount of money to Tatneft, but is in no hurry to pay with fuel, and in this situation offers gasoline at a price hiked up by 15-20 percent if we

want it faster. See what is happening in the economy! We can demand sanctions, file a claim with the arbitration court, of course. But how much time this will take!... Meanwhile, Muscovites advise us: Do not ship the oil. But you cannot just stop the wells.

[Taran] Yevgeniy Borisovich, I understand that enterprises must, of course, settle accounts with the budget and agricultural producers. But there also is another line item on which calm and stability in the republic depend. I mean paying wages—and paying them on time. At many enterprises people have not been paid for three to four months. I do not know whether there is any truth to the rumor that 50 percent of the money received will be reserved specifically for paying wages.

[Bogachev] I cannot either confirm or deny this information. At the recent meeting held by the president I submitted a proposal for the anticrisis program: to let enterprises keep at minimum 5 percent of the money received for their immediate needs.

[Taran] Is this an emergency reserve?

[Bogachev] Yes, and no one—not the budget, not the funds, not the banks—can touch this money. It happens sometimes that an enterprise cannot send people on vacation, provide financial assistance, and so on.

This proposal was supported, and in one document there is even the figure of 30 percent. But if this passes, it will hit the budget hard.

[Taran] But you have to pay people, too. They have to live on something...

[Bogachev] Yes, there are enterprises in the republic where wages have not yet been paid for February, and in some kolkhozes and sovkhozes—for January. But overall as of 1 May the back pay owed amounted to 160 billion rubles [R]. This is one month's worth of back pay. In certain sectors, however—agriculture, the defense industry, light industry, the budget sphere—the arrears are substantial. Measures are being taken, however, to pay off these arrears at least through April. It looks as if we will be issuing credits in order to get out of this situation.

[Taran] Yevgeniy Borisovich, will we find credit resources?

[Bogachev] I will give you these figures. As of 1 January our credit resources amounted to R600 billion; as of 1 May—already R900 billion. I know the interest rate is very high, and it is hard for enterprises to carry the debt, but what can we do? Just recently our bank charged 210 percent interest, then 205 percent, then 200 percent. At the latest auction we acquired centralized resources at 190 percent. Of course, commercial banks charge a higher interest rate.

We have to keep in mind, however, that we issue credit to agriculture on average at 20 percent, and to some farms—at 10 percent. For instance, the bread products

association received most of its credit at 10 percent. But even this money is difficult to get back. The enterprise ships flour and cereal, but the money does not come back, it gets stuck somewhere. Consumers do not pay.

[Taran] How do you explain the lowering of the Central Bank's interest rate?

[Bogachev] I want to remind you of the statements of Central Bank of Russia Chairman Gerashchenko that by the end of this year the interest rate will be 100 percent. But in my opinion even this is too much. If interest rates were no higher than 20-30 percent, prices would go down, too.

The lowering of interest rates is a result of the decline in the inflation rate. In my opinion, there is no particular reason to rejoice. We have achieved it at the cost of reducing consumer demand—people do not have any money, they are not paid wages. This is the way to entirely ruin industry, which will stop producing any output.

[Taran] We were talking mostly about noncash clearing. But there also are quite a few problems with cash, are there not?

[Bogachev] The National Bank has now put into circulation about R600 billion in cash. Republic banks have only R21 billion. Where is the rest of the money? I do not think it is in the hands of the population, because people are not being paid wages. It is possible that it is circulating hand-to-hand, bypassing the budget and other taxes. This is my first guess. The second is that the money is at enterprises. I do not know of a single instance of any manager being penalized for using cash in lieu of noncash transactions. When the money goes through the bank, taxes are withheld, along with other deductions. Quite often, however, enterprises get cash through their own trade network and immediately use it to purchase goods, pay wages, etc.

I am against repressive measures. The National Bank of Tatarstan is proposing other ways. We need to make it possible to buy in the market shares of profitable, prestigious enterprises and banks, without restrictions, for money. Right now, however, many banks are privately-held joint-stock companies. But if enterprises have the money (the R600 billion is sitting around somewhere unused, after all!), why not buy shares if good dividends are paid on them? We need to speed up the creation of a securities market. Then this money will surface.

The situation today is such that we simply do not have time to spend months developing programs and laws, and then more months adopting and amending them. We need to give our president the powers to resolve some matters through decrees. We need urgent measures to save our economy, first and foremost industry. This is where the budget revenue is formed. To a certain degree

I am beginning to support those politicians and economists who maintain that the road to the market should go through dictatorship. Chaos is not going to get us anywhere.

Kabardino-Balkaria To Work on Treaty With Russia

944F0735A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 94 p 1

[Untitled Kabardino-Balkar Republic Presidential Directive No. 11-rp, issued 18 April 1994]

[Text] For the purpose of carrying out additional editing of the draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic entitled "On Delineation of Objects of Administration and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between Russian Federation Organs of State Authority and Kabardino-Balkar Republic Organs of State Authority" a working group comprised of the following members is hereby established:

1. Ketov, Yu. M.—Kabardino-Balkar Republic [KBR] presidential legal policy advisor (head of the working group).
2. Altudov, Yu. K.—deputy prime minister and chairman of the KBR State Property Management Committee.
3. Bechelov, I. B.—chairman, Commission on Legislation, Law and Order, Security and Human Rights under the KBR Parliament Soviet of the Republic (on a consulting basis).
4. Golovko, Ye. N.—deputy chairman of the KBR Parliament Soviet of Representatives (on a consulting basis).
5. Ilyushchenko, A. I.—KBR deputy prime minister.
6. Tsikanov, M. M.—KBR minister of economics.
7. Sheozhev, Kh. V.—KBR minister of finance.

This working group shall by 1 May 1994 submit an agreed-upon draft of the aforementioned treaty to the organizations affected by it.

[Signed] V. Kokov, President, Kabardino-Balkar Republic

Kabardino-Balkaria Considers Limiting Residence Permits

944F0735C Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Zamir Shibzukhov, member of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic [KBR] Parliament Soviet of the Republic Commission on Legislation, Law and Order, Security and Human Rights, conducted by the KBR Parliament Press Center: "In the KBR Parliament: One

Decree... Was Not Enough To Resolve the Issue of Limiting KBR Residence Permits"]

[Text] *As already reported by the press, the joint session of the houses of the KBR Parliament will continue on 20 April 1994. On the deputies' agenda is consideration, among other matter, of the issue of a temporary suspension of residence permit issuance in the KBR. As you are aware, this matter was previously discussed by the KBR Supreme Soviet, which by a decree issued on 30 August 1990 temporarily suspended the issuance of permanent residence permits in the KBR. It was in connection that this that the KBR Parliament is now taking up the issue again. This was the subject of our interview with Zamir Shibzukhov, a member of the KBR Parliament Soviet of the Republic's Commission on Legislation, Law and Order, Security and Human Rights.*

[Shibzukhov] Yes, the Supreme Soviet did in fact issue its decree, and that decree has not yet expired, no one has repealed it, and it remains in effect. Furthermore, the KBR Council of Ministers, and later the Cabinet of Ministers, have issued a number of directives and decrees in compliance with that decree. A number of orders in connection with this also exist within the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, which issues residence permits to citizens.

The Supreme Soviet was forced to make the decision in question due to our republic's overpopulation and acute problems with housing, food and other social issues. The primary purpose of the decree was to restrict unregulated migration into the republic.

[Press Center] And have we succeeded in eliminating the problem?

[Shibzukhov] Unfortunately not. Plus new problems have emerged that are equally difficult. Our republic has become a border area of the Russian Federation, an area located in immediate proximity to regions of interethnic conflict. There has been a sharp upsurge in the crime rate, and interethnic problems are on the rise.

[Press Center] Insofar as I am aware, the influx of migrants is not decreasing, is it?

[Shibzukhov] Despite the measures taken, the influx of residents into our republic has only been restricted insignificantly. Population density in this republic is eight times higher than the average for Russia as a whole. According to statistics from the State Committee for Statistics and the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 7,519 people took up residence in the republic in 1993, or 2,028 more than in 1992. Recently, and particularly within the past year, various individuals have resided here without registering by evading current statutes. Those individuals now number several thousand. They generally accomplish this by acquiring houses or apartments by various means.

[Press Center] A decree by our highest legislative body did not help. Why not?

[Shibzukhov] The main purpose of that Supreme Soviet decree was not accomplished. Furthermore, the lack of a clear-cut, well-planned and well-organized mechanism for implementation of the decree resulted in various abuses by local bureaucrats and allowed many officials to feed at the trough. As proof allow me to cite just one fact. According to Ministry of Internal Affairs information, a total of 2,194 people were illegally issued residence permits in our republic in 1993 alone.

I think that what I have said makes it quite clear why the Parliament has taken up this issue once again.

[Press Center] What is going to be done now?

[Shibzukhov] The commission on legislation, law and order, security and human rights in both houses of Parliament have been instructed to prepare specific proposals in regard to this matter. We have prepared those proposals in the form of a draft decree. The deputies will have the final say. The proposals pertain, once again, to restrictions on residence permits and expropriation of houses and apartments. The Parliament should establish clear-cut control over the mechanisms by which this decree is implemented.

I can already see your next question coming: how legal are these restrictions? Yes, it should be noted that some deputies have pointed out that the new Constitution of the Russian Federation, and along with it the KBR Constitution, proclaim the freedom to relocate and choose one's place of residence. On that point I would like to comment that no specific legal act forbidding the issuance of residence permits has ever been adopted. On the contrary, residence permits and restrictions on them exist throughout the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the measures we are proposing are purely temporary in nature.

[Press Center] Well, we can only hope that this time the decision made by our highest legislative body will be more effective.

Kabardino-Balkaria Signs Treaty With Ingushetia

944F0735C Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 94 p 1

["Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia"]

[Text] The Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia, subsequently to be referred to as "the parties to this Treaty,"

on the basis of mutual interest in the further development and strengthening of relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation, which are in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia,

acknowledging their responsibility to preserve and reinforce civil tranquility and interethnic harmony in the Northern Caucasus,

in consideration for the changes that have taken place in their republics in recent years, and in an effort to raise traditionally diverse ties to a qualitatively new level, have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The parties to this Treaty will develop and deepen relations of friendship and cooperation in all areas of life on the basis of equal rights and respect for the legislation and state status of each party to the Treaty.

Article 2

The parties to this Treaty deem it appropriate to conduct regular exchanges of official delegations, economic experts and creative groups, and to support both public and private initiatives aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the two republics.

Article 3

The parties to this Treaty will protect human rights and liberties regardless of national origin, respect the rights and interests of ethnic minorities, and create proper conditions for those minorities' economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Mutual relations between the republics will be based on mutual advantage. The parties to this Treaty will refrain from actions which cause economic harm to each other. Within the limits of their authority they will facilitate the establishment and maintenance of direct relations between organizations and enterprises under all forms of ownership, establishment of market-based relations, introduction of new competitive types of production, and economic cooperation on development of sectors that are priorities for each republic.

Article 5

The parties to this Treaty will within the limits of their authority provide assistance to commercial entities with the completion of mutual shipments of produce and goods regarding which an agreement has been reached.

In cases of failure on the part of one of the parties to perform an agreed-upon volume of shipments without just cause, the affected party has the right to reduce its own volume of shipments.

Article 6

The parties to this Treaty pledge to monitor effectively and regulate at the level of the governments of Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia shipments of particularly

important types of produce and goods with regard to which an agreement has been reached.

Article 7

The parties to this Treaty pledge to support and develop all types of existing freight and passenger transportation between the republics, ensure the safety of transportation within their respective territories, implement a unified transportation price policy, and maintain existing operational relations between state transportation enterprises.

Article 8

The parties to this Treaty pledge to ensure mutually advantageous cooperation within the agro-industrial complex.

Article 9

The parties to this Treaty will render assistance and support with the establishment of ongoing relations between institutions in the fields of science, culture, health care, information science, tourism, sports and the mass media, as well as between the ethnic culture societies of the peoples who live in the republics. Particular importance will be attached to the conducting of joint scientific research and cooperation in the area of personnel training and advanced training.

Article 10

The parties to this Treaty will provide aid to each other in the event of natural disasters.

Article 11

The parties to this Treaty deem it essential to ensure direct coordination of actions by the republics' law enforcement agencies aimed at combatting economic and other crimes.

Article 12

The parties to this Treaty deem it essential to conduct systematic joint efforts:

- on comprehensive optimization of natural resource use;
- on implementation of a unified scientific and technical policy for environmental protection;
- on state regulation of natural resource use during the transition to a market economy.

Article 13

In order to implement the principles contained in this Treaty the affected ministries, agencies, organizations, enterprises and institutions will conclude specific agreements.

For the purpose of ensuring that the parties fulfill their mutual obligations under this Treaty joint commissions

may be established, with the procedure for their establishment, their operations and the extent of their authority to be set forth in separate protocols.

In order to coordinate activities and resolve in a timely manner any issues that may arise during the implementation of specific programs, the parties to this Treaty may exchange authorized representatives.

Article 14

This Treaty will remain in effect for a period of five years. It will be automatically extended for the following period unless one of the parties to it states in writing a desire to abrogate it at least six months prior to expiration of the current five-year period.

The parties to this Treaty may, based on the actual sociopolitical and economic situation in the republics, jointly make amendments in and additions to the text of this Treaty.

This Treaty will become effective immediately upon signing.

This Treaty was prepared in Russian in two copies and signed in the city of Nalchik on 15 April 1994.

[Signed] For the Kabardino-Balkar Republic: V. Kokov, President of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic

[Signed] For the Republic of Ingushetia: R. Aushev, President of the Republic of Ingushetia

Kabardino-Balkaria Publishes Law on Security

944F0734A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 94 pp 4-5

["Law of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic: On Security"]

[Text] This law enshrines the legal foundations of the safeguarding of the security of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic within the Russian Federation and determines the place of the system of security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic within the federal system of security and its functions ensuing from this and the procedure of the organization, interaction, and financing of the security authorities and also control and supervision of the legality of their activity.

Section I

General Provisions

Article 1. The concept of security and its objects

Security is the state of the protection of vitally important interests of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic against internal and external threats.

Pertaining to the principal objects of security are the individual—his rights and liberties; society—its material

and spiritual values; the Kabardino-Balkar Republic—its constitutional system, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Article 2. Subjects of safeguarding of security

The principal subject of the safeguarding of security is the Kabardino-Balkar Republic exercising its functions in this sphere via the organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power.

In accordance with the current constitution, the republic provides for the security of each citizen on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic. Citizens of Kabardino-Balkaria within its confines and also persons that are not such on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall be guaranteed protection and patronage.

Citizens and grassroots and other organizations and associations are subjects of security and possess rights and obligations in respect to participation in the safeguarding of security in accordance with legislation of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Russian Federation. The Kabardino-Balkar Republic provides for the legal and social protection of citizens and grassroots and other organizations and associations rendering assistance in the safeguarding of security in accordance with the law.

Article 3. Threat to security

A threat to security means a sum total of conditions and factors creating a danger to the vitally important interests of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

A real and potential threat to the objects of security emanating from internal and external sources of danger determines the content of the activity in the safeguarding of internal and external security.

Article 4. Safeguarding security

Security shall be achieved by the pursuit of a common official policy in the sphere of security and a system of measures of an economic, political, organizational, and other nature appropriate to the threats to the vitally important interests of the individual, society, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and the Russian Federation.

Provision shall be made for unswerving compliance with the Laws "On Security" laws of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic for the creation and maintenance of the requisite level of protection of objects of security in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and a system of legal provisions regulating relationships in the security sphere shall be devised, the guidelines of the activity of the organs of state power and administration in this field shall be determined, and the authorities providing for security and the mechanism of control and supervision of their activity shall be formed or transformed on the basis of the latter.

A Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall be created under the leadership of the president of the

Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the system of the executive and, in accordance with the Laws "On Security" of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, state security authorities shall be formed to safeguard the security of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Article 5. Principles of the safeguarding of security

The basic principles of the safeguarding of security are: legality;

observance of a balance of the vitally important interests of the individual, society, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and the Russian Federation;

mutual responsibility of the individual, society, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and the Russian Federation for security;

integration with the federal and regional systems of security of the Russian Federation.

Article 6. Legislative principles of the safeguarding of security

The legislative principles of the safeguarding of security are composed of the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, this law, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Law of the Russian Federation "On Security," and other enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic regulating relationships in the sphere of security; international treaties and agreements concluded or recognized by the Russian Federation and not conflicting with the constitution or laws of the Russian Federation.

Article 7. Observance of the rights and liberties of the citizens in safeguarding security

Qualification of the rights and liberties of the citizens, except in the instances directly specified by law, is not permitted in the safeguarding of security.

Citizens and grassroots and other organizations and associations shall be entitled to obtain explanations in connection with a qualification of their rights and liberties from the security authorities. Such explanations shall be given on demand in writing within the time-frame established by law.

Officials who exceed their authority in the process of activity in the safeguarding of security shall be liable in accordance with the law.

Section II

System of Security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic

Article 8. Basic elements of the system of security

The system of security is formed by the organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, state,

grassroots, and other organizations and associations, and citizens participating in the safeguarding of security in accordance with the law and also by legislation regulating relationships in the sphere of security.

The creation in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic of security authorities not established by laws of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Russian Federation is not permitted.

Article 9. Basic functions of the system of security

The basic functions of the system of security are:

the ascertainment and forecasting of internal and external threats to the vitally important interests of the objects of security and the implementation of a set of operational and long-term measures to prevent and neutralize them;

the creation and maintenance in a state of readiness of the forces and resources for the safeguarding of security;

command and control of the forces and resources for the safeguarding of security under everyday conditions and in emergency situations;

implementation of a system of measures for the restoration of the normal functioning of the objects of security in areas that have suffered as the result of an emergency situation;

participation in measures for the safeguarding of security outside of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Russian Federation in accordance with agreements concluded or recognized by the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Article 10. Delineation of the authority of the organs of power in the system of security

The security of the individual, society, and the state shall be safeguarded on the basis of a delineation of the authority of the organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power in this sphere.

The parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall:

shape the strategy and determine the priorities in the protection of the vitally important interests of the objects of security;

devise a system of the legal regulation of relationships in the sphere of security;

establish the procedure of the activity of the security authorities;

exercise supervision of the personnel policy of the state security authorities;

determine the budget appropriations within the framework of its jurisdiction for funding the security authorities and republic programs in the security field.

The parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall receive at least once a year a report of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic on the security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

The executive authorities shall:

provide for compliance with the laws and other enforceable enactments regulating relationships in the field of security;

in accordance with the law, form, upgrade, and directly provide for the functioning of the republic security authorities;

organize the elaboration and realization of official security programs;

implement a system of measures for the security of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic within their jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, form, reorganize, and liquidate the republic security authorities.

The judicial authorities shall:

provide for the protection of the constitutional system in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, guided by the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the laws of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

administer justice in cases involving crimes encroaching on the security of the individual, society, and the state;

provide for judicial remedy for citizens and grassroots and other organizations and associations whose rights have been violated in connection with activity to safeguard security.

Article 11. Leadership of the state security authorities

Overall leadership of the republic security authorities shall be exercised by the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

The president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall:

head the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council;

determine in conjunction with the parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic the strategy of the safeguarding of the internal and external security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

control and coordinate the activity of the republic security authorities and the federal security authorities located on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic or serving it;

within his jurisdiction determined by law adopt operational security decisions;

present to the parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic at least once a year a report on the security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

The Cabinet of Ministers (Government) of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall:

within its jurisdiction determined by this law provide for leadership of the republic security authorities of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

organize and monitor the elaboration and realization of security measures by ministries and state committees of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and other organs of the republic under its jurisdiction.

Ministries and state committees of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall elaborate within their jurisdiction and on the basis of current legislation intra-departmental sets of instructions (statutes) pertaining to the safeguarding of security and present them for consideration by the Security Council.

Article 12. Forces and resources for the safeguarding of security

The forces and resources for safeguarding security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic include military formations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security-Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation for the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and border forces stationed on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

the organs of foreign intelligence, the tax service, and customs, services for the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations, and civil defense formations; authorities providing for occupational safety in industry, power engineering, transport, and agriculture; services providing for the security of means of communication and information; mountain-rescue services, environmental protection authorities, public health authorities, and other state and nonstate security authorities operating on the basis of legislation.

The military formations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and border forces of the Russian Federation stationed on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall be employed in the safeguarding of the security of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the procedure established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Services of the Ministry of Security-Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation for the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and other executive authorities employing in their activity special forces and resources shall operate only within their jurisdiction and in accordance with legislation.

The leaders of the security authorities shall, in accordance with legislation, be liable for a violation of the established procedure of their activity.

Section III

Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council

Article 13. Status of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council

The Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council is the constitutional authority that prepares decisions of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the security sphere.

The Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council considers questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the sphere of security, strategic problems of republic economic, social, defense, information, environmental, and other types of security, public health care, the forecasting and prevention of emergency situations and the surmounting of their consequences, and the safeguarding of stability and law and order and personnel matters.

The Security Council is responsible to the parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic for the state of the protection of vitally important interests of the individual, society, and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Article 14. Composition of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council and the procedure of its formation

The Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall be formed on the basis of the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and this law.

The Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall include a chairman and members of the Security Council and a secretary of the Security Council.

The president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic is ex officio chairman of the Security Council.

The Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall include, ex officio, the vice president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

the prime minister of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

the minister of internal affairs of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

the minister of security-director of the Federal Counter-intelligence Service of the Russian Federation for the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

the minister of justice of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; the chairman of the State Committee of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters.

The secretary of the Security Council is a member of the Security Council and is appointed by the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Leaders of republic ministries and departments and also other officials appointed by the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic may be members of the Security Council.

Article 15. Principal tasks of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council

The principal tasks of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council are:

protection of the rights and liberties of the citizens and the constitutional system, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

ascertainment of internal and external threats to the objects of security and the preparation of operational decisions for the prevention of emergency situations that could have appreciable sociopolitical, environmental, and other consequences and the organization of their elimination;

coordination of the activity of the forces and resources of the safeguarding of security;

elaboration of the guidelines of the strategy of the safeguarding of security and the rights and liberties of the citizens of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the organization of the preparation of republic programs in support of them;

preparation of recommendations for the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic for the adoption of decisions on matters of domestic and foreign policy in the sphere of the security of the individual, society, and the republic;

preparation of proposals for the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic on the imposition, extension, or cancellation of a state of emergency;

elaboration of proposals for coordination of the activity of the executive authorities in the process of realization of the decisions adopted in the sphere of security and the evaluation of their efficiency;

the upgrading of the system of security by way of the elaboration of proposals for a reform of the current authorities or the creation of new authorities safeguarding the security of the individual, society, and the republic;

consideration of the nominations presented for appointment to directive office by decisions of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and also the leaders of the security forces of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic;

elaboration and control of the execution of republic programs and other decisions aimed at the prevention

and curtailment of unlawful activity in society and the structure of power and coordination of the activity and interaction of ministries and departments, organs of executive power of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and grassroots associations taking part in law enforcement activity and protection of the interests of the individual and the economic and political interests of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and an evaluation of their efficiency;

collation, analysis, and processing of information on the functioning of the system operating in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic of the protection of the individual, society, and the state against criminal endangerment and the formulation of recommendations for its improvement;

participation in the preparation of draft legislative instruments and other enforceable enactments on questions of the fight against crime and corruption, protection of the rights of the citizens and all forms of property, and the safeguarding of law and order;

preparation of draft decisions of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic on questions of the fight against crime and corruption and the safeguarding of law and order;

determination of the priority areas of scientific and practical research into problems of the protection of the individual, society, and the state against criminal endangerment and corruption;

exercise of other functions of the Interdepartmental Commission for the Fight Against Crime and Corruption in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Security" and in interaction with the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for the Fight Against Crime and Corruption.

Article 16. Procedure of the adoption of decisions by the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council

Sessions of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall be held not less than once a month. If necessary, special sessions of the Council may be held.

Members of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall have equal rights in decisionmaking.

Decisions of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall be adopted at its sessions by members of the Security Council by simple majority vote of the total number of members and take effect following confirmation by the chairman of the Security Council.

Decisions of the Security Council on security matters shall be formalized by edicts of the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

Article 17. Administrative system of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council

Operational work of the Security Council and organizational-technical and information support of the activity of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council shall be performed by its administrative system headed by the secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council.

The structure and list of personnel of the administrative system of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Security Council and also the statutes governing it shall be confirmed by the chairman of the Security Council.

Section IV

Security Activity Funding

Article 18. Security activity funding

Activity in safeguarding security shall be funded, depending on the content and scale of the programs and the nature of emergency situations and their consequences, from the resources of the federal and republic (Kabardino-Balkar Republic) budgets.

Section V

Article 19. Control of security activity

Control of security activity shall be exercised by the parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

The organs of state power and administration of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall within their jurisdiction exercise control of the activity of the ministries and departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in safeguarding security.

Grassroots and other associations and organizations and citizens of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic shall have the right to obtain, in accordance with current legislation, information on the activity of the security authorities.

Article 20. Supervision of the legality of the activity of the security authorities

Supervision of the legality of the activity of the security authorities shall be exercised by the prosecutor of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic and the prosecutors subordinate to him.

[Signed] V. Kokov, president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic
15 April 1994

Kabardino-Balkaria Reports First Quarter Food Prices

944F0733A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by K. Dzhabbayev, Kabardino-Balkar Republic State Statistical Committee chairman: "Food Product Price Increases in First Quarter 1994"]

[Text] In the first quarter of 1994 prices for goods and services rose by 33.4 percent, including a 30.3 percent increase in the price of goods, and 85.9 percent for services. For food products the price index was 134.3 percent, with figures of 113.8 percent in January, 107.5 percent in February and 109.8 percent in March.

During the current year there have been increases in January in the regulated prices of bread and beef and twice (in January and March) for milk, yogurt and curds. As a result of this the price of milk has increased by a factor of five since the beginning of the year, and stood at R400 [rubles] in March, as compared to R80 in January. The price of beef increased by a factor of 2.5 (R2,000 compared to R1,600 [sic]) and the price of bread by a factor of 1.5 (R180 per loaf compared to R120). During the first quarter the prices of certain food products in the regular retail trade network and at markets were virtually equal, as the cost of a one kilogram of sausage purchased from the retail trade network increased by 58.5 percent (R5,195 compared to R3,278), and by 50 percent (R6,000 compared to R4,000) at the collective farm market. The corresponding figures for butter were 59.7 percent (R4,200, R2,630) and 26.7 percent (R3,800, R3,000), for hard cheese—61.4 percent (R3,550, R2,200) and 60.7 percent (R4,500, R2,800).

Due to a decline in stockpiles of vegetables in the regular trade network and at markets there has been a fairly significant increase in vegetable prices. For example, the price of one kilogram of cabbage increased by a factor of 1.7 in the regular trade network (R300, R180) and by a factor of 2.2. at kolkhoz markets (R1,000, R450). The corresponding price increase for onions was by 25.4 percent (R627, R500) and by 44.4 percent (R1,300, R900).

As a result of significant infusions of sugar, vegetable oil and eggs into the republic's trade network the prices of these items at kolkhoz markets have begun to drop. Since the beginning of the year the price of vegetable oil has come down by 16.7 percent (R1,000 per kilogram, as compared to R1,200), the price of sugar has dropped by 14.3 percent (R600, R700), and chicken eggs are now 25 percent cheaper (R900 for 10 eggs, as compared to R1,200).

As of 29 March 1994 the prices of basic food products remained quite high in the capitals of republics, krais and oblasts in the Northern Caucasus, as is clear from the following figures (all prices are in rubles per kilogram or liter):

Item	Nalchik	Krasnodar	Stavropol	Rostov-on-Don	Makhachkala	Vladikavkaz	Cherkessk	Maykop
Regular Trade Network								
Beef	2,000	2,014	2,200	1,814	2,200	2,500	2,700	1,778
Pork	2,475	2,071	2,800	1,817	—	2,200	—	2,040
Chicken	3,105	2,011	3,080	2,867	3,000	3,700	2,648	2,170
Sausage, first quality	5,195	4,991	4,370	4,448	4,315	4,350	4,985	4,385
Butter	4,950	3,738	4,000	3,830	4,013	3,600	4,322	3,872
Vegetable oil	779	780	870	794	1,250	1,100	1,062	977
Margarine	2,000	1,660	2,000	1,750	1,867	2,467	2,034	1,686
Milk	400	520	400	476	555	150	550	481
High-fat yogurt	240	557	484	524	573	290	580	486
Sour cream	2,600	1,741	1,990	1,845	2,578	1,525	2,000	2,187
Chicken eggs, 10	885	746	810	864	1,200	983	830	847
Granulated sugar	651	556	580	594	700	683	625	609
Salt	98	78	200	126	175	150	200	40
Bread, first and second quality	240	313	333	288	366	60	347	338
Vodka	3,280	4,350	5,080	3,653	4,747	1,790	4,150	4,397
Potatoes	260	208	220	260	400	275	193	218
Kolkhoz Markets								
Beef	2,500	2,800	3,800	3,000	2,700	2,500	2,750	2,600
Pork	2,800	3,000	4,000	3,500	—	2,500	3,700	3,000
Chicken	5,333	3,100	4,000	3,500	4,500	5,500	4,000	3,500
Vegetable oil	1,000	800	900	700	1,500	1,200	1,000	700
Milk	833	450	330	500	800	700	500	330

Item	Nalchik	Krasnodar	Stavropol	Rostov-on-Don	Makhachkala	Vladikavkaz	Cherkessk	Maykop
Sour cream	4,000	4,000	2,700	3,000	5,000	3,300	—	3,000
Curds	1,500	1,500	1,000	1,500	2,500	—	—	1,500
Eggs	900	700	900	800	1,000	917	800	900
Potatoes	400	250	250	250	400	350	225	250
Cabbage	1,000	800	800	700	850	467	700	800
Onions	1,300	1,800	1,300	1,300	1,500	1,800	1,600	1,800
Carrots	1,000	1,200	1,000	800	1,300	1,250	1,250	1,000
Apples	800	800	750	800	1,000	1,000	1,160	1,000

Kabardino-Balkaria Radio Services Cut

944F0733B Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 94 p 6

[Article by A. Khatsukov, head of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic Radio and Television Broadcasting Center: "A Message to the Republic's Radio Listeners"]

[Text] The economic difficulties currently being experienced by every enterprise, both in Russia and in our republic, unfortunately extend to radio and television as well. Thus due to a lack of funds to pay for electricity, the numerous taxes levied by Russia and the republic and the technical upkeep of television and radio broadcasting equipment or to pay salaries to our employees, as of 1 April 1994 two radio broadcasting stations in the medium-frequency band which carry the programming of Mayak, Radio Rossiya and local Kabardino-Balkaria Radio programming will go off the air.

It is not by choice that we are shutting down these two energy-intensive radio transmitters, but rather for the purpose of maintaining broadcasts of television programs within the territory of our republic and maintaining broadcasts of the aforementioned radio programming in the ultra-shortwave band, since during the first quarter of 1994 the Republic Radio and Television Broadcasting Center received only about 10 percent of the requisite funding via television and radio companies from the Russian budget, which is its sole source of funding.

Nor is the Russian Government currently promising to resolve the matter of funding for the radio broadcasting companies that carry television and radio broadcasts throughout all of Russia, including our republic.

In consideration of the fact that many radio listeners do not own receivers capable of receiving the ultra-shortwave band, temporarily, until such time as the current economic difficulties stabilize, broadcasting of Kabardino-Balkaria Radio programming will continue in the medium-frequency band, with one station operating at a lower power level. Therefore reception of the programming in question will be possible in the city of Nalchik and in nearby towns if an external antenna is used.

For high-quality reception of central and local radio broadcasts listeners must have a radio receiver that operates in the ultra-shortwave band. These are available in stores.

We will be emphasizing this band as we develop our radio broadcasting efforts. Toward that end, despite economic difficulties the staff members of the republic radio and television broadcasting center are themselves presently installing a new four-channel Dozhd-4 radio transmitter that will operate in the ultra-shortwave band. This transmitter will be located in Nalchik and will replace a Dozhd-2 transmitter.

When this four-channel transmitter goes on air on 1 July 1994, full central programming will be available over three channels: Channel One, Mayak and Radio Rossiya. The fourth channel will be reserved for our own republic programming. This will be the first time since its establishment that Kabardino-Balkaria Radio will have its own independent channel.

At the present time the creative staff of Kabardino-Balkaria Television and Radio Broadcasting are looking for ways to increase their own air time.

Kabardino-Balkaria Decree on Fighting Crime

944F0733C Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 2

[Kabardino-Balkar Republic [KBR] Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 37, issued 3 March 1994: "On Efforts by the Nalchik City Administration To Maintain Public Order and Combat Crime, With Consideration for the Requirements of a KBSSR Presidential Edict Issued on 16 January 1992, 'On Urgent Measures To Improve Law and Order in the KBSSR'"]

[Text] The KBR Cabinet of Ministers notes that issues pertaining to maintenance of public order and anti-crime efforts account for a significant share of the work done by the Nalchik City Administration. It is making efforts to ensure compliance with laws and create the proper conditions for the functioning of law enforcement agencies, including public safety militia units (local militia). A number of measures of an organizational,

financial and physical support nature have been implemented for the purpose of supporting law enforcement agencies, in particular militia units.

However, despite the measures that have been taken the crime situation in the republic capital remains difficult, with the number of serious crimes increasing by 19.4 percent and the number of crimes committed by minors up by 56 percent. The overall apprehension rate is 45.3 percent, below the republic-wide figure. There is no clear-cut interaction between various internal affairs departments. Crime prevention efforts are poorly organized, including efforts to prevent recidivism.

Economic crime is occurring on a large scale. Proper interaction between internal affairs agencies, the tax service and the Tax Police Department has not been developed in connection with efforts to combat this type of crime. Serious shortcomings have been noted in the operations of the city court, and procuratorial oversight is not sufficiently effective.

Physical and technical support for law enforcement agencies is not up to modern standards. There continues to be a shortage of vehicles, telephone and radio communications equipment and many other types of special equipment. The 2nd Internal Affairs Department lacks office space, the city court is housed in two buildings, and the city procuracy lacks normal working conditions. The problem of how to provide housing for members of law enforcement agencies is acute.

Thus far the city administration has not made full use of the powers granted it to maintain law and order and monitor the operations of internal affairs agencies. A plan for priority anti-crime measures in the KBR in 1993 that was approved by a Republic Supreme Soviet decree on 27 April 1993 has not yet been fully implemented.

The KBR Cabinet of Ministers hereby resolves:

1. to note that measures taken by the Nalchik City Administration to protect public order and combat crime in the republic's capital are inadequate.

2. in view of the difficult crime situation in the city of Nalchik, to instruct the Nalchik City Administration to draw up during the second quarter of 1994, in conjunction with the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies, priority measures to improve protection of public order in the city and to prevent and investigate serious crimes.

3. that the Nalchik City Administration (S. B. Abrokov) shall:

—increase its demands on the heads of city internal affairs departments and personally oversee their efforts to combat violations of the law;

—take effective measures to reverse the decline in public activism with regard to preservation of public order, and by 1 July 1994 arrange for the establishment of

volunteer citizens' patrols through major labor collectives, providing them with material incentives and reestablishing public law enforcement posts;

—focus greater attention on improving the working and living conditions of persons employed by law enforcement agencies and judges, providing them with office space and housing in a timely manner; during the first half of 1994 make private garden plots, parcels of land for individual construction and loans for those purposes available to the aforementioned personnel; by the end of 1994 fully provide members of the militia, the procuracy and judges with telephones in their offices and homes; complete by 1 April 1994 the renovation of office space set aside for the 3rd Internal Affairs Department; by the end of 1994 solve the problem of locating appropriate office space for the City Procuracy;

—in conjunction with the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs, during the first half of 1994 consider and take action on the possibility and appropriateness of establishing a coordinating center for the purpose of arranging interaction between internal affairs departments and other law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat crime and establish proper order in the city of Nalchik;

—in order to improve protection of all forms of property, in conjunction with the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs and other affected agencies study the appropriateness and possibility of restricting and eventually banning entry into the city by motor vehicles from other regions of the Russian Federation, submitting proposals to this effect to the KBR Cabinet of Ministers during the fourth quarter of 1994.

4. to direct the attention of KBR minister of internal affairs Kh. A. Shogenov to serious shortcomings in the operations of internal affairs departments in the city of Nalchik with regard to the investigation and prevention of crimes, and to demand that effective measures be taken to improve the effectiveness of those departments' efforts to strengthen law and order.

5. that the KBR minister of internal affairs (Kh. A. Shogenov) shall in conjunction with the city administration consider and take action on the following matters in 1994:

—additional allocation of motor vehicles, fuels and lubricants for the needs of city internal affairs departments, primarily dispatcher stations and patrol and checkpoint units;

—full supply of radio communications equipment, recording equipment, photographic supplies, copying machines, video equipment and other types of special equipment to criminal militia under the city's internal affairs departments;

—relocation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Financial and Economic Department, the Address Bureau and

the Okhrana [Protection] Association Warehouse (a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) out of the 2nd Internal Affairs Department's building in order to ensure normal working conditions for the department's personnel;

- the possibility and appropriateness of setting up militia units in the Volnyy Aul and KBGU microrayons and a militia station in the park zone, with allocation of the necessary buildings;

- improvement of the effectiveness of the medical detoxification unit to ensure profitability in its operations.

6. to propose that the KBR Procuracy (R. I. Abazov) take measures to improve the effectiveness of procuratorial oversight in the city of Nalchik with regard to exact compliance with laws pertaining to the protection of citizens' rights and legitimate interests, crime prevention and investigation, and compliance with the law in the operations of internal affairs agencies, the city court and the executive branch.

7. that the Ministry of Justice (A. M. Batyrbekov) shall take measures to increase the effectiveness with which the city court's operations are organized and ensure correct application of legislation in judicial practice.

8. that the Administrative Law Department of the KBR Cabinet of Ministers Administration of Affairs shall monitor compliance with this decree.

9. that the status of compliance with this decree by the Nalchik City Administration and the KBR Ministry of Internal Affairs shall be reported to the KBR Cabinet of Ministers by 1 February 1995 based on year-end findings.

[Signed] G. Cherkesov, KBR Prime Minister

[Signed] M. Shogenov, KBR Cabinet of Ministers Administrator of Affairs

North Caucasus Anticrime Chief Views Current Tasks

944F0736A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with Col Militia Ruslan Shkhamgeriyevich Yeshugaov, chief of the Administration for Organized Crime in the North Caucasus, by Z. Malbakhova: "Crime Is a Shadow of Society"; place and date not specified]

[Text] A few years ago, when organized crime was discussed at the state level, many, including specialists from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, believed that the creation of special subdivisions for the struggle with it is has no prospects, basing their argument on individual facts of the appearance of gangsterism, the corruption of the state administrative structures, etc.

The transition to the new social order proved to be protracted. And this is what had to happen in a country that had started, towards changes, clearly understanding only one thing—from what it is running away, but having only a vague notion of where the road will lead on which it has embarked, and what pits, turns, and holes it will encounter on this road.

The criminals of all colors and categories could not but profit from this, and the apprehensions about the lack of prospects for the creation of the country's Ministry of Internal Affairs new structural subdivisions for the struggle against organized crime, unfortunately, turned out to lack foundation. On the contrary, their appearance was somewhat late.

Today I am talking with the chief of the Administration for Organized Crime in the North Caucasus Col. Militia Ruslan Shkhamgeriyevich Yeshugaov. He is heading the only subdivision of this kind in Russia that is not subordinated to the territorial organs of internal affairs but is an independent structural organ of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs and carries out the full scope of work in regard to the exposure and unmasking of corrupt persons and organized criminal formations that have inter-oblast, inter-republic, and inter-state links.

Given the complication of the operational situation in the region, this subdivision must provide qualified assistance to the territorial organs of international affairs and monitor the implementation of federal laws pertaining to the struggle against organized crime and corruption by the local organs of internal affairs.

[Malbakhova] Ruslan Shkhamgeriyevich, today, as never before, a great deal depends on the personality of the leader of any level. We would like to find out in detail about your career path, about who you were prior to your appointment to this post?

[Yeshugaov] Since birth I have lived and worked in Kabardino-Balkaria. My first post was inspector of the nursery of the militia at the Nalchik Railway Station. Upon graduation from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, I was appointed deputy chief for criminal investigation of the republic and then took part in the formation and creation of the new Sixth Department for the Struggle Against Organized Crime of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. While in this post, I was invited to work in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs as deputy chief of the Inter-regional Department for Struggle Against Drug Traffic in the territory of the North Caucasus. During this time there took place a training period in the FRG in line with the new appointment. After the breaking up of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs I was invited to create this subdivision in the territory of the North Caucasus, which is what I worked on.

[Malbakhova] How justified is the presence of an independent subdivision for organized crime of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs when such departments exist in the territorial organs of internal affairs?

[Yeshugaov] The criminal world has changed. It has expanded its influence not only on the social but also on the geographic plane. If state relations have weakened, criminal ones, on the contrary, acquire an increasingly stable character.

The creation of such a subdivision had many reasons, including the unabating Osetino-Ingush, the Abkhaz-Georgian, and the Armenian-Azerbaijan armed conflicts, and the confrontational policy of Chechnia in relation to Russia.

The North Caucasus has become a convenient place for the acquisition and sale of weapons, the hi-jacking and sale of means of transport and many other no less serious manifestations of the criminal milieu.

The crimes themselves, as a rule, have ceased to have a local character. They can begin in one republic, develop in another, and be realized in a third. Our tasks include the coordination of the activity and the extension of practical assistance to all territorial organs for organized crime in the North Caucasus.

Quite recently, for example, an operation was completed to arrest criminals during the delivery of fire arms destined for sale, in which, together with us, staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kabardino-Balkaria and Stavropol Kray took part. Forty-nine automatic weapons were confiscated. Jointly with the UOP [Office for Combating Organized Crime] of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, we are conducting an investigation into a case concerning the sale of a large batch of drugs, more than a thousand ampoules, stolen, according to our information, from pharmaceutical institutions.

A group of criminals was arrested, inhabitants of Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnia, from whom 26 million in counterfeit money were confiscated. The success of this operation was also attained through joint efforts. Our administration is handling more than 30 operational investigations, including a certain part dealing with the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

[[Malbakhova] They say that in the employment of staff members in your subdivision preference is given to those who are not residents of the republic.

[Yeshugaov] In the formation of staffs we proceed only from the professional suitability of the candidates and we put the moral qualities of people in first place. Representatives of 13 nationalities are working in our administration, and among them also Kabards and Balkars. Many of our staff members are former paratroopers, masters of sports, military officers who have lived through Afghanistan, have the title of Honored Workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, decorated with the orders and medals "For Bravery" and "For Personal Courage."

[Malbakhova] How does your subdivision differ from similar territorial ones?

[Yeshugaov] First of all, we are better equipped technically. We have more powerful means of transportation; if necessary, even helicopters are put at our disposal, since the entire North Caucasus region is our zone of operation. Appeals for our assistance come from Perm, Kursk, Ryazan, and Magadan in order, in cooperation with the Chechen organs of internal affairs, to solve the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

[Malbakhov] Why do you single out the Chechen Republic?

[Yeshugaov] Because it singled itself out. Proceeding from the reports of the press and radio about the Chechen mafia and the frequently hypertrophied rumors about disorders in the republic, internal affairs staff members from the Russian regions do not go there, fearing refusal of assistance by representatives of the law enforcement services of Ichkeria. We are successful in getting this cooperation; for example, our people took part in the liberation of two hostages from Moscow, who were held in the territory of the republic for over 2 months.

Secondly, we have subdivisions that the territorial administrations do not have. For example, a department for the introduction of new forms of operational and intelligence activity.

[Malbakhova] What does this department do?

[Yeshugaov] It develops and introduces new methods of work in the criminal sphere.

[Malbakhova] What is the result of your work after a year of existence, and what are you engaged in at the present time?

[Yeshugaov] As the result of the operations that have been conducted valuables worth R4.5 billion have been confiscated from criminals, several thousand units of ammunition, two rocket launchers, 142 kilograms of explosives in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic. It is necessary to work in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict together with the operational and investigation group and the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs for the ascertainment, investigation and release of hostages.

We take part in the investigation of crimes that have been perpetrated by members of revolutionary groups. For example, [the investigation] regarding the exposure of the murder of V. Polyanichko—the former head of the provisional administration.

[Malbakhova] Can one call it a political crime?

[Yeshugaov] The work has not yet been completed, but all of its participants are known. The only thing remaining is their arrest.

[Malbakhova] Incidentally, why do the representatives of the law enforcement organs in their numerous press conferences regarding the exposure of various sorts of

crimes utilize such answers: "The situation is under control." "We know the names of all the participants," and so on. Journalists perceive such statements as subterfuges, an escape from direct answers.

[Yeshugaov] I disagree in principle with such assertions. To our great regret, according to data of the analytical center of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, only one-third of the organized crime groups are known. . .

[Malbakhova] Could you not tell us about the most serious cases on which you are now working?

[Yeshugaov] We are investigating the theft of large monetary assets carried out through the forgery of bank documents, and the creation of fake enterprises in the territory of Dagestan. Ninety investigators and as many operational workers are taking part in it. From this you can conclude what the "dimension" of crime is.

Recently, according to our operational materials, we instituted criminal proceedings, in accordance with which about 100 motor vehicles are being confiscated that were stolen, among 400 others, from the Nizhni Novgorod Automobile Plant. . .

[Malbakhova] Have you in your practice encountered cases with mafia manifestations?

[Yeshugaov] The case of the theft of 400 motor vehicles, which I mention, is in the stage of investigation and a great deal remains to be illuminated. But already now, as soon as we started to confiscate transportation, the deputy plant director for marketing, has shot himself. For the time being, we do not yet have reason to believe that the suicide took place because of the involvement of the director of the enterprise in this crime. But the very fact points to corresponding changes of the investigation.

[Malbakhova] What are the basic characteristics of the manifestations of organized crime in the region?

[Yeshugaov] First of all, the high degree to which criminals and the population in general are armed. Every third serious crime is committed with the use of fire arms or in their presence. Secondly, gangsterism in pure form. Somewhere in the region there is less, for example, in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, and somewhere there is more—in Dagestan.

Attack on motor transport, cargo theft, the murder of drivers. Thirdly, all conceivable machinations with securities—counterfeit, forgery of bank documents. These trends are not subsiding.

[Malbakhova] What can you say about the two murders in Nalchik: In the barbershop and the "Audi-500" motor vehicle? According to rumors, this was a quarrel of two gangs.

[Yeshugaov] We have not worked on this case.

[Malbakhova] Why? Is this not a manifestation of organized crime?

[Yeshugaov] In terms of our functional obligations, we work on inter-republic and inter-state cases of organized crime. Although I can say that not a single serious case remains outside of our purview. The presence of quarrels characterizes the level of organized crime. But in the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria their intensiveness is not great. Close by, in Mineralnyye Vody, we have many more of them, but in Dagestan up to 160 terrorist acts with explosions and similar affairs. Moreover, whole groups of criminals take part in the quarrels, in this case one can suppose the settling of accounts of two enemies.

[Malbakhova] What, in your view, are the reasons for the growth in crime?

[Yeshugaov] This is the seamy side of the political, social, and economic processes that are taking place in society. The militia can influence some one trend, but to put a stop to this growth as a whole is beyond its strength.

Beginning in 1982, the law enforcement organs have been in constant change. Because of low salaries, 600,000 high-class specialists in their time left the internal affairs organs. It was at that time, in my view, that the inadmissible rapprochement of the poles of the criminal world and the law enforcement services took place. In many respects this is connected with the material aspect.

According to the data of our Main Administration, 500 cases have been recorded where action was brought against staff members of the militia who had become members of criminal groups. In our Administration, there is a special subdivision that monitors our own staff members. A similar structural unit exists in many special services in the world. And I think that in the present conditions it is necessary.

To the reasons for the growth in crime one can add the factor of impunity. At a recent conference in the Main Administration it was stated that there are 120 cases, where gangsters were released from custody by the unjustified decision of courts. And this means that their subsequent decisions will still be more audacious and impudent. One cannot but single out the inertness of society itself. If all citizens of the country cease [as published] to be so passive and individual means of reaction to criminal manifestations remain, indifference to the fate of others and fear for their own will remain high.

The reports of the law enforcement organs on the criminal situation in the country at times remind one of fragments of "hard-boiled" Western police films. We have already become quite accustomed to all the horrors being created by criminals which are talked about on TV screens and simply in the people. Because of this there is a special demand of the law enforcement organs, for they are the guardians of the law. But, apparently, it is worth thinking about the fact that all the claims which society is making on the militia service must also be addressed

to society itself as a whole, which is suffering from a shortage of spirituality, morality, purity of thoughts, and hence just causes as well.

Kazan 1993 Budget Reviewed

944F0747A Kazan KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 26 May 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The City Budget for 1993"]

[Text] Starting with today's issue we will be publishing materials from the 28th session of the city soviet of people's deputies.

We offer for your attention the statement of the revenues and expenditures of Kazan in 1993 submitted by the chief of the city financial administration V. Titov and the resolution "On Local Taxes and Fees."

Kazan began 1993 without an approved budget, but specialists of finance and tax organs and leaders of the city and rayons were working under calmer circumstances. Having had the stressful experience of 1992, the city accumulated a small reserve of financial resources in the amount of 2.2 billion rubles [R].

The first to be financed were immediate expenditures on wages, grants, stipends, medications, and food, compensations for children, and costs of acquiring equipment. [Line(s) missing] financing of repair and capital construction.

But again it was necessary to make a request to the republic finance minister, D. Nagumanov, to allot the city an interest-free budget loan, which would make it possible to solve many problems in city management and the sociocultural sphere and to grant financial aid to rayons and enterprises that had found themselves in an extremely difficult financial position.

Only on 28 April 1993 did the deputies of the city soviet approve the city budget and take under advisement the consolidated budget of Kazan for revenues; for expenditures—R54 billion, with a deficit of R7 billion or 18 percent [line(s) missing].

The rayon leaders were urged to look for new revenues and to utilize budget funds economically. There was a concrete plan of extraordinary measures for the period from May through December 1993 for each city service and for each rayon. Thus revenues amounting to R246 billion were mobilized.

The main sources of revenue for the city budget in 1993 were:

- profit tax—R94.2 billion;
- income tax on individuals—R29.2 billion;
- property tax—R3.6 billion;
- land fees—R1.7 billion

—revenues from privatization—R46.5 million;

—water fees—R59 million, and other receipts.

With the help of local taxes and fees approved by the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies an additional R2.6 billion was mobilized for the budget. Moreover additional income was collected in keeping with decisions of administrative commissions in the amount of R222 million, fees collected for automotive inspection—50 [lines missing]...books—R387 million, and the sums received from raising prices above the maximum level of profitability—R365 million. Other reserves were utilized as well, for example, tax on profit of enterprises with foreign capital amounted to a total of R14 million, the tax on profit from intermediary operations—R25 million, the tax on operations with securities—R108 million, and fees for transactions conducted on commodity markets—R5 million. So the developing market structures are capable of providing the city's treasury with considerable funds in the future.

Because the growth rates of expenditures considerably outstripped the growth rates of revenues, the financing of the local economy and the sociocultural sphere was extremely strained. Practically all of the overfulfillment of the revenue part of the city budget was used to cover costs related to indexation of material expenditures and the wage increase. More than R15 billion was spent just on raising wages of workers of the sociocultural sphere.

On the whole, expenditures from the city budget amounted to R169 billion:

R81 billion was spent on the economy;

R69 billion—on sociocultural measures;

R44 billion—on the development of housing and municipal services enterprises;

R35 billion—on capital investments in various branches;

R16 billion on capital repair of roads and maintenance.

R3 billion was spent on capital repair of residential buildings and yard areas, which made it possible to repair 70,500 square meters of apartments and restore the facades on 327 buildings. R534 million was spent on routine maintenance of cemeteries.

An amount of R19 billion was allotted to make up for the declining revenues of housing and municipal service enterprises and organizations. Allotted from the budget for housing operations organizations was R8 billion just to cover planned losses caused by the sharp increase in the cost of materials and heat and electric energy.

In 1993 there was a significant increase in the proportion of financing of city electric transportation with city budget funds since the actual revenues of the transportation workers compensated for only 3.3 percent of the costs of transporting passengers. Thus the average cost of

transporting one passenger on city electric transportation was R65, of which R58 or 89.2 percent was paid from the city budget. On the acquisition of 17 streetcars [line(s) missing]... cultural institutions in 1993, R56.2 billion or 33.2 percent was allotted from the state budget. Some R25.5 billion was spent on public health. Costs of food and medications came close to R5 billion. The same amount was spent on capital repair of treatment institutions.

An amount of R13 billion was allotted for the development of cultural institutions. With these funds they managed to finance 24 children's music and art schools, 66 libraries, a zoo, and the Central Park of Culture and Recreation. More than R190 million was spent on partial reimbursement for costs of editing the city's newspapers SHAKHRI KAZAN and KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI; and on the creation of city programs of the Efir television company and the Radio and Passazh organizations—more than R37 million.

A total of R28 billion was spent on the development of public education, of which R10 billion went for wages. Last year about R7 billion was spent on repair of schools and other educational facilities; on the acquisition of computers—R125 million, and on the repair of school dining rooms and the purchase of equipment for them—R600 million. In 1993 local soviets included on the balance sheet 51 children's departmental preschool institutions, whose maintenance took R990 million.

Some R136 million was allotted for mass sports measures and capital repair of the Central Stadium imeni Lenin; R17 million was allotted for maintaining 12 movie theaters that were transferred to city ownership.

The reinforcement of the material and technical base of the municipal militia and the maintenance of its subdivisions cost the budget R1.5 billion.

Expenditures on maintaining organizations of representative and executive powers of Kazan amounted [line(s) missing] ... required collecting budget funds in a volume of R50 billion, including for housing construction—R18 billion, municipal construction—R16 billion, construction for public education—R4 billion, and public health—R9 billion. Some R2.6 billion was spent on compensation for the rising cost of construction of housing construction cooperatives, and R400 million on the draft of the General Plan for the Development of Kazan.

Alignment of Sverdlovsk Political Forces Surveyed

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in Russian 5 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by A. Khuzin: "On the Theatre of Party Activities"]

[Text] Our newspaper sometimes reports on the political forces of the oblast. What kind of forces are these, and

what specifically do they do, for example in the electoral campaigns?—V. SHARKOV, Sysertskiy Rayon.

The time of inception

The first and last elections of USSR people's deputies in 1989 led to a bipolarization of our civil society. For Sverdlovsk Oblast specifically this meant a conditional division of its residents into the "party of the Month" and the "party of Kudrin." The personified "multiparty system" was one of the stages of its birth. The groups supporting the candidates for deputy became that germ of future parties whose inception occurred specifically during the time of introduction of alternative choice into the country's political system. Not even 9 months had passed after the elections to the union parliament, and the first child was born in the Central Urals—the "Democratic Choice Movement" (DCM).

The next elections, to the Russian parliament, also took place under conditions of bipolarity of civil society, but it was already of a higher level. There was a transition from the personified "bipartisanism" to an organized one—the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the DCM competed against each other. And so, finally, the elections in December of 1993 demonstrated the polycentric party system. For the first time in many years, we saw voting according to party lists.

In Russia, as we know, they are slow to hitch up the horses, but then they ride rather fast. And so it was in the question of a multiparty system, the country will evidently soon find itself "at the head of the entire planet." According to the lists of the RF Minyust [Russian Federation Ministry of Justice], over 120 organizations had the opportunity of participating in the December elections. Over 50 of them decided to exercise this opportunity, but only 35 engaged in gathering of voter signatures needed for participation in the elections under the proportional system. Twenty-one organizations gathered the required number of signatures. However, our very rich traditions of "holding and not letting in" allowed only 13 electoral associations to enter the final stretch. Moreover, "quite by accident" it happened that one of the primary political associations—the National Patriotic Association—"left" the arena of struggle. This, specifically, may explain the phenomenon of the Liberal-Democratic Party, which received the greatest number of votes.

The process of mutual development of political pluralism and the electoral system for the present day is still far from its conclusion. This is true of the multi-party system, where the increase in numbers no longer facilitates the development of quality. This is true also of the system of elections, where we have noted shameless administrative intervention in the process of certain subjects of the electoral campaign. If we take specifically Sverdlovsk Oblast, we see the immaturity of the system of elections to the oblast Duma and the organs of local self-government prior to elections under the proportional system, or according to party lists.

'Bumps and bruises' from past elections

The December elections to the RF [Russian Federation] Federal Assembly are still fresh in our minds. Undoubtedly, their dominant factor was the activity, agitational and organizational, of the parties, movements and blocks, which facilitated the continued re-structuring of civil society. However, it is not difficult to note their main peculiarity—weak social roots, a strong cadre-oriented character, and a non-systematic method of work.

Even before the elections, it was quite obvious that the upcoming campaign would lead to changes in the power ratio between the center and the regions, in favor of the former. The elections by party lists gave an undisputed priority to the candidates from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Even the introduction of the standard on the right to break down the party list of candidates for deputy into regional groups did not help. Plus, by some inscrutable administrative means, the electoral districts in the center turned out to be smaller in their number of voters than those in the provincial regions. And this meant that there were relatively more of them. Why should we now be surprised when around 62 percent of the deputies in the State Duma are from Moscow?

Another rather new situation for us is the change in the relationship between the role of the individual and the organization. The introduction of party lists made it possible for individual candidates to seemingly hide behind the curtain of the party or the leader of their block, as a result of which there has been a depersonification of the candidate corps. Many of those who "did not get the light" of mandate got into the Duma.

The next peculiarity which we cannot discount is the fact that the "apical nature" of parties conditions the formulation of a certain elitiness of the elections. A sort of closed system (group of persons) is formed, which by the method of a periodic "shuffling of the cards" holds in its hands the authority of power. To this one might object: What is so bad about that? After all, the formation of a stable elite in society facilitates its stable development. Furthermore, politics is not a matter for housewives. However, there is another side to this coin: Our elite, as a rule, is far from being uniform, and periodic "bulldog fights under the rug" cannot facilitate the development of true democracy, i.e., people's power.

12 December for Sverdlovsk Oblast, as, we might add, also for many other oblasts, became a notable day: For the first time, the majority of voters did not come to the electoral districts. Thus, one of the most widespread, age-old and chronic illnesses of traditional democracies—absenteeism (the refusal to vote in the elections) came also to our parts. It is interesting that preliminary polls conducted by the Committee on Relations with Public Associations under the oblast government showed that 42-54 percent of the voters intended to participate in the voting. There were some hopes placed on the "undecided" voters, particularly since no more than

one-fourth of those surveyed categorically refused to vote. Nevertheless, the result was somewhat surprising—51 percent of the voters on the average throughout the oblast refused to vote.

We may cite many reasons why this happened, and far from the last one of these is the factor of great polyvariation of the political choice. Many with whom we had occasion to speak since 12 December said just that: There were so many parties and candidates that it was impossible to sort them out, and therefore there was no sense in voting.

Our sociological surveys came to the same conclusion. In mid-November, only one in ten respondents considered himself informed on the platforms of the parties and candidates. Approximately four out of five persons surveyed in different parts of the Central Urals noted that they did not know about the draft constitution, the statute on elections and the programs of those hoping to be elected to the Federal Assembly.

So what is the choice?

According to the all-federal party lists, there were 37 people nominated from Sverdlovsk Oblast. Among them: From "Choice of Russia"—10; from the Democratic Party (Travkin)—5; from the "Future of Russia—New Names" block—5; from the Movement for Democratic Reform (Sobchak)—3; from PRES [Party for Russian Unity and Accord] (Shakhray)—3; from "KEDR"—3; two each from the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia], the Agrarian Party and the "Civic Union", and one each from the Russian Communist Party and "Yabloko." Thus, out of 13 blocks our oblast countrymen were represented in 11 of them.

Altogether by territorial okrugs in the oblast there were 34 candidates presented. Of those, three were from the double-mandate district to the Federation Council, 22 were from blocks and parties, and 12 were from the groups of electors to the State Duma.

And so, what choice did we make?

Most apparent is the rather small percentage of those who voted against all the electoral blocks—only 3. We may assume that the main mass of those who did not come to the polls was also "against everyone."

The political breakdown of forces among the oblast's voters may easily be expressed in a table, grouping together all the electoral blocks and groups: The presidential ("Choice of Russia," Yabloko, PRES and RDDR [Russian Movement for Democratic Reform]; the centrist ("Future of Russia—New Names," "Civic Union," the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], "Dignity and Charity," "KEDR," and "Women of Russia") and the opposition (CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], APR [Agrarian Party of Russia], LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia]). The results of the voting by percentage of voters were as follows:

District	Pro-presidential	Centrist	Opposition	Against all blocks
Artemovskiy	32	13	37	5
Verkh-Isetskii	57	14	17	5
Kamensk-Ural	44	19	23	5
Nizhnetagil	47	17	22	5
Ordzhonikidze	58	14	17	4
Pervouralsk	40	18	28	5
Serovskiy	45	19	24	6
All	46	17	24	—

As we see from the figures presented above, the fellow countrymen of the first RF [Russian Federation] President on the whole retain their ties. The elections to the Federal Assembly also showed an exceptional weakness and erosion of the political center and a considerable polarization of society. Evidently, the times of the centrists have not yet come, and the logic of the "revolutionary" situation and civic opposition remains in force. The weakness of the center is explained by its fragmentation, by the high degree of differentiation of these forces, by the absence of a unifying organizational principle and an outstanding individual capable of organizing the center.

Unlike the blocks of general political forces, the elections showed the weakness of the functional blocks which are oriented toward a certain social group or social problem. The only exception to this was the "Women of Russia," which won 8 percent of the votes.

Such a peculiarity of the elections as lack of correspondence of political affiliations of many voters in voting on different bulletins also did not escape the eye of the specialists. For example, in the Artemovskiy Electoral District, where the candidates for the State Duma represented the most varied political forces, by party lists the LDPR was victorious, by the single-mandate district—the candidate from the Agrarian Party, and the majority upheld the presidential draft constitution. And the same voters were voting on all of these.

The main characters

There are already over 700 public associations registered with the oblast justice administration. The most numerous group of these is represented by various funds—around 15 percent. Sports and cultural organizations comprise approximately the same amount.

Twelve percent of those registered are youth organizations, the largest of which is the oblast organization of the Russian Union of Youth, the Association of Student Youth, the section of the Russian Union of Young Entrepreneurs, and the Association of Youth Organizations.

A large relative share is comprised of organizations of former military servicemen and veteran's organizations (around 8 percent), invalids (around 5 percent), and

women (around 2 percent). Of the ecological organizations (around 4 percent), most are territorial sections of the "Chernobyl" Union.

The dominant role among professional organizations belongs to the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Sverdlovsk Oblast, aside from which there are the Independent Trade Union of Miners, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the Partnership of Trade Unions of the city of Yekaterinburg.

The Sverdlovsk Oblast Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs was the most influential among entrepreneurial organizations.

Cossack associations comprise the registered Cossack stanitsas [villages], which are affiliated with two primary organizations: The Yekaterinburg section of the Orenburg Cossack Troops [OCT] and the Isetskii section of the OCT.

There are around 50 organizations registered with the oblast justice administration which have a clearly expressed political character. These comprise over 6 percent of the overall number. One in every three has all-Russian status, one in six has oblast status, and every other one has city or rayon status. One in six speaks out as a political party, and one in four—as a rights protection organization.

The absolute figures are not presented here for one reason—their make-up is constantly changing: Some "fade into history," others register again, and still others re-register under new names.

By the beginning of March the oblast electoral commission had registered 29 public associations which wanted to take part in the elections. These may be divided into specifically political (party and non-party) and functional (corporate) groups.

The political group is made up of about 12 organizations which are usually called "democrats," 4 centrist organizations ("Transformation of the Urals," "Ural Center," DPR, and RSM [Russian Union of Youth], and finally, 7 opposition organizations—of communist, socialist and national-patriotic directionality.

The second group is comprised of associations which have a clear function of reflecting the interests of a

specific category. The "Russian Fund for Charity and Health," the "Beer Lovers Society", etc. may also conditionally be classed in this group.

Many socio-political associations have for a comparatively long time been preparing for the struggle for seats in the oblast Duma and the organs of local self-government. The temporary statutes on elections which were ratified by the head of administration clearly did not suit them by the very procedure by which they are held as well as by the number of seats in the representative bodies and the functions of these bodies.

The definite dissatisfaction with the rules of the pre-electoral struggle nevertheless did not decrease the number of those wishing to participate in them. The change in principles, according to which the elections will be conducted on 10 April, defined a certain regrouping of the political forces. One of the main determining factors will evidently become the multi-mandate districts.

The political blocks which had consolidated before the 13 December elections began to break up in order to try to win the maximum number of mandates in the multi-mandate districts. Thus, for example, "Choice of Russia" "fell apart" into "Choice of Russia" proper, the Fund for Support of the First RF President, "Our City," "Rebirth of Self-Government and Regions," "Action," "Rebirth," the Party of Economic Freedom and the Republican Party.

The opposition forces had not joined together in the last elections, and they are also speaking out individually at the upcoming ones. The rise in the ratings of the communist and socialist organizations which has recently become apparent organizationally inspires the leftist opposition embodied by the oblast organizations of the CPRF (V. Novoselov), RCWP [Russian Communist Workers' Party] (V. Sarvarov), the "Rabochiy" ["Worker"] association, as well as the association of workers. The national-patriots will be represented at the elections by "Russian Union" (V. Ilyish).

Around 70 percent of the oblast residents polled in February of this year had already decided which political forces they would vote for. Thirty spoke out in support of the independent candidates. Naturally, the results of such a survey do not yet warrant far-reaching conclusions. However, they did illuminate certain tendencies and proportions. We may assume that the future oblast Duma will be divided into four parts: One-fourth will represent the democratic orientation, one-fifth—the centrist, another one-fifth—the opposition, and one-third will remain with the "independents." The final breakdown of forces in the Duma, of course, will depend on the degree of "independence" of the latter, and one conclusion is apparent already today: The deputies of this Duma are simply doomed to cooperation, and this will require of them a high degree of political and purely human tolerance.

Sverdlovsk First Quarter Socioeconomic Statistics Published

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[Article by the Sverdlovsk Oblast Statistical Administration: "The Start of the 'Great Depression'? On the Socio-Economic Development of Sverdlovsk Oblast in the First Quarter of 1994"]

[Text] In the first quarter of the current year, oblast industrial enterprises produced products (work, services) in the amount of 2754.0 billion rubles (R) in effective prices, including R1097.2 billion in March. This exceeds by 4.8 and 4.5 times, respectively, the level for the corresponding periods of last year. In comparable prices, the volumes of production have declined by 26.5 percent as compared with the level of the first quarter of 1993, and for March—by 28.4 percent. This is evidence of the decline in output of basic types of products by enterprises in all sectors of industry. The scope of reduction in product output differs significantly by sectors and types of production.

Industry

Due to the reduced demand, production in ferrous metallurgy in the first quarter declined as compared to the level of the corresponding period last year. For finished rolled stock this decline comprised 11.2 percent, for low-alloy steel rolled stock it was 55.6 percent, for bent sections—by 60.8 percent, for cold-rolled sheet stock—by 79.5 percent, and for steel—by 13.9 percent. At the same time, the smelting of cast iron increased by 8,900 tonnes (0.7 percent). Its growth was noted at only one enterprise—the Nizhnetagilsk Metallurgical Combine (by 31,200 tonnes).

The changes in market conditions on the domestic and world markets and the high, world-level, prices on aluminum sharply limited the demand, as a result of which the volume of aluminum production declined by 15.8 percent.

In machine building, due to the decrease in solvent demand of consumers, there was a significant reduction in the output of many types of goods. Thus, the production of oil drilling equipment declined by 34.2 percent, of chemical equipment—by 57.3 percent, metallurgical equipment—by 55.7 percent, and equipment for light industry—by 81.2 percent.

Due to the shortage of the necessary raw goods and materials (domestic as well as those coming from abroad), the volume of production in the enterprises of the chemical and petrochemical industry was reduced by 20.1 percent. This included a decline in production of sulphuric acid by 28,400 tonnes (or 16.1 percent), of synthetic resins and plastics—by 5,900 tonnes (40.7 percent), of polyvinylchloride plastics—by 587 tonnes (24.2 percent), and of automobile tires and motorcycle covers—by 26 percent.

The enterprises of the lumber, wood processing and cellulose-paper industry continue to reduce production of basic types of products. In the lumber industry, the output of commercial lumber declined by more than one-third as compared with the level for the corresponding period last year. This has led to a reduction in production of many types of products in the sector: Lumber (by 197,000 cubic meters, or 32 percent), plywood (by 3,932 cubic meters, or 20.3 percent), fiberboard (by 1.5 times), and prefabricated wood houses (by 7.6 times). In the cellulose-paper industry, as a result of difficulties with the sale of products which have increased many times over in price, the output of paper has declined by 3,625 tonnes (55.7 percent). At the same time, the output of writing and notebook paper has declined by 2.7 times, and of cardboard—by 6.4 times.

In the building materials industry, the rate of decline in product production as compared with the level of the corresponding period for last year comprised: For cement—33.7 percent, asbestos—0.6-48.4 percent, masonry materials—20.3 percent, and pane glass—40.6 percent. This was the result of a decline in the volumes of construction.

The overall decline in industrial production, the decline in demand and the reduction in provision of electrical power to consumers as a result of their many months of indebtedness to power producers, as well as interruptions in fuel deliveries, and specifically Ekibastuz coal, all had an impact on the state of affairs in electrical power production. In the first quarter of this year, electrical power generation declined by 17.2 percent as compared with the corresponding period for last year.

Volume of consumer goods production

For the first quarter of the current year, the volume of consumer goods production comprised R464.7 billion, which is 20.8 percent below the level for the corresponding period last year. This includes the output of R182.0 billion in food products.

In the first quarter, the production of 3 out of 12 basic types of food products increased as compared with the level for the corresponding period last year. These were: Meat and category 1 by-products (increase of 7.2 percent), sausage goods (25.9 percent), and mayonnaise (13.6 percent). However, there were 20.3 percent less whole-milk products produced, 13.4 percent less butter, 22.3 percent less margarine, 17.8 percent less bread and bakery goods, 6.4 percent less confectionery goods, 25.1 percent less fish products, 3.7 percent less flour and 27.9 percent less cereals.

The volume of production of wine and vodka products for the reporting period declined by more than half as compared with the level for the corresponding period last year. Out of 9 titles of non-food items which are in everyday demand, and on which observation is conducted, the output of 8 titles declined in the first quarter. The most significant decline was seen in production of all types of fabrics (by 76.7 percent), leather shoes (by

60.6 percent), and woven footwear (by 70.3). The output of children's goods, being the least profitable, continues to decline at a faster rate than other light industry goods. Thus, the production of children's shoes declined by 73.4 percent as compared with the corresponding level for last year, and of tricot goods—by 36.2 percent.

For a number of household appliance goods (washing machines, electric teapots, radio receivers), the output declined by 70-75 percent as compared with the level for the first quarter of last year.

The production of steel enamel-coated cookware and needles for household sewing machines decreased significantly (by 90 percent), as did the production of porcelain-china dishware (by 44.0 percent).

Capital construction

In the first quarter of the current year, enterprises held under all forms of ownership in the oblast assimilated R349.4 billion in capital investments, which is 7.6 times higher than the level for the corresponding period last year. At the same time, prices on construction products increased by 9.5 times. Of the overall volume, the greatest relative share of capital investments falls to state enterprises and organizations—R207.9 billion (59 percent of the volume of capital investments). R214.8 billion (61 percent) were used for construction of facilities to be used for production.

Centralized capital investments in the oblast's national economy for the first quarter comprised R67.5 billion (72 percent of the level for the corresponding period last year). Of those, local budget funds comprised R50.6 billion (77 percent), federal budget funds—R16.9 billion (59 percent), funds of enterprises and organizations themselves—R247.9 billion (83 percent), preferential investment credits—R1.3 billion (96 percent), and state extra-budgetary investment funds—R32.7 billion (73 percent).

In the non-production sphere, R134.7 billion were assimilated (39 percent of the volume of capital investments, as compared with 43 percent in the first quarter of last year). Of those, housing construction comprised R99.3 billion (74 percent of the volume of capital investments in facilities of non-production function), public health facilities—R5.7 billion (4 percent), children's preschool institutions—R1.1 billion (0.8 percent), general education schools—R3.7 billion (3 percent), municipal services facilities—R16.4 billion (12 percent), and other facilities—R8.4 billion (6 percent).

For the reporting period, enterprises held under all forms of ownership placed into operation 2,274 apartments with total area of 138,500 square meters (76 percent of the level for the first quarter of last year). Among these were 34 apartments in rural areas with total area of 4,300 square meters (144 percent). State enterprises channeled R45.5 billion in capital investments into housing construction (46 percent of the volume of capital investments), and placed into operation 52,300 square meters

of housing (38 percent of the overall operational introduction). Municipal enterprises respectively introduced R24.9 billion (25 percent) and 47,800 square meters (35 percent); mixed enterprises—R24.0 billion (24 percent) and 21,900 square meters (16 percent), and private enterprises—R5.0 billion (5 percent) and 16,500 square meters (11 percent). Through its own funds, the public built 59 houses and 60 apartments with overall area of 6,431 square meters (100.7 percent). This included 5 houses with overall area of 426 square meters (89 percent) placed into operation in rural areas.

Transport and communications.

The volume of cargo shipped by general use transport declined by 22.4 million tonnes (37 percent) as compared with the first quarter of 1993. Moreover, cargo shipments by railroad transport declined by 29 percent and by automobile transport—52 percent, while air cargo shipments increased by 5.9 times. The lower tariff on cargo shipments by railroad transport led to an increase in the relative share of cargo shipped by rail, from 62 percent in the first quarter of 1993 to 70 percent in the reporting year. The sharp increase in the volume of cargo shipped by air transport, despite the higher tariffs as compared with other types of transport, was caused by the increasing entrepreneurial activity.

Passenger turnover on general use transport increased by 8 percent as compared with the first quarter of 1993. Part of the population changed over to the relatively cheaper railroad transport, where passenger turnover increased by 13 percent. The passenger turnover of automobile transport declined by 9 percent, and of air transport—by 2 percent. Buses along suburban and inter-city routes made 7 percent fewer runs, and 4 percent fewer in cities, as compared with the first quarter of last year.

By 1 April, 15 general use motor transport enterprises had been privatized (24 percent of their overall number). They transported 70 percent of the entire volume of cargo and 6 percent of the passengers. The decline in volume of cargo shipments by privatized enterprises comprised 48 percent, and by state enterprises—60 percent.

For the first quarter of the current year, communications enterprises provided R37.2 billion worth of communications services, including R10.3 billion worth to the public. In actual prices this is 14 times more than in the first quarter of last year.

Agriculture

PREPARATION FOR SPRING PLANTING. The oblast's agricultural enterprises are performing preparatory work for the Spring planting. As of 1 April 1994, the oblast's farms were generally well provided with seeds of grain and leguminous crops. However, potato seeds are not available in full volume, since in the Fall of last year the farms in many rayons stored poor quality seeds. By the start of April of the current year, the relative share of

substandard seeds of Spring grain crops remains high, and comprised 11 percent. The amount of first class sowing-standard seeds on hand comprises 9 percent, and second class—34 percent.

In March, the rate of preparation of farm equipment for sowing had increased somewhat. However, the amount of equipment which is in a state of disrepair exceeds the level for 1 April of last year, and comprises 27 percent of the available tractors (8 percent greater than for the corresponding date last year), 24 percent of trucks (5 percent greater), 30 percent of tractor sowers (11 percent greater), and 35 percent of the tractor-pulled plows (8 percent greater). A considerable portion of such equipment in Achitskiy, Verkhoturkiy, Garinskiy, Tavdinskiy and Tugulymkiy Rayons has not been repaired.

The question of providing the farms with basic types of petroleum products remains acute. The availability of diesel fuel in the agricultural enterprises as of 1 April 1994 comprised 4,700 tonnes (34 percent of the level of last year), and gasoline—3,800 tonnes (47 percent). Moreover, in Artinskiy, Baykalovski, Verkhoturkiy, Garinskiy, Irbitskiy, Kamyshevskiy, N.-Lyapinskiy, Severskiy, Taborinskiy, Talitskiy and Shalinskiy Rayons the reserves of diesel fuel and gasoline comprise less than half of the reserves available on the same date last year. We might add that the reserves of diesel fuel cover only 8 percent of the needs of farms in performing the sowing, and of gasoline—only 14 percent.

LIVESTOCK RAISING. The decline in herd size of livestock and poultry continued in the first quarter of the current year. As of 1 April 1994, the number of cattle comprised 489,700 head (89 percent of the level for the corresponding period in 1993), including cows—191,500 (91 percent), pigs—311,200 (85 percent), and poultry—13,622,000 head (95 percent). Also, there were 6 percent fewer calves born, and 20 percent fewer piglets. Losses from epizootic disease and deaths surpassed last year's level by 70 and 45 percent, respectively.

For the reporting period, agricultural enterprises sold 34,600 tonnes of livestock and poultry to slaughter, and obtained 113,200 tonnes of milk and 327.9 million chicken eggs. For the reporting period of the current year, 32,700 tonnes of livestock and poultry went to state resources (105 percent of the level for the corresponding period of 1993) at an average purchase price of R934,000 per tonne; 88,800 tonnes of milk (82 percent) at R170,000 per tonne, and 244.9 million eggs (86 percent) at R68,000 per thousand. Eighty-eight tonnes of livestock and poultry and 297 tonnes of milk were purchased from individual farmers.

On 1 April of this year there were 3,100 peasant (individual farmer) farms registered, which were given 92,600 hectares of land, or an average of 29.5 hectares for each farmer. In the last two years, 616 individual farmers ceased their activity for various reasons.

In the first quarter of the current year, land continued to be parcelled out to citizens. 2,400 families received 271

hectares of land for the purpose of developing collective orchardry, and 6 hectares were parcelled out to 375 families for collective gardens.

Prices and tariffs

In the first quarter of 1994, the rate of inflation was significantly lower than in the fourth quarter of last year. The consumer price index on goods and services in March comprised 133.7 percent of the level for December of 1993. If we do not count the non-essential goods and services, this figure is 136 percent (in the fourth quarter of 1993 these figures were 165.4 and 163.4 percent, respectively). The rates of inflation on the full range of goods and services in January and February comprised 11.6 percent and in March—7.4 percent. Discounting non-essential goods and services, in January this figure was 11.5 percent, in February—12.2 percent, and in March—8.7 percent.

As they did last year, the prices and tariffs on paid services provided to the population increased in greater amount, exhibiting a growth of 2.8 times. The growth of prices on food products for the quarter comprised 27.4 percent, and on non-food products—21.2 percent. Of the food products, the greatest price increases since the beginning of the year have been on milk and dairy products, fish, cheeses, vegetables, canned vegetables, potatoes and salt (by 1.5-1.7 times). Of the non-food products, the greatest price increases were on printed publications (by 2 times) and medicines (by 1.6 times).

The minimum standard food ration in March was estimated at R49,800 rubles, and as compared with December of 1993 its amount increased by R16,400 rubles, or by 1.5 times.

The greatest increase in rates on paid services provided to the population took place for municipal services: Rents in houses of the municipal housing fund increased by 47 times on the average throughout the oblast, fees for hot water supply—by 13 times, for cold water and sewage—by 11 times, and for heating—by 9 times. Rates for payment of housing and municipal services in various cities (rayons) of the oblast added up to the following amounts: Rent—R11-R120 for a square meter of general housing area; heating—R35-R200 rubles per meter; hot water supply—R100-R870; cold water and sewage—R68-R742 per person per month.

In the first quarter of 1994, the rates of growth in consumer prices and wholesale prices on products of industrial enterprises came closer together. In March, wholesale prices increased by 40.3 percent as compared with the level for December of 1993 (in the fourth quarter of 1993 by 52.8 percent). As compared with the level of the fourth quarter of last year, the rate of growth in wholesale prices declined on products of all sectors of industry except non-ferrous metallurgy and the liquor-vodka industry, in which the repeal of regulated commercial prices on vodka led to a sharp jump in wholesale prices. The rates of growth in prices were influenced by the shortage of monetary resources held by consumers of

industrial products, which was caused by the tightening of the credit-finance policy as well as by the growth of mutual indebtedness of consumers and suppliers.

Finances

In the first quarter of this year, the consolidated budget of Sverdlovsk Oblast received revenues of R361.7 billion, which is 4.4 times greater than the level for the corresponding period for last year. Due to the unsatisfactory financial state of enterprises and organizations, the debt on payments to the oblast and local budgets continues to grow. On 1 April of the current year its amount reached R149.2 billion.

Budget expenditures increased by 5 times and comprised R364.0 billion. R99.4 billion was directed to financing the national economy, R100.7 billion to public education, R95.3 billion to public health and physical culture, R9.5 billion to culture and art, R0.3 billion to science, and R14.2 billion in compensation payments for children.

The consolidated oblast budget showed a deficit of R2.3 billion.

For January-February, the sum of profits obtained by oblast enterprises and organizations comprised R440.9 billion. At the same time, 545 out of 2,000 enterprises studied suffered losses in the sum of R28.8 billion. Of these, R5.1 billion was in industry, R18.5 billion in transport, around R1.8 billion in trade and public catering, and R0.6 billion in housing and municipal services.

The credit indebtedness of industrial, construction, transport and agricultural enterprises and organizations on 1 March comprised R2063.2 billion, including R761.6 billion in overdue debts, or 36.9 percent. Of this, the largest part was comprised of indebtedness to suppliers—R555.3 billion, or 73 percent.

On 1 March the overdue indebtedness comprised R1970.4 billion, including R752.3 billion, or 88.5 percent, being the overdue consumer indebtedness.

Commodity turnover

In the first quarter of the current year, the volume of retail goods turnover was formulated in the sum of R741 billion, which in actual prices is 6.8 times greater than the corresponding period for last year, and in comparable prices—by 17.6 percent. Trade services to the oblast population are provided by 8,334 retail trade enterprises and 3,712 public catering enterprises. R690 billion worth of consumer goods were sold to the population, and R51 billion worth of products in public catering. The relative share of food products in the volume of goods turnover increased from 53 percent to 57 percent in the reporting year, while that of non-food products declined from 47 to 43 percent.

With the formation of an oblast consumer's market, trade on the kolkhoz markets is beginning to win

stronger positions. Thus, after the systematic decline in sales volumes over the last few years, the sale of most agricultural products in the first quarter of this year increased as compared with the level for the corresponding period last year: The sale of potatoes doubled, of vegetables—increased by 2.5 times, and of meat—by 1.3 times. Over R5 billion were earned from the sale of agricultural products at kolkhoz markets.

The oblast population acquired R320.8 billion worth of non-food items through the retail trade network. The reduction in volume of sale testifies to the re-distribution of monetary expenditures of the population in favor of the purchase of food products. Despite this, the public demand for goods in light industry, cultural-domestic and household durables remains high.

The volume of sale of clothing and underwear increased by 1.3 times in comparable prices as compared with the level for January of 1993, of stocking-hosiery goods—by 1.4 times, of tricot goods and shoes—by 2 times, of cotton fabrics—by 2.6 times, and of silk fabrics—by 4.1 times. There were 22,600 radio receivers sold (98.3 percent), 22,300 televisions (146.7 percent), and 9,900 refrigerators (180 percent).

FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER in Sverdlovsk oblast for the first quarter of 1994 comprised \$189.5 million, and increased by 2.5 times as compared with the corresponding period last year.

The export of products equalled \$168.8 million, and increased by more than 3 times. These figures included: Export to the industrially developed countries—\$59.0 million (increased by 1.8 times), to the developing countries—\$19.8 million (by 3 times), and to other countries (former CEMA countries, China, KPDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic], the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and the Baltic countries)—\$90.0 million (by 8.6 times).

Within the volume of export, the relative share of raw goods and materials comprises 96.9 percent, including ferrous metals—76.5 percent, non-ferrous metals—18.2 percent, and machinery and equipment—1.3 percent. The relative share of consumer goods within the overall volume of export comprises 1.8 percent. There were 599,000 tonnes of ferrous metals and products from them exported (export deliveries of copper and ferroalloys increased by 1.2 times, while aluminum deliveries declined by 3.5 times); 444 tonnes of lumber (deliveries declined by 6.5 times), and \$2.2 million worth of machinery and equipment (deliveries increased by 6.3 times).

The increase in rates and the introduction of new import tariffs had the effect of reducing the volume of import by 1.2 times as compared with last year's level. The import of consumer goods decreased—individual types of food products, textile and tricot clothing and footwear.

Import comprised \$20.7 million, including \$16.1 million from the industrially developed countries (an increase of

38 percent), \$0.8 million from the developing countries (a decline of 72 percent), and \$3.8 million from other countries.

The foreign trade balance was positive in the amount of \$148.1 million (in the first quarter of 1993 there was a positive trade balance in the amount of \$27.1 million).

MONETARY INCOME OF THE POPULATION in the first quarter comprised R1184 billion, which is 5.7 times higher than the level for the first quarter of last year. Taking into consideration the correction of income for the consumer price index, it declined by 15.5 percent for the reporting period.

Labor wages comprise 58.4 percent of the income, social payments comprise 14.6 percent, and other payments account for 27 percent. At the same time, the average monthly labor wage comprised R148,400, including R171,300 in March, which is 19.2 percent higher than the level for February and 28.2 percent higher than the December 1993 level.

EXPENDITURES BY THE POPULATION for the purchase of goods and payment of services in the first quarter of the current year comprised R815 billion, which is 6 times greater than in the first quarter of 1993. Expenditures for payment of taxes and fees were R113 billion (5.3 times greater), and for the growth of savings in investments and securities—R87 billion (10.9 times greater).

The growth of expenditures by the population somewhat exceeded the increase in nominal monetary income in the first quarter of the current year as compared with the corresponding period last year. The volume of money on hand increased by R125 billion and on 1 April of this year comprised R169 billion. Expenditures of the population in March were 21.9 percent higher than in December of 1993. Moreover, consumer expenditures increased by 24.9 percent, while expenditures for payment of services increased by 72.4 percent.

The **DIFFERENTIATION OF THE POPULATION BY LEVEL OF AVERAGE PER CAPITA MONETARY INCOME** continues to increase in the current year. In March of the current year, the income of the most well-to-do 10 percent of the population exceeded by 9.5 times the income of the same portion of persons who were least well off. Here we should note that the **PROPERTY DIFFERENTIATION OF THE POPULATION** is not yet as significant as the differentiation by level of income. This is confirmed by the data of household surveys.

Employment of the population

The number of workers engaged in the oblast's national economy comprises 1,737,900 persons (not counting those working in small enterprises). As compared with the first quarter of last year, the number of employed persons has declined by 5.0 percent.

The number of citizens contacting the employment service on questions of job placement comprised 41,500 persons at the end of the first quarter. Of those, 16,400 persons, or 51.7 percent, were women.

As of 1 April 1994, there were 39,800 persons registered as being unemployed. Of those, 33,600 persons received the official status of being unemployed, with payment of unemployment benefits. According to the employment service data, the demand for workers reported by enterprises comprised 7,732 persons on 1 April 1994. Without taking into consideration the structure, there are 5 unemployed persons competing for each vacant position in the employment service.

During the first quarter, 2,331 persons participated in strikes due to delays in payment of wages. The largest of the three registered strikes was the one-day work stoppage by workers at the PO [production association] "Vakhrushevugol," in which 2,047 persons participated. The total losses of work time comprised 3,098 man-days, and products in the sum of R257.9 million were not produced.

Demographic situation

The population numbers in Sverdlovsk Oblast on 1 January 1994 comprised 4,666,700 persons, including 4,067,900 urban residents, and 598,800 rural residents.

The birth rate in the first quarter of the current year remained at last year's level, and comprised 8.7 births per 1,000 members of the population. This testifies to a certain stabilization of the birth rate.

At the same time, the continuing growth in the mortality rate of the population evokes concern. The number of deaths in the first quarter of the current year increased by 4,400, and the mortality rate increased from 14.8 to 18.7 per 1,000 residents. One third of those who died were persons of working age. A 1.3-time increase in the mortality rate due to illnesses of the respiratory organs has been noted, as well as a 1.2-time increase in mortality due to infectious and parasitic diseases.

The unfavorable changes in the mortality rate have led to an increase in the natural decline of the population by 1.6 times. It comprised 11,500 persons.

There has been a significant change in the character of the migration processes. While in the first quarter of last year we observed a departure of the population from rural areas, at the present time we are noting a migrational increase. Since the beginning of the year, 436 refugee families have come to our oblast, numbering 859 persons, as well as 377 families who were forced to resettle, numbering 825 persons (children comprise 31 percent, persons of able-bodied age—62 percent). Most of these people came from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They settled primarily in the large cities of the oblast. Only 10 percent of the newcomers settled in rural areas.

Privatization

As of 1 April 1994, there were 3,089 enterprises privatized in the oblast, including 261 in the first quarter of the reporting year. Of the overall number of privatized enterprises, 74.9 percent were bought outright, and 9.1 percent of those—in the reporting period.

During the reporting period, 3,358,700 shares of stock were put up for sale by 81 joint-stock companies, for a sum of R3499.6 million. Of those, it is presumed that shares in the sum of R1659.1 million will be sold through closed bidding. 56.5 percent of the shares have been handed over to the property fund for free sale. 2,200 shares of stock were sold at auction for a sum of R2.2 million, and the rest are in the management of the privatization agencies.

The revenue received from privatization of enterprises (facilities), including joint-stock companies, was R4237.5 million. 90.6 percent of the revenues were received from enterprise-buyers, and 9.4 percent from the personal funds of citizens. There were 171,100 privatization vouchers received. The privatization of enterprises held in municipal ownership yielded R2427.3 million (57.3 percent), in oblast ownership—R113.7 million (2.7 percent), and in federal ownership—R1696.5 million (40 percent).

During the first quarter, there were 30,247 apartments handed over to individual ownership of citizens, which comprises 2.5 percent of the number of apartments subject to privatization. The overall area of the privatized apartments comprised 1,379,000 square meters, and their overall cost comprised R13663 million. Altogether since the beginning of privatization, 394,973 apartments (33 percent) have been handed over and sold to citizens for private ownership.

Siberian Bank To Pay Off Trade Obligations

944F0749A Novosibirsk *VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK* in Russian 25 May 94 p 6

[Unattributed article: "Debts of the USSR Savings Bank: The Question, of Course, Is Interesting"]

[Text] When will the trade obligations of the Union Savings Bank for special-purpose checks, bonds, and certificates be paid off, how will it proceed, and who will assume the payment?...

These questions are troubling the owners of checks. Citizens of the local administration are also asking them. Therefore, the mayor's office of Novosibirsk asked the Ministry of Finance of Russia for an explanation.

The reply, signed by M. Chekurova, deputy director of the Securities Department of the Ministry of Finance of Russia, states:

"In accordance with Decree No. 344 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 16 April 1994 'On State Debt Trade Obligations,' the Ministry of Finance, from

15 June 1994 to 1 June 1995, through the system of institutions of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation, and other banks determined by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, will redeem 1990 non-interest-bearing bonds of state special-purpose loans from owners for appropriate domestically produced consumer commodities (except passenger cars) at existing consumer prices, and for passenger cars—based on 60 percent of the price determined by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, in coordination with plant manufacturers.

"In a priority procedure, the indicated bonds will be redeemed from invalids and participants in the Great Patriotic War and invalids of the Armed Forces.

"The procedure for the redemption of special-purpose loan bonds will be developed by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation together with the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation in the near future."

As Tamara Aleksandrovna Lyubimets, deputy chairman of the Novosibirsk bank of the Savings Bank of Russia, reported to the editorial office at "Krasnyy Prospekt 34," if merchandise is issued for all trade bonds for all citizens from 1 July of this year to 1 June of 1995 (and only for invalids of the Armed Forces and participants of the Great Patriotic War—from 15 June), then the redemption of certificates, which ends according to the letter of the Savings Bank on 1 March, is extended to 31 December 1994.

In addition, Tamara Aleksandrovna emphasized that the debts will be settled by the Savings Banks only on the condition of the payment of money for their accounts. The AKSB [expansion not identified] of the Russian Federation, not being the legal successor of the USSR Savings Bank, at the same time assumed settlements with the citizens for certificates, but it will make payment at the expense of resources of the federal budget allocated in 1994-1995 for these purposes.

Decrease in Oblast's Productivity Observed

944F0749B Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 25 May 94 p 3

[Article by Olga Ort: "Rally of Many Thousands Is Being Prepared. Will It Be Noticed in Moscow?"]

[Text] The presidium of the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of the oblast passed a resolution on 18 May to conduct a workers' rally in Novosibirsk on 9 June 1994 at 1500 on V.I. Lenin Square in support of demands that the president, the government, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the oblast administration, and the mayor of Novosibirsk prevent a slump in production, pay wages in a timely and complete way, adopt a state employment program, and guarantee citizens' safety.

An application for the conduct of a rally was addressed to V. Tolokonskiy, the city's mayor. The proposed

number of participants—30,000 persons. There have been no actions on such a scale in Novosibirsk since 1992, when a delegation nominated here at a rally departed for Moscow "to shake loose" money for wages. The trip was successful at that time. But time passed, and the needs of Novosibirsk Oblast were forgotten in the capital. Our position cannot be called pleasant. Seventy percent of the oblast industrial complex consists of defense enterprises that are shutting down shops one after the other and sending workers on forced leave. The NPO [scientific production association] Vostok has been idle since 24 April, the Lenin plant has gradually been coming to a stop since 16 May, Kometa stopped on 23 May, and the condenser plant has been idle since 1 May. The Berdsk electromechanical plant is stopping work in two stages from 6 to 14 June. Sibselmash is stopping agricultural and foundry production starting 1 June. The sorrowful list can be continued. In the words of V. Medvedko, director of NEVZ [Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant], he has already been left without half of his skilled personnel. Director of Sibtekstil'mash Popelyukh says: "Production is stopping—robbery is increasing..."

It is not especially necessary to explain how the situation of the large enterprises will affect the city budget, and this means the people who get their wages, pensions, and allowances from it. April payments to the budget totaled 17 percent of what was planned. Sibselmash alone went into debt to the pension fund for 1.2 billion rubles [R]. Sibtekstil'mash owes R7 billion and Novosibirskenergo R5 billion to the budget.

The oblast trade unions hope to attract attention to all these problems with the multi-thousand-strong rally. Following it, a delegation will go to Moscow with a package of proposals.

The oblast trade unions are observing a "nonaggression pact" with the government and are not putting forth any kind of political demands. Time will tell whether this loyalty will be appreciated in Moscow.

Contamination of River Ob Examined

944F0749C Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 24 May 94 p 1

[Article by Galina Andreyeva: "Execution of the Ob's 'Sentence' Postponed Until Autumn"]

[Text] A report on the situation at sewage pumping station No. 14 and the discharge of polluted drainage into the Ob, respectively, thoroughly alarmed city residents last week.

Dust was raised for two days on the winding road that leads to a small two-story structure in the valley of the Kamenka River, a structure that from its looks is barely noticeable and does not in any way reveal anything particular about its functional significance to the vital activity of the life of the city. In the words of the workers of the pumping station, the television reporters and the newspapermen were getting tiresome. Although neither

the steady drone of the pumps in the KNS [sewage pumping station] nor the homey appetizing aroma from the domestic area—it was getting close to lunchtime—gave any sign indicating an emergency at the station.

A.N. Kolesov, the station foreman, clarified the emergency in question, since the station had not stopped and was operating according to the usual regime.

However, it was not without reason that the alarm was raised in the city regarding the next ecological disaster. This time thunder struck in the Maritime region, where the wall of an intake reservoir of one of the KNS collapsed. Learning a lesson from the mistakes of others, the Gorvodokanal [city water channel administration] decided to investigate the condition of the pumps in the city. However, it was not possible to execute this plan at KNS 14, where the sluice gates, "stop logs," did not function, and it was not possible to stop the flow from the input collectors. The attempt to establish a temporary gate also ended without result.

Does every cloud have a silver lining? Alas, no! The defect of the sluice gate, according to the statement of the station workers, which lies on the conscience of the builders from the day the station is put into operation, only postponed the prediction of an inevitable massive pollution of the Ob. An inspection of the KNS and preventive repair, in any event, cannot be avoided. Not only at this station but at all the others, and there are about two dozen of them on the city's right bank alone. But the total daily volume of city sewage is almost 1 million cubic meters. And all this sooner or later empties into the river. It is fortunate that the contamination from the KNS did not pass on closer to summer. Otherwise, farewell to the swimming season. And not only for Novosibirsk residents but for the "lower neighbors" as well.

Extent of Money Counterfeiting Reported

944F0748 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA
GAZETA in Russian 26 May 94 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Kondrashov: "When Fifty Thousand Is Not Money"]

[Text] Crime

Counterfeiting is probably one of the world's oldest and most widespread types of crime. In our country it now seems to be getting accessible to virtually anyone who wishes.

Counterfeit money is circulating throughout Russia. It is printed with color Xerox machines, drawn by some skilled craftsmen, stamped in printing presses. As acknowledged "masters" say, forging a 50,000 bill is easy as pie. Perhaps that is why the appearance of forgeries is registered every day in some 30-40 regions.

Some statistics. During the whole of last year, 607 cases of discovering counterfeit bills were recorded in Krasnodar Kray. In four months of this year there were already 413 cases. In Voronezh Oblast - 184 and 141 respectively. In Moscow Oblast there were 374 cases last year and already 239 this year. In Rostov Oblast the respective figures are 376 and 291. Tula Oblast has simply set a record: 250 cases of exposed counterfeit money in four months this year as against 102 cases last year. In Tyumen Oblast the figures are 173 and 166.

Counterfeits are proliferating extensively even in formerly little affected areas. The comparative information is the same: data for the whole of last year and four months of this year. Yakutia: 9 and 22 cases, respectively. Vladimir Oblast: 4 and 11. Ivanovo Oblast: 11 and 10. Magadan Oblast: 10 and 62. Novosibirsk Oblast: 5 and 51. Sakhalin Oblast: 6 and 21. And so on, and so forth.

Counterfeiting, once the domain of lone craftsmen, is increasingly being put on an industrial footing. Whole groups are organizing to manufacture and unload counterfeit money. For example, not long ago three criminal groups which used college students to distribute "forfeits" [fantiki] were uncovered in Samara. In Volgograd, three North-Caucasus residents were detained with some 87 million rubles' worth of phony R50,000 bills. In Smolensk, a group of four counterfeiters and distributors was detained. A group of nine people counterfeiting Deutschmarks was uncovered in Kaliningrad. A search of them netted four SKS carbines, pistols, revolvers, handgrenades...

Here is an excerpt from an MVD report for 23 May 94: "In Kemerovo Oblast, OEP [Economic Crimes Department] personnel detained K. K. Nikerkhayev, born 1951, non-working, in Yaya township for passing off counterfeit bills: 38 counterfeit R50,000 bills made on a Xerox machine were confiscated.

"In addition, two R5,000 bills, sixty-four R10,000 bills, and sixty-nine R50,000 bills manufactured on Xerox machines were found and confiscated in the Kalmyk and Buryat Republics, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk and Stavropol Krays, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk and Ulyanovsk Oblasts, and in the cities of Perm, Voronezh, Izhevsk, Nizniy Novgorod, Orenburg and Saransk..."

According to some data, the "black gross product" [cherniy val] market in Russia totals around 90 trillion rubles. This is money which is totally unaccounted for. Incidentally, the deficit of our current state budget is only about R70 trillion. Naturally, in such conditions counterfeiters feel themselves like fish in water.

Also in circulation are counterfeit dollars manufactured by industrial means, mainly in Poland and the Middle East. The quality of these forgeries is so high that sometimes it is impossible to distinguish a counterfeit

from the original even with the help of special equipment. This, however, doesn't make a counterfeit less counterfeit.

In the near future the MVD expects an upsurge in counterfeiting of securities and stocks, which presents no great difficulty with the existence of color copier equipment.

So far it is extremely difficult to combat this phenomenon. The temptation to earn a quick buck at minimum risk is simply too great, especially when forgeries come to Russia from Chechnya, Azerbaijan and other former soviet republics.

So, citizens, be wary: the counterfeiter is not napping.

New Chief of Moscow Criminal Investigation Department Interviewed

944F0741A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 May 94 p 3

[Interview with V. Kuptsov, by Erik Kotlyar, under rubric "Law and Order": "First Interview With New MUR Chief, Exclusive for SK Readers"]

[Text] It is no secret that the fight against crime is spinning its wheels. Accusations leveled at the militia are heard on all sides. People say that the fight is being waged poorly, that officials are being bought and sold, and that criminals are being coddled and retrained as chastisers. And the fight is being increasingly drawn into political games that are well seasoned with payoffs. There really is no fight at all! Are these reproaches justified? Basically, unfortunately, yes, they are! For the most part, such facts have been confirmed. But there are a few things that are frequently forgotten in the heat of the polemics. The structure of the militia includes criminal investigation and prosecution services for which the elimination of the criminal segment is their direct duty! If society rejects that purpose, then those services are no longer needed and should simply be abolished or transformed into something else. But they do exist, and it is incorrect to say that the fight against crime has been completely stopped. It is another matter that the results have become the wrong ones! And that the services are up to their ears in debt to the taxpayers.

Why is this happening? There are several reasons. The main one is that the social environment and the modern economic order are engendering and multiplying crime in the way that dampness gives rise to mold. The rates of its multiplication are greatly outstripping the development of those militia agencies whose functions include the putting up of resistance to the criminal forces (unlike the rates of formation of detachments for the protection of law and order). As of today, the criminal militia has not gone far in its development from the number of personnel in the old times, when the situation was more normal and it was possible to walk along the streets in Moscow at night, arm in arm with one's girl friend. A second reason is the fact that the highest echelon of authority has been corrupted.

Frequently that echelon sympathetically supports the criminal element for their mutual advantage. The third reason is the frustration of a society that has been shaken by the unprecedented boldness with which the criminal world is invading the customary way of life. And, finally, the last reason: the frustration of the militia itself, which has become accustomed to operating, like every other line service, in accordance with a command from above. Fewer and fewer of these commands are coming in. But, under conditions of the political instability and confusion, it is simply impossible to operate at one's own risk. There have been attempts to assume responsibility in individual instances, but that did not lead to anything good. Several times the "authorities," restrained by the desperate risk of protectors of law and order, allowed themselves to get under the so-called "pledge," by issuing threats to the operational agents and their families. You have to agree that it is a lesson that people remember! It is truly a "golden age" for all kinds of rogues!

Of course, among the militia men there have arisen doubts and, in accordance with the customary tradition (and, one should not forget, we all have emerged from the Soviet authority), searches for the extreme began. Why is it important to find the guilty person? Because everyone has bosses, and, as everyone knows, those bosses never want to share with anyone the responsibility for what is happening! Their task is to analyze the situation and punish people! "If you get money (but I don't), you'll have to answer!"

It is no wonder that, with this kind of disjointed resolution of a very serious question, the only thing that we have today is the constant rotation of personnel among the militia professionals, in the hope that the new employee will be luckier than his predecessor. In one of the statements made in the State Duma it was stated that workers who have distinguished themselves are deliberately removed from the law-enforcement system! But this is a special question, and it should be analyzed in a special study...

It is a fact that today the reason for removing a militia employee can be not only his poor performance in the precinct, but also his failure to develop the proper on-the-job interrelationships. Observing all of this, we are most troubled that the person sitting in the chair behind the control panel in the fight against crime is not the latest in a series of heating specialists. Let me hasten to assure the readers that this has not happened. The person who replaced Yu. Fedoseyev at MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigation Department] was his deputy, a person with a long biography in the militia, who, even in the past, frequently executed the direct duties of the UGRO [criminal investigation] chief—Vasilii Nikolayevich Kuptsov.

The 42-year-old militia colonel is as erect as an athlete and is meager in his words and gestures. He actually does have behind him a difficult path from an ordinary militia man in 1974 to responsible positions in which the only person who can work successfully is one who has had good experience and who enjoys authority among his comrades.

V. Kuptsov meets all these criteria. He graduated from militia school, and then a branch of the RF [Russian Federation] MVD Academy. He worked "on the ground" as an operational agent in a militia department, and was also a department chief, senior operational agent for especially important criminal-investigation cases, the first deputy RUVD chief, deputy chief of BKSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], and, over a considerable period of time, MUR deputy chief. He is very knowledgeable about operational work, and, most importantly, makes a sober evaluation of the real order of things. The hopes of Moscow's criminals that they will have an easy life with the arrival of the new MUR chief are apparently in vain. One would certainly want to believe and hope that this is so!

[Kotlyar] Vasilii Nikolayevich, you arrived in the job of MUR chief at what is probably not the most favorable time. All the barriers are shaking under the onrush of crime. Do you have your own concept or will you develop MUR's traditional work practices?

[Kuptsov] I have been working at MUR long enough to assert that the experience and traditions of the city's investigation administration are unique. They took years to form, and every administrator made his own contribution; of course, every one who bears responsibility for the assigned job has his own approach to those tasks. It is important that the basis of his job should be the practical considerations in accordance with the requirements of the time. Because crime changes very quickly, and failing to take those changes into consideration in operational work would be a big mistake! With the development of privatization there appeared new methods of taking personal savings away from private individuals with the help of various swindles. We have introduced certain functional and structural changes in the administration's work in order to specialize individual links in criminal investigation specifically in those types of crimes. The situation is exactly the same in the area of crimes against property. The concepts of private and state property are identically high-priority in the legal sense. Correspondingly there must be a change in the level of professionalism in the departments that are engaged in the uncovering of crimes against all types of property, including private and personal. Incidentally, for the period of transition to market relations this is of great political importance.

Take, for example, such a type of crime as explosions. Previously such unusual cases used to be investigated by us in the general work flow. But currently a new type of crime has turned into an entire "branch" that has acquired its own specialists and underground industry. Consequently, MUR also needs a department in which the trained operational agents can make an educated evaluation and analyze each occurrence. That is, life forces us to carry out a kind of "modernization" of investigation as applicable to the "technology" of crime.

The same thing can be said about the discovery of illegally acquired weapons. Everyone is well aware of

how those weapons are used. Frequently the people who perish are completely innocent individuals who just happened to be at the scene of the crime. Previously this phenomenon was viewed as a part of the overall picture involving the crime that had been committed. Currently we want to achieve the intensification of investigation work to such a degree that the guns can be taken out of illegal circulation even before they can be fired! In order to do that, it will be necessary right now to have our employees specialize. One important circumstance is that the employees for the new types of work are selected strictly on the basis of their on-the-job qualities. Other considerations are categorically precluded. We take a very thrifty approach to the personnel makeup that has developed at MUR and the city's criminal investigation department.

[Kotlyar] Vasilii Nikolayevich, you have mentioned MUR's historic heritage. In those departments that will be affected by the respecialization, won't the important experience and skills that were previously accumulated be lost?

[Kuptsov] I can put your mind at ease. MUR will not part with anything beneficial that it has in its arsenal.

[Kotlyar] MUR was constantly understaffed—something like approximately 300 persons in the operational complement. How do you propose to fill in that personnel gap? The complication lies in the fact that the payment for the labor performed in the various militia services is definitely not equal, and criminal investigation in the table of organization is viewed not in the most favorable light.

[Kuptsov] There really is a problem here. Many people are more eager to go to the new services where the pay is better. But the people who come to MUR are the romantics, who are seized and attracted by our unusual job. I hardly think that there is anywhere else that an enthusiast would be able to graduate from the kind of school for detective service that we have in our subdivisions. We have had good experience in training junior operational agents. They learn the science of investigating from start to finish in our system. From the operational agents we create reserves for promotion. The most capable employees who have reached the level of skill must definitely have growth prospects. The young ambitious person must be assured that if he works well, he will definitely be singled out and will be trained for promotion. I am convinced that this kind of worker will open up his capabilities even more in his next assignment. We have certain administrators who like to "hide" their valuable workers and keep them for themselves. That is a vicious practice. It leads to a situation in which, in the final analysis, we are deprived of the people whom we need. For our work it is not just enough to have education. It is also mandatory to do some work "on the ground," where it is necessary to carry out directly the dirty work with criminals. Only then will a person reveal his on-the-job qualities and his understanding of how it is necessary to act in various situations. Those who

travel the entire path from the initial cell in criminal investigation at a militia station, then through the okrug links, and then gradually rise to the city administration, are in my opinion people who have substantial qualification. For them there are no secrets: they become easily oriented, like highly trained professionals. Unfortunately, in our service it sometimes happens that workers in the administration make disdainful comments about those who are working in the initial investigation teams. And the opposite situation also occurs. Both groups of people are mistaken. It is necessary to have worked at all levels in order to become a full-fledged detective or operational agent.

As for the unequal payment for their labor, this question, I am convinced, will be resolved properly! In the final analysis we will achieve a situation in which steady collectives of like-minded individuals who are devoted to their city and its inhabitants will form gradually at MUR and the city's criminal investigation links.

[Kotlyar] MUR employs slightly more than 300 people, and the number of workers in criminal investigation for the city as a whole is 4000. Have you developed a methodology for interaction among all the parts of what would seem to be, on the whole, a rather large detachment of people?

[Kuptsov] Your question is very correct. The bulk of the work must be conducted only where the crime has been committed. We are already taking steps to guarantee the coordination of all our subdivisions. Here, as you have correctly noted, we used to make a strategic miscalculation. Without the mobile attraction of all the city's personnel, it will be impossible to resolve the crime problem, even if we increase the MUR apparatus to 3000! But the share of the central investigation department will be a few more uncovered cases! But that will not provide much until we achieve a situation in which all the crimes will be identified at the place where they were committed. Another question is that it is impossible to require the okrug departments and stations to uncover all the crimes, irrespective of the type of complexity. For example, murders by hire—for work like that we simply do not have enough manpower or informational support. In that instance their share will be the execution of the overall algorithm for actions—the processing of the housing sector, investigation of the scene of the crime, etc. Such cases are within the competency of the city administration, and we have opportunities to uncover them. Although much also depends here upon the corpus delicti and its complexity. Many crimes are within the capabilities of specialists from the okrug criminal investigation links. In this respect all the city administrations and departments have been given guidelines concerning what types of crimes should be uncovered at their level. There must be no formal check-list approach here—not worrying about whether or not it is within your capabilities, but just do it for the sake of the record, and that's all there is to it! I think that, with the passage of time, it might even be possible to reduce the apparatus in the city administration, by transferring

some of the employees to the okrugs. MUR will retain the functions of providing consultative and methodological guidance and of monitoring the actions of the city's services, and, of course, the work involving especially important and dangerous cases.

[Kotlyar] Vasily Nikolayevich, have you noted any precise delimitations in the area of the work between MUR and RUOP? We sometimes hear people saying, "This is our job, but that isn't..."

[Kuptsov] The concept of "our job or not our job" does not exist. For Muscovites there is only a single concept—the city militia. And for the victim it is a matter of complete indifference as to whether the person who came to his assistance is a MUR or RUOP operative. The most important thing is the final result. As for our internal evaluations, I think that, in the interests of the overall job for which we all are responsible, it is necessary to construct the work on principles of good interaction and mutual understanding, rendering assistance to one another in the name of our common goal. Then the results will become obvious, and Muscovites will truly feel that they are getting real assistance!

[Kotlyar] MUR has a good rule: preserve the, as it were, "money-box of experience." That money-box used to be represented by a consultative group made up of MUR veterans. Others who are being called upon are former administration chiefs from wartime and the postwar period and major investigative specialists who retired for reasons of age, but who are completely capable. Will this undertaking—which is, in our day, a rare and beneficial one—be preserved in the future?

[Kuptsov] Not only will it be preserved, but it will also be multiplied. These people are the militia's "gold fund." Their experience is invaluable. For young detectives they are not only help, but also a personal example in behavior and attitude to the job. Therefore we shall expand the group of our unique specialists: their knowledge and work habits are an important contribution to the administration's work.

[Kotlyar] During the short period of time in which you have been heading MUR, have you encountered any difficult situations?

[Kuptsov] Maybe you should have asked me whether I have had a free moment recently. All you have to do is to glance at the summary. Every day there are dozens of corpses, violent incidents, attacks... The impression is that we are working in a frontline city! The tension has remained unchanged. But I would like to direct your attention to something. We have enough manpower and enough intellect, but nevertheless the elimination of crime is a comprehensive problem. Here it is necessary for everyone to participate identically—the manpower of the procurator's office, the city authorities, and, most importantly, the public, without which it would be impossible to cope with the city's woes! Recently there has been a sense of a certain loss of enthusiasm, or maybe a certain disappointment. That's bad. I would

like to take advantage of the opportunity provided to me to make a statement in your esteemed newspaper, and to call upon all the healthy forces in Moscow to render all the assistance that they can to the militia, to be more attentive to everything that is happening around them, and not to avoid interacting with the internal-affairs agencies if such interaction is required. I also state confidently, on behalf of my comrades, that the people at MUR are well aware that the basic weight and responsibility for preventing and uncovering crimes lie on the shoulders of the militia.

[Kotlyar] Thank you, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, for having this conversation with me. Please allow me to wish you success in your job, which is a very familiar one for you but which is very difficult today!

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dangers Seen in Russian Involvement in NATO Peacekeeping

944D0037A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
13 May 94 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Ignatenko, doctor of philosophical sciences, expert of the Gorbachev Foundation: "Last Push? To the South!: Russia's Involvement in the Partnership for Peace Could Critically Destabilize the Situation on its Southern Flanks"]

[Text] It would be utterly unproductive in an examination of the Partnership for Peace program and the prospects of Russia's participation in it to address it alone—the texts of the Invitation, the Framework Agreement, and Organization and Procedures. Much should be derived from a consideration of the contexts of this program also—geopolitical, military-strategic, economic, and others. In addition, it is impermissible to ignore also the fact that the states of the post-Soviet South—of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia—would be drawn into the orbit of NATO's influence also. And the situation in this "soft underbelly" of Russia will largely determine the future of both the global South and of Russia itself.

Russia—Missing Link in the Global Military-Political Alliance of the North

The consistent and successful realization of NATO's Partnership for Peace would impart a finished nature to the North-South global opposition. The membership of the Atlantic structures of Russia and also all the other components of the former great Eurasian state—the Soviet Union—would signify the emergence of a global military-political bloc of states of the North (the northern hemisphere).

The North's line of contact with the South, this global zone of instability, does not run along the Equator, of course. For the United States, Canada, and Mexico it is the narrow isthmus of Panama. North America is protected from Asia and Africa with their vast South by two

oceans. For West Europe this boundary is the Mediterranean. There are some remnants of the South in the former Yugoslavia still, it is true, but they could soon be wiped out.

In other words, this part of the North is protected against the destabilizing factors of the South by natural barriers. This North is doing and will continue to do everything possible to bar to states of the South as far as possible, if not in full, access to weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear, and to their delivery systems capable of delivering these weapons to the North. The examples of the pressure on Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are typical in this respect. The North even looks askance at Israel.

But with Russia things are considerably more complicated. Russia is in direct, immediate contact with the South. So immediate that it is not always clear where Russia ends and where this notorious South begins. According to one version ("each for himself"), Russia borders the post-Soviet South—the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, that is, zones of extremely high conflict potential. It is sufficient to recall the Abkhaz-Georgian, Karabakh, and Tajik conflicts and a mass of others—of a lesser scale or occurring in latent fashion.

In the other version ("Russia as an integral part of the CIS with vital interests in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia") Russia—both directly and indirectly—is in contact with another conflict-potential zone, which is to no less an extent rich in factors of instability: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Kurdish problem (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria), the Afghan problem (the civil war in Afghanistan and this state's practical disintegration), the Pakistani-Indian contradictions (the problem of Jammu and Kashmir), Uighur separatism (China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous District), and so forth.

Russia—Pacifier of the South?

Let us assume that Russia has subscribed to the Partnership and/or has actively begun to participate in NATO actions in some other form. All questions would then confront it in entirely particular fashion, if Russia is in contact with the South, being part of the global military-political alliance of the northern hemisphere (the North). Historical circumstances themselves would impose on Russia the role of gendarme covering the global North on one of its "burning" flanks and locking onto itself many most acute problems of North-South relations on a world scale.

Why would Russia involuntarily find itself in this role? I see at least three reasons here.

First, peacemaking operations or, in NATO terminology, "peacekeeping operations" are envisaged by both the plans of NATO and the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) and the content of the Partnership for Peace program itself (clause 3-D of the Framework Agreement). The actual force capable of undertaking broad-based peacemaking operations on the territory of

the CIS and in the entire post-Soviet space is the Russian Army. Evidence of this is the correlation of the participants and the degree of their assertiveness in the CIS Collective Peacemaking Force in Tajikistan.

Second, "peacekeeping operations" are at this moment the priority direction in NATO activity, virtually. We would recall Somalia, Bosnia, and even Egypt (the participation of NATO consultants in the organization of the struggle against Islamic fundamentalists in this country). A special zone of NATO interests in this respect, incidentally, is the Caucasus region (see, in particular, clause 03 of the section "Questions of Policy and Security." Supplement to "Curriculum of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation in 1994"). The same applies also to post-Soviet Central Asia, the "projection" of stability onto which is, according to a statement of Manfred Woerner, general secretary of NATO, a principal function of the North Atlantic alliance. A number of NATO "peacekeeping operations" have shown the direction in which the tactics of such operations are evolving, these contemplating the active enlistment in direct combat operations of the peacekeeping subunits and covering units.

Third, Russia would very much like to take part in peacemaking operations on the territory of the CIS. One has the impression that certain influential Russian politicians and military figures, not without peasant cunning, see such activity as a convenient form of the restoration of Russian influence in "zones of Russia's vital interests." If they are lucky, what is more, with these operations being funded and a mandate for them being granted by any party—the United Nations, the CSCE, the CIS... and NATO?

Fourth, the talk about the danger of "Islamic fundamentalism" (P. Grachev and A. Kozyrev and B. Yeltsin have already spoken about it in the appropriate manner) puts us on our guard. A number of influential Russian politicians and military personnel are prepared, it would seem, to turn Russia into a kind of barrier against so-called "Islamic fundamentalism," moving up to the forward lines of contact with it.

How To Destroy Russia

Were this conjecture to be realized, Russia's future would seem utterly bleak. On its "southern" flank Russia (like the CIS as a whole) is exceptionally vulnerable. A border, which is designed to perform a protective function, with the new independent states of the post-Soviet South (in the regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia) is lacking; in a number of sectors the external border of the CIS here is eroded and penetrable (to a varying extent) in both directions (the Iranian-Azerbaijani, Afghanistan-Uzbekistan, Afghanistan-Tajik, and other sectors).

Russia could find itself—voluntarily or involuntarily, for reasons, at times, not even susceptible to predictions based on the logic of common sense—pulled into a number of conflicts. Primarily the Tajik, Abkhaz, South

Ossetian, or Karabakh, which are now "habitual." It is difficult for Russia even now in its attempts to extinguish these centers of military danger situated in direct proximity to its borders. But the difficulties could grow many times over were Russia to operate under the aegis of NATO or within the framework of NATO programs. We can imagine the frustration of the leadership of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, endeavoring to protect themselves against Russian peacemaking, had hastened to sign the "framework agreement" (in March and May of this year respectively) and which, as a result, could get those same Russian troops as peacemakers. Whatever the case, Russia would not, in any event, manage to preserve a normal relationship with all the parties to the conflicts on the territory of the post-Soviet South, and the resistance to it of some parties would be assured.

A particular danger of the situation for Russia is the fact that there is no clear-cut border between the non-Russian South within the framework of the CIS and the purely Russian South. It is sufficient to recall here the North Caucasus (that is, Russian!) operational formations—from subunits of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus through the Cossacks—that participated (are participating) actively in the Transcaucasus conflicts: Karabakh, South Ossetian, Abkhaz. It is hard to foresee the details and the routes by which the conflagration of the conflicts being "pacified" could spread. But some directions are easily defined: the zones of the spread of Islam and of the settlement of Turkic peoples on the territory of Russia.

What the response of the states of the traditional South to the globalization of NATO and the conversion of the border of the CIS or a part thereof into the NATO border would be is a special and very difficult question. For Iraq, Iran, and Syria border Turkey—a NATO member. Desert Storm (1991), on the other hand, demonstrated together with many other things, it is true, a readiness for cooperation even on the part of sworn enemies (I would recall the coordinated crossing to Iranian territory of Iraqi aircraft to preserve them from American strikes). But Russia, were it to find itself NATO's southern flank, would have to assume assignments pertaining to elimination of the nuclear missile programs in such countries as Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, and Syria for the realization of one further NATO goal—blocking these countries' missile programs for protection against missile attacks against the forward and expeditionary units of NATO and its allies.

Opposition to so-called "Islamic fundamentalism" as a strategic goal, Russia's conversion into an outpost of this struggle—all this would necessarily evoke and exacerbate hostility between Russia and, at a minimum, Iran (it is usually seen as the source of "Islamic fundamentalism") and, possibly, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and more distant Near and Middle East neighbors also.

Nor can Russia's involvement as a "peacemaker" in conflicts that the world community imposes on itself and that blaze or merely flare up in direct proximity to

Russia's borders be ruled out. The Kurdish problem is already making itself felt quite nearby—on the Turkish-Armenian border. Iranian-Arab contradictions are not completely settled. There is no certainty that it will be possible to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict conclusively and to general satisfaction. Afghanistan, for many of whose inhabitants war has become a way of life, demands pacification. The Pakistani-Indian disputes over Jammu and Kashmir are not subsiding. Chinese Xinjiang is beginning to boil over. The list could easily be continued.

Thus in the event of Russia's aggressive participation in NATO activity, it would face the threat of involvement in a whole series of conflicts in the South. Some of them would detonate in Russia itself. The time would come for "peacemaking operations" in Russia. The very existence of the Russian state could be in jeopardy. The "last push" to the South beneath the NATO pennant could be for Russia the last in its history altogether.

CIS-NATO Security Link Seen More Effective Than PFP

944D0038A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 May 94 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov by Colonel Nikolay Portnikov; place and date not given: "'We Are Bound by Deep Historical Roots': The CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Staff Has Its Own Plan of a Defensive Alliance Different From NATO's"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov was born in 1943 in Kyrgyzia [Kyrgyzstan] to a worker's family. After high school graduation, a military school officer candidate, army service, and training at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. He worked for a long time in the USSR Ministry of Defense central administrative offices and was head of its Administrative Department. A candidate of historical sciences and the author of scientific works. In May 1992 he was unanimously elected secretary of the Council of Defense Ministers of Commonwealth states.

[Plotnikov] Leonid Grigoryevich, in the opinion of certain political scientists, military experts, and journalists, the military cooperation of the Commonwealth states is at an impasse. How far does this viewpoint correspond to reality?

[Ivashov] Despite the fact that there really are many difficulties, I would not speak talk about an impasse situation. Everyone has now recognized that no Commonwealth state will create modern armed forces and a dependable system of national military security by itself. Either a pooling of efforts in the field of military organizational development or a lengthy period of waiting for the level of economic development of our states to permit the appropriation of sufficient funds for the needs of the army are needed for this. But this period would, I emphasize, be very long. In any event, even

were the second path to be taken, integration in the military-technical sphere would be required.

A sober estimation of the situation that has been shaping up has recently been nudging the military-political leadership of the Commonwealth states in the direction of the need for greater integration not only in the economic but in the military sphere also. What, therefore, was unacceptable a year ago, when many people did not even allow of the idea of the formation of some new alliances and of the creation of real, not sham, joint armed forces, is today being spoken of insistently by many defense ministers, of Russia—General of the Army Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev—included.

It should be observed that the creation both of the defensive alliance and its main component—the Joint Armed Forces—is a lengthy process. Calculations have shown that it will take no fewer than two or three years. A political decision of the heads of state and the supreme legislative bodies, with recognition in this unifying process of the lead role of Russia, is, naturally, essential for this first and foremost. The latter by no means signifies attempts at the infringement of the sovereignty of any participant in the Commonwealth or a revival of imperial ambitions. Whether some people like it or not, historically, on account of many objective factors, it is Russia that has been and will continue to be the pivot and a kind of connecting link of a unified defense space on the territory of the former USSR.

[Plotnikov] And what factors, in your opinion, explain the need for the reconstitution of the unified defense space?

[Ivashov] There are many such factors. But three main ones, I would say.

First, the troop groupings and all the defense systems (air defense, ABM defenses, command and control and communications, and others) were for decades created on the basis of the interests of the military security of a unified territory. The common system of operational-strategic planning, the provision of the troops and naval forces with equipment, and specialist training was structured in just the same way. The military infrastructure developed on the basis of common interests. The disruption of this intricate organism, connected by thousands of threads, did considerable, if not to say immense, damage to the military security of each state of the Commonwealth and has had a serious effect on the combat readiness of all the national armies without exception.

Second, the economic factor. The profound integration of the republics in the sphere of military production developed and a single research, development, testing, and engineering took shape and functioned successfully over decades. More than 70 head enterprises of industry and research institutions of all states of the Commonwealth and the Baltic countries worked on the strategic nuclear force. No republic, except for Russia, has its own

military-industrial base capable of independently manufacturing the final models of arms and military equipment.

And, third, the moral factor. For several centuries our peoples lived in a unified country. Whether some people like it or not, we are bound by deep historical roots. The majority of us, therefore, cannot be reconciled to the appearance of borders and the severance of family and friendly ties. Is it normal when the dream of a young man from Kyrgyzia or Uzbekistan, say, to join the Navy cannot come true? Many people are deprived of this opportunity at this time. Did the state lose anything when military service was performed by young men of different nationalities? People's trust strengthened, mutual understanding emerged.

The officer corps, initially of the Russian, then of the Soviet, Army, was historically international. Representatives of over 100 nationalities and national groups were serving as regulars on 1 January 1992. Aside from the indigenous peoples of the 15 Union republics, there were 1,600 Poles, 1,300 Germans, 560 Koreans, 440 Bulgarians, 250 Greeks, 50 Finns, and 25 Czechs in officer, general, and admiral ranks. There were even representatives of so ancient a people as the Assyrians.

[Plotnikov] Which states of the Commonwealth, aside from Russia, are advocating the creation of a new defensive alliance?

[Ivashov] From day one this idea has been supported consistently by Kazakhstan and President Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev personally. The military-political leadership of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzia, Tajikistan, and Armenia advocate active integration in the military sphere and the creation of joint armed forces. There are similar sentiments in a number of other states of the Commonwealth also.

[Plotnikov] Following the statement of the minister of defense of Russia concerning the need for the creation of Commonwealth joint armed forces, skeptical words were said in some news media about the reconstitution of a new, Warsaw Pact-type joint armed forces....

[Ivashov] All that was best in the Warsaw Pact needs to be adopted, in respect to the creation of joint armed forces also. The experience that was generated cannot be denied. For together with the shortcomings there was much that was useful also. No one intends to copy things in full. The military-political situation in the world has changed, and enormous geopolitical changes have occurred on the territory of the former USSR. The Warsaw Pact was a European defensive community, and it was opposed by a specific enemy in the shape of NATO. The present community is to be a defensive alliance of Eurasian countries. Its main thrust is not against some external enemy but primarily the defense of the national interests of each participant and the Commonwealth as a whole. Each state has national-state interests, and any self-respecting country will unswervingly defend them. In addition, the tasks of the alliance

are to be the stabilization of relations within the Commonwealth itself and the elimination of the current focal points of tension.

[Plotnikov] Nonetheless, the creation of a defensive alliance and joint armed forces are things of the future. There is currently the Military Cooperation Coordination Staff. Is such a body necessary or not?

[Ivashov] Merely the fact that the representatives of nine republics are working at the level of deputy chiefs of staff and that the specialist positions are manned on a coalition basis says a great deal. Were the states of the Commonwealth not interested in this body, the leaders of our countries would not at the last meeting have commissioned the elaboration of plans to extend cooperation, in the military sphere included.

It is contemplated that the adoption of a concept of collective security, which will be of a doctrinal character in nature, will be one of the first measures of this plan. In other words, this will be a kind of military doctrine of the subscribers to the Tashkent Treaty.

The next document will be devoted to a refinement of the principles of military cooperation. It is contemplated instituting several levels of military cooperation. It will be realized to a fuller extent within the framework of the Tashkent Treaty. The first—a kind of allied relations level. The second—the level of cooperation with states of the CIS that have not signed the Tashkent Treaty. And the third level—cooperation with states of the far abroad.

[Plotnikov] Are the Baltic countries displaying an interest in interaction in the military sphere with states of the Commonwealth?

[Ivashov] There have been no active steps as yet. But I am sure that this process will begin sooner or later, for all that. The last two years have shown that political populism is one thing, real life, quite another. We republics of the former Soviet Union need only ourselves and one another. The rest have an interest in us of an entirely different sort. Politicians should think about the future of their children and grandchildren. What have we left them, how will they live in the next millennium? Destroying things requires no great intellect....

[Plotnikov] How is the Military Cooperation Coordination Staff's interaction with other CIS structures shaping up?

[Ivashov] We maintain the closest contacts with the CIS Executive Secretariat in Minsk. Its secretary, Ivan Mikhaylovich Korotchenya, regularly takes part in sessions of the Defense Ministers Council. Our representative, Major General Volkov, works in Minsk on a permanent basis.

The staff has good working contacts with the Interparliamentary Assembly and with the Foreign Ministers

Council. The most important military-political questions have been discussed repeatedly at joint sessions of the Defense Ministers Council and the Foreign Ministers Council, incidentally.

[Plotnikov] You recently took part, as a member of a staff delegation, in NATO's Military Committee. The question of the possible affiliation of Commonwealth states to the Partnership for Peace program was discussed, *inter alia*....

[Ivashov] I would like to mention first and foremost that quite serious attention was paid to our delegation. The speeches of the head of the delegation, Colonel General Samsonov, chief of the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Staff, attracted great attention. We were convinced once again that mutual cooperation is essential. Everyone benefits from this. As far as the affiliation of Russia and the other states of the Commonwealth to NATO's partnership program is concerned, too much attention is being paid to this question, in my opinion. We have other, more important problems, that have to be resolved.

Without rejecting the idea of the Partnership for Peace program or the participation of the CIS states in this process, it is necessary in principle to give the creation of our own, Eurasian, system of collective security priority. Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov proposed a version of cooperation between the two defensive alliances according to the 16+9 formula, which had been formulated by the staff, coordinated at the last session of the Defense Ministers Council, and initialed by eight ministers. We believe that this would be more effective in the interests of the maintenance of a stable military-political atmosphere in the world and the defense of the national-state interests of Russia and the other states of the Commonwealth.

PFP: Fears of Conflict With 'South' Discounted

944D00394 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
20 May 94 p. 3

[Article under "Foreign Policy" rubric by Yevgeniy Silin, director-coordinator of the Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation: "Partnership for Peace in an Apocalyptic Light. Cooperation Is Not Determined by One of the Parties"]

[Text] Discussions

"Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace may critically destabilize the situation on the southern flanks," warns Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Aleksandr Ignatenko in the 13 May issue of *SEGODNYA*.

It could, we agree with him, if the country and its leadership follow all the author's assumptions, making Russia's future look completely hopeless or even fatal. Fortunately, I think we can avoid such a fate if we note the excessive weight of schematic determinism in the

very method of approaching this acute and urgent problem, not only on the part of the author of the aforementioned article, but of quite a few investigators of the subject as well.

According to A. A. Ignatenko's version, in order to "doom Russia" it must itself get involved in realizing several of the author's assumptions, which, he is sure, will certainly happen if our country accedes to the "notorious" program.

Ignatenko considers that "The inclusion in Atlantic structures of Russia, as well as all the other parts of the once great Euro-Asian state—the Soviet Union, will lead to the appearance of a global military-political bloc of nations of the 'North' (Northern Hemisphere)." And since Russia, unlike its potential partners in the NATO program, is in direct, immediate contact with the "South," with its extremely high-conflict zones, NATO will burden our country with the unenviable role of pacifier of the "South," for which it (Russia) will pay the price of its demise. The reality of such a course of events is borne out, in the author's view, by the vital interests of the NATO countries themselves, some trends in Russian policy, and certain schemes of its military and political leaders.

On the whole, there is nothing wrong with such warnings, and it is good that the Russian public is given timely notice of the possible dangers of partnership, if we embark on it with no one knows whom and no one knows why. If the content of the partnership is defined by one side, not by us, and according to the worse possible scenario for us. But that is far from being the case. With its Partnership for Peace project NATO is extending Russia a hand with a specific proposal that meets our own wishes not to take hasty steps to expand the organization to the East and not, thereby, isolate Russia in Europe.

Judging by things, on the whole the framework, i.e., most general, agreement on the Partnership meets such wishes. The specific commitments of Russia and NATO under the program are still to be thoroughly worked out and, it must be hoped, the common sense of both sides will not permit landing in a situation detrimental to Russia's national interests. Moreover, these interests can hardly be subordinated to a single reference frame, a single geopolitical axis or paradigm. It is obvious that for Russians "North"—"South" relations are no less important than West-East relations. The very Eurasian nature of our country requires the establishment of harmonious relations of cooperation and interaction for peaceful purposes in all geopolitical directions and along all conceivable axes. The global character of international intercourse and formidable challenges to all humanity have only strengthened the need to take into account the interdependence of problems of Russian foreign policy in every direction.

Getting back to the "extended hand" metaphor, I hasten to respond to those who question the intentions of the

party extending that hand. In politics realists should, of course, voice healthy doubts, but they should verify their doubts against their own actions. Only in the 20th century our country experienced for itself the negative consequences of the "empty chair" tactics and a priori rejection of projects and programs from which others certainly benefited. One need but recall our nonparticipation in the work of the UN Security Council when it was debating the Korean question or our refusal to take part in the Marshall Plan.

We cannot guarantee that all of those in NATO who put forward and supported the Partnership for Peace idea did so solely out of altruistic or Russophile considerations. More likely than not they are guided by their own interests, however understood, but their own. However, NATO's will and actions in this, as well as other, questions represent a certain balance of different interests of the countries comprising the alliance. At times nuances in the motivations behind the actions of individual NATO countries and politicians vary significantly. It is the duty of our own foreign policy makers to carefully weigh this diversity and inject our own interests into the common behavior patterns of the participants in partnership relations, whatever form they may take.

So far, reasoning according to the logic of the author of the reviewed article, we can only add one assumption: whether, in the absence of Russia, the NATO countries might not give the role of pacifiers of the "South" to the former republics of the USSR in Transcaucasia and Central Asia which have already joined or are hastening to join the Partnership program. That is, of course, an entirely speculative assumption. But are not prophecies of the threat of worsening Russian-Chinese or Russian-Muslim relations if Russia becomes a member of the Partnership as speculative? Warnings about the loss of markets for our military-industrial complex (MIC) and other troubles should, apparently, be viewed in the same light.

The conference, "Russia and NATO: Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region," sponsored recently in Moscow by the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Association, demonstrated the artificial character of a priori rejection of the proposal. As Western participants in the conference told us, one of the main conclusions they drew for themselves was that some Russian politicians rejected the Partnership idea out of hand not because of any organic flaws discovered in the program, but by virtue of the urge to come out in opposition to official policy on any issue.

Naturally, members of parliament, political parties, scholars, the press, and society as a whole, are entitled and duty bound to critically appraise the actions of official circles in the international arena, especially if they are imprudent, contradictory or, occasionally, unreasonably far-fetched. However, it appears that with regard to the problem we are debating the official policy promoters managed to display a healthy degree of caution and find forms of expressing specifically Russian interests, the interests of a great Eurasian power, a bridge

between West and East, a major influential force of the CIS, a connecting link in the unified defense space on the territory of the former USSR.

It should be noted, and the aforementioned conference once again confirmed, that official Russian politicians are considering possible (and in some cases already implemented) partnership relations with NATO precisely with due consideration of our interests in interaction with the entire world, along all lines; that in Europe, too, we view the role of NATO and associated formations in the context of European countries' participation in the activities of the United Nations and the CSCE. The buildup of practical forms of relations between NATO itself and those organizations, of which Russia is an equal member, is the earnest of the promise of the Partnership program.

Incidentally, specific consideration of proposed forms of partnership in this program is an indication of the reasonable modesty of the initial proposals, whereas the ill-conceived issue regarding the standardization of weapons, with imminent difficulties for our MIC, is, in the eyes of many scholarly Russian experts, on the contrary, more an opportunity for overcoming political and technical barriers to the opening of foreign markets to all that is of value which our industry can still produce.

In short, common sense with a necessary degree of prudence does not, in our view, permit offhand dismissal of the Partnership for Peace program, insofar as we have not yet overcome the dearth of confidence in East-West relations, have not yet done away with all vestiges of the Cold War, while our current economic and domestic difficulties leave no place for negative attitudes towards positive sprouts of the desired harmony in European and world affairs. It is another matter not to permit exploitation of our difficulties, which is just what exponents of Russophobic ideas in both the West and the East who have rushed in to replace anticommunism since the target of their hate has ceased to be a source of real military threat, are striving to do.

It is all the more necessary for Russia not to miss the chance to enhance confidence towards itself in the eyes of close and distant neighbors in both West and East, to help find a mutually acceptable variant of cooperation between two defense communities, NATO and the CIS, even if the former is at the apex of its influence and effectiveness while the latter is just taking its first steps towards establishing itself. It is important to launch a mechanism for coordinating the reciprocal interests and programs of Russia, NATO and the CIS.

All too often a position of haughty contempt coupled with blind distrust of other parties in international relations has served our country ill. In our view, it is precisely on such soil that apocalyptic pictures of Russian downfall could acquire real, but totally unwanted, features.

Kremenyuk Ponders 'Partnership' With West
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in Russian 24 May 94 p 5

[Article by Professor Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, under the heading "Criticism": "The Start of a Long Road: Is a Partnership Between Russia and the West Realistic?"]

[Text] *A number of questions were discussed during the Russian president's visit to Germany in May. But it appears that the main purpose of the visit was something else altogether: to find out how seriously the FRG and the West as a whole are about partnership with Russia. Are they not tending, concealed by declarations of "partnership," to place Russia in the dependent position of a "junior partner" and thereby cement their "victory" in the Cold War? These issues have been the subject of public discussion*

In January of this year, during a meeting in Moscow, presidents Yeltsin and Clinton asserted "that relations between Russia and the United States have entered a new stage of mature strategic partnership, mutual benefit and recognition of each other's national interests." However, the overall evolution of relations between Russia and the United States and other Western countries—most importantly, practical steps in the field of mutual relations—indicates that the actual state of those relations is very far from a "partnership" as that term is understood in international usage. In fact, the West has undertaken a number of actions—from the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia over Russia's objections, to the humiliating refusal to invite Russia to attend the 50th anniversary of the opening of a "second front" in Europe—which cannot be interpreted as anything except an attempt to "put Russia in its place."

Correspondingly, there is no way that relations between Russia and the West can achieve the balance, the optimum formula, that would calm politicians on both sides and would correspond to their objective needs. And it is unlikely that empty talk about "partnership" will help matters any. What are needed are practical actions that will in fact lead to an equal partnership (if such a thing is possible), or else Russia's relations with the West will continue to be characterized by nervousness and unpredictability.

Therefore, so as not to mislead the public and the decision makers, it would be advisable to think about just how justified it is at the present stage to speak of partnership as an accomplished fact in Russia's relations with the West, or whether this is still just a cherished dream that is very far from being a reality.

There Is 'Partnership,' Then There Is 'Partnership'

The Americans first began seriously talking about "partnership" as one of the key principles of their foreign policy under President Nixon in the late 1960's. The

failure of aggression in Vietnam, the accompanying acute domestic crisis in the United States and disarray in political circles all forced Washington to stop regarding its allies as "junior partners" and attempt to fashion a system of relations with them based on the principles of partnership.

Thereupon followed years of intensive efforts to find the most adequate forms of partnership, including active efforts by the Trilateral Commission, which in the 1970's prepared documents on all the main issues in international relations, with consideration for the interests of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, and meetings of the Big Seven countries beginning in 1975, though as a rule these took place without a great deal of commotion or public notice. On the whole, one must honestly admit that while the countries of the "socialist commonwealth" were unwaveringly heading for the collapse of that commonwealth, in the 1970's and 1980's the Big Seven countries were, on the contrary, moving toward a higher level of cooperation and consolidation.

Russia has virtually no experience establishing that kind of relations. Therefore there is little reason to expect that it can immediately, within a few years' time, wade through the mass of obstacles that objectively stand between Russia and partnership with the leading Western states. One will be able to speak of real "partnership" when a solid foundation for it exists in the form of a mutual stake in economic relations and closeness or similarity in the social base and political structure of and cooperation among kindred parties of a democratic, Christian or liberal orientation. When, finally, governing circles have similar or comparable social experience.

There is not even a hint of these things in Russia's relations with the West today, and it will take years (if our country develops successfully) for them to begin to appear.

The Foundations of a Possible 'Partnership'

If one were to attempt to assess prospects for a partnership between Russia and the leading Western countries, in particular with the United States, first of all one must acknowledge the marked inequality or asymmetry in the two sides' position.

Following the end of the Cold War the United States lost virtually nothing in terms of its international standing. It remains the largest nuclear superpower, its military and political blocs have not collapsed, and it continues to play the role of the largest provider of aid to other countries. The U.S. economy, though experiencing some difficulties, is nevertheless successfully weathering a technocratic era, assuming positions of leadership in virtually every advanced technology. The United States remains a country with one of the highest per capita incomes and well-developed health care, social security and educational systems. The same can be said of the FRG, Great Britain, Japan and other Western countries. Without idealizing their situation, in which problems do

exist, one must nevertheless admit that the West is a wealthy and developed society with good prospects for the 21st century.

Russia comes up looking badly by comparison. The USSR has collapsed, but virtually no one except the elites of the new republics gained by that, with the possible exception of the Baltic countries. As the largest country in the former Soviet Union, Russia inherited its military status and its role as a great power. But its economy is in deep crisis, a majority of the population is barely making ends meet, and over 35 percent of the population (according to various estimates) are living on the verge of poverty. The country is characterized by instability, and institutions of government are fighting among themselves, unable to propose either a socioeconomic future that is acceptable to the majority or, at the very least, a tolerable existence. The center and the regions are in a state of constant competition, and ethnic minorities are rebelling. A country that has the potential to be the richest in the world is in a state of semi-collapse.

It is clear that in this situation there is only one point for Russia to a "partnership" with the West: obtaining a source of funding, technology and know-how to rescue its economy from crisis. Consequently, from the very start the West regards it as a burden on the West's quite frankly somewhat limited available resources, because the United States, Germany and other seemingly "rich" countries themselves require loans and credits to maintain production. Even prosperous Germany is having increasing difficulty coming up with foreign aid funds as it spends approximately \$100 billion annually on reconstruction of the former GDR.

What does Russia have to offer in exchange? Vague promises of future income from Russian mineral resources? Equally vague promises to open up its capital investment market to foreign corporations? It is hard to imagine that this is an adequate attraction to the West, which is very well aware that even Russian entrepreneurs, though secretly and illegally, are taking their own capital out of the country, and that with current taxes and laws and the reign of the bureaucracy only a madman would risk investing his own money. These concerns increase in proportion to Russia's internal instability: what if Zhirinovskiy comes to power? Or the communists? What then?

The only thing that Russia can offer as an adequate contribution to a "partnership" is cooperation in the area of arms control and resolution of international crises. In that regard one must admit that the real partnership that emerged in relations between the USSR and the United States in the course of profound changes in the international arena (this "partnership" was first mentioned by President Bush during a meeting with CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in Malta in December 1989) could serve as a serious foundation upon which both powers could build broader and more lasting partnership relations.

Subsequently events took their course: at the end of 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, and the United States was skeptical of Russia's attempts to replace it as a "partner." This did not prevent the United States from signing the START II Treaty with Russia. But that was most likely due to inertia from previous years, because the treaty left out Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, which were also nuclear heirs of the USSR.

As for crises and examples of cooperation with regard to resolving them, the Americans are increasingly disinclined to trust the Russian Government, which is definitely not always prepared to risk unpopular decisions (for example, supporting the West's anti-Serbian course in Yugoslavia) and at times is incapable of defining a given region's degree of importance to Russia.

"Partnership" between Russia and the West, if it were actually to begin functioning now, would most likely mean a tremendous inequality between the partners, an inequality that would become increasingly difficult to correct with the passage of time.

A weak Russia that has lost its traditional image and has an inefficient economy cannot be an equal partner for the United States or the European Union. It will continue to ask for loans and extension of its debt repayment schedule. Gradually there will emerge (or perhaps already has emerged) between it and the West a dense network of dependency that will ensnare the country, its resources, its policy and even its culture. That is what must be avoided at all costs. We must resolutely focus primarily on fixing the economy, without pinning any particular hopes on anyone curing our ills for us.

We should be oriented toward a partnership with the West, but only in some distant future. Entering into one now would be to risk the free future of our nation.

The Convergence Has Begun

Despite all these seemingly obvious facts, the Russian Government has set itself the task of rapidly building "partnership" relations with the West. As a rule, the response it gets consists of polite ambiguities, vague sentiments and, at the same time, some rather harsh demands. Moreover, those demands apply to the realms of politics, economics, security and even, in a number of cases, internal affairs. Very often those demands give absolutely no consideration to Russia's specific circumstances, and can even take the form of dictates.

One can imagine that Western politicians have too thoroughly perceived the "smiling diplomacy" of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as evidence of Russia's willingness, like a wayward schoolboy, to listen to lectures and commentary in hopes of some unspecified reward in the future. Even in a matter in which Russians could well take pride—the overthrow of the communist regime—there has been the usual expression of gratitude to the West for its "energetic efforts," even though it is a well-known fact that after the end of the war in Vietnam the West renounced "crusades" and was

prepared to cooperate with the communist Soviet Union or China, if that was in line with its own needs.

The initial and quite naive attempts to depict Russia as virtually a ready-made "partner" for the West have given rise to a very incorrect reaction there. There people often forget that Russia, despite all its internal weakness, was and still remains a great power. There people have dared to flagrantly interfere in Russia's internal affairs in the Baltic countries and in Russia's relations with the CIS countries. There people have deemed it possible to reproach Russians over Zhirinovskiy both publicly and on an official level in a way that would be unthinkable if the subject were any Western politician (for example, publicly ridicule of the eccentric American millionaire Ross Perot during the presidential campaign).

Western dictates have taken particularly ugly forms in the area of Russian economic reforms. Threatened with the cutoff of loans or refusal to extend debt repayment, Ye. Gaydar's government was forced to take measures that had not been prepared, worked out in detail, carefully considered or discussed in public. Of course, Gaydar was not just a passive observer; he, too, had a burning desire to create a market economy in Russia as quickly as possible. But one would like to think that he did realize how many objective social, political and cultural obstacles there were to accomplishing that. And he probably realized that without painstaking preparatory work that could provide at least a minimal political base for reforms they should not be adopted.

There are plenty of examples of Western high-handedness in dealings with Russia. They include the cancelled rocket engine deal between Russia and India, attempts to restrict the Russian arms trade, slowness in repealing formal bans and restrictions on trade, an obvious unwillingness to accept Russia as a member of the Council of Europe, and many more. Among the latest acts of a hostile nature toward Russia one could cite the infamous NATO plan called "Partnership for Peace" and the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia carried out by NATO aircraft.

One gets the impression that the nascent convergence between Russia and the West, in which "smiling diplomacy" played such a visible role during the first stage, has produced some not very positive results. The foundation without which partnership is impossible—mutual respect for each side's legitimate interests—has not been laid down. The West was happy to believe A. Kozyrev when he claimed that Russia does not have any special, "private" interests, and concluded that it could impose its own "values" and "ideals" on Russia as a guide to understanding of what Russia should do in the international arena.

These thoughts are brought to mind by the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia. It should be noted that on the whole the NATO "initiative," which arbitrarily

declares former Yugoslavia a zone under its "responsibility" (unaligned Yugoslavia never was such) and offers its services to the U.N. as a "peacemaker," evokes the strongest reservations.

Simple logic says that this military and political bloc, a creation of the Cold War, should follow the Warsaw Pact's example and dissolve itself, as there is no real threat of a major war in Europe. U.N. forces are fully capable of monitoring the conflicts that do occur in Europe, such as the Yugoslavian conflict, and there is no need to assemble huge air armadas to resolve them. The very idea that air strikes could be used to put an end to a highly complex ethnic conflict with a tragic history is simply beneath serious politicians.

Nevertheless, despite the vigorous objections of Russia, which has its own interests in the region, the NATO air strikes were carried out. In effect Russia's interests were publicly ignored, and no one even remembered to consult her president.

All the doubts that have been expressed about "partnership" with the West should not be interpreted as a rejection of its value for the international system in general and for Russia in particular. "Partnership" has become a fairly good form of mutual relations between groups of countries and ensures that balance is maintained between their interests. Russia also needs "partnership," but only the kind of partnership in which it respects other countries' legitimate interests without any harm to its own legitimate interests.

Then Russia's entry into the world community would not destabilize that community, but rather would markedly strengthen it. However, in order to achieve that level of relations both Russia and the United States, as well as all of our country's other possible partners, still have a long road to travel. And that road begins in Russia, not in the West. It is only possible to build partnership relations with other countries if we have a healthy economy, a transparent process for the development of foreign policy, a strong system of democratic institutions and a clear and unambiguous image of our country in the rest of the world.

Observations on Duma Delegation's Visit to Former Yugoslavia

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13 May 94 pp 10-11

[Article by Sergey Parkhomenko under the rubric "Impressions": "The Balkan War Through the Eyes of Amateurs: Russian Members of Parliament Take Lessons in Diplomacy in the Zone of the Yugoslav Crisis"]

[Text]

Mandate

Belgrade-Pale-Sarajevo-Vukovar-Moscow—As far as I could see in accompanying a delegation of the State

Duma on a tour of the region of the Balkan crisis on the last days of April. Russian members of parliament make only middling diplomats. Their trip proved odd, to say the least. And the participants in the journey themselves also appeared, from the viewpoint of their partners in the former Yugoslav republics, odd.

These oddities were predetermined, most likely, by the Duma itself. All the complaints should be laid at its door. This was altogether quite a priceless decision: to choose a moment when the protracted civil war was experiencing one of the most drastic exacerbations of bloody animosity throughout its history and to dispatch a group of deputies directly to the zone of the hostilities. To convince itself that the NATO command was not kidding in issuing the parties to the conflict one ultimatum after another, threatening to engage the entire colossal military machine—and to suggest to the members of parliament that they put in some practice at the art of shuttle diplomacy. Especially since professional diplomats of the highest skills had exactly the day before publicly declared that their patience was exhausted, confidence had been undermined, they no longer saw any point in efforts of this kind....

The mandate extended by the lower house of the Russian parliament to the delegation of deputies to the Balkans was never recorded on paper. The mission was put together, as we recall, not simply in haste but in semi-hysterical fashion. The NATO bombing in the Goradze region, which had begun without full-fledged consultations with the Russian leadership, provoked one of the most bitter political rows experienced by the current corps of deputies. The row developed into a highly-strung and, as always in such cases, muddle-headed altercation at a plenary sitting. A decision was postponed—it not being entirely understood, meanwhile, of what it should, for that matter, consist—until the return of the "inspection," which was instructed "to meet with all the belligerents and ascertain everything on the spot." Only having closely studied the verbatim record of the debate is an approximate reconstruction of the meaning of this actual "everything" which was to be ascertained possible.

The deputies set out for Belgrade with, apparently, roughly the following assignment:

- 1) To ascertain the cause of the war going on there;
- 2) To ascertain who is guilty in this war and in what respect and who, consequently, is innocent;
- 3) To ascertain whether or not it is possible somehow to terminate this war;
- 4) To ascertain whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia is behaving correctly there and whether it is communicating the truth in response to parliament's inquiries on the Yugoslav problem;
- 5) To ascertain separately what "UN sanctions against Yugoslavia" mean and whether we are doing right in

supporting them, and if not, how we might cease our support for them and what this would mean for us;

- 6) As for the rest, on the small points, get your own bearings on the spot....

Not bad for a first experiment in parliamentary diplomacy?

There was, after all, really nothing more specific on the deputies' "travel checklist." Inasmuch as there was, we repeat, no travel checklist. There were airline tickets to Sofia, expenses for seven days, two officials from the Duma administrative system for assistance, \$3,500 for unforeseen group expenses, and a promise to call the Russian Embassy in Belgrade and request assistance.

Working Model of the State Duma 1/47th Its Natural Size

The Duma sent nine amateurs on the far-reaching diplomatic expedition. The list, drawn up according to the "one faction—one representative" principle, was filled out with people, the absolute majority of whom were incidental. The considerations that guided the leaders of the factions in suggesting candidates for the trip are totally unclear. As the members of the delegation themselves acknowledged, one of them "thought about it a bit and asked in," another "had not been abroad for a long time," a third was "seated near the aisle in the hall and caught someone's eye at the wrong time."

This was the result: Major General Nikolay Bezborodov (in the recent past, chief of a flying school, from Kurgan), head of the delegation—Communist Party of the Russian Federation and, as ascertained on the spot, Russia's Way; Vladimir Averchev (counselor at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States)—Yabloko; Mariya Gaydash (deputy chief of the administration, from Nizhny)—Women of Russia; Grigoriy Dyudyayev (distinguished kolkhoz member, Kemerovo Oblast)—Agrarian Party of Russia; Konstantin Zatulin (entrepreneur, from Moscow)—Party of Russian Unity and Accord; Vyacheslav Marychev (director of a plant clubhouse, from Petersburg)—Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; Adrian Puzanovskiy (lecturer at an agricultural institute, from Kostroma)—New Regional Policy; Aleksey Sarychev (judge, from Barnaul)—Russia's Choice; Viktor Talanov ("not currently employed," nor is his place of residence indicated in the reference book)—Democratic Party of Russia.

Anything you like, only not a diplomatic mission....

Only Vladimir Averchev has practical experience of foreign policy service: two years at the embassy in Washington under Vladimir Lukin plus work as an official of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last parliament and membership of the same committee of the State Duma, as a deputy this time. He alone, it would seem, could in the situation that had come about in the Balkans as a result of the three-year war get his bearings relatively easily. A further two or three persons had,

perhaps, some idea of the heart of the matter in general outline, if only at the level of daily newspaper reports. The rest, alas...

It cannot be claimed that the delegation had not, prior to departure, received any briefing from the professionals. Vitaliy Churkin paid a visit to the Duma in the evening of the day before departure. Subsequently the deputies, stunned by the information that had been rained down on them all at once, paraphrased these instructions thus: "Churkin said: Convey to the Serbs that there will be no more games; convey to them that they will now be hit hard and that we will, finally, support the NATO people...."

The absolute majority of members of the delegation were learning for themselves at this moment, let us speak plainly, a tremendous amount of what was new and interesting, about which they had hitherto heard, at best, just something or other. That, for example, there are today on the map of the former Yugoslavia, apparently, a whole three Serbias: Serbia proper as part of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]; the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), which is cut in two and which occupies in toto approximately one-third of the territory of Croatia; the Serb Republic (RS), which controls approximately 64 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They learned that all three Serbias are in a state of war with Croatia. But that in 1993 active hostilities around the RSK gradually subsided and that the front stabilized. There was an intensification, on the other hand, of the clashes between the Serb Republic and the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who relatively recently declared their readiness to form a federation and join Croatia in a "soft" confederative union. Nonetheless, even at its present stage the Balkan war continues to be considered tripartite. Two ethnic communities are essentially uniting against a third.

They learned that as of February 1992, when the UN Security Council voted to send to the Balkans the first "blue helmet" contingents, a fourth party to the drama—the UNPROFOR (SOONO in its Russian version) multinational force—appeared also. By the end of last year the personnel of the British, French, Canadian, Egyptian, Russian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and other military units deployed here already totaled more than 25,000.

Generally, only here was it ascertained that "all parties," whose arguments were to be heard, were not two ("Serbs" and "Muslims," as has traditionally been heard in all parliamentary debates and in the majority of reports supplied by the Foreign Ministry also) but a minimum of four. The time for learning everything about everything was, as before, a week.

An adventure, in short? Not at all, why so? More the traditional approach to matters: A rush job is announced, and it is proposed making up for the lack of time, lack of resources, lack of organization, lack of

qualifications, for all that is missing, making good the shortage thanks to the enthusiasm and conscientiousness of the citizens.

Nor is it all that simple when it comes to conscientiousness either, for that matter. The idea akin to that of a jury—entrusting the function of arbiters to people whose view is free of preconceived notions and prejudices and whose perception of events is patently not overburdened by stratifications of secondary (and, consequently, inevitably distorted) information—would be elegant even. Were the potential arbiters truly impartial and prepared to renounce their customary affections and traditional taboos. If, in our case, they did not sympathize so ardently and sincerely with one of the sides. The Serbs, of course.

We should one day, probably, in a more tranquil atmosphere, try to ascertain why it came about that a 100 percent pro-Serb interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict became in Russia an obligatory attribute of a "serious, responsible policy," his own involvement in which any public figure concerned for his reputation considers himself duty bound to prove and defend. In the most general outline the heart of the matter is perfectly comprehensible: The December elections demonstrated the propaganda value and the "high profitableness" (in the sense of the return support of the electorate) of patriotic slogans. The upheaval caused by the success of the nationalist radicals of the LDPR provoked the almost instinctive reaction of democratic circles and, simultaneously, of the ruling Russian elite: "We will not cede our patriotism to all these riff-raff! We ourselves will be patriots also!"

But the proclamation of patriotic values as the core of Russia's domestic policy, which is attended by unpleasant national problems, is a troublesome, risky business. And should it come to be a question, say, of the policy of the Russian Federation in the former space of the Union, even costly also, in the direct, financial, and economic sense, inasmuch as it immediately creates additional obligations of the country to compatriots abroad. On the foreign policy market, on the other hand, "state patriotism" is proving to be a far more profitable commodity insofar as it does not, seemingly, require direct outlays, if only at the initial stage: The Slav peoples, Orthodoxy, historical fraternity, cultural kinship, similarity of national characters—all this comes, after all, free of charge, virtually.... The result: "Russia will never betray Serbia!..."

Whatever the case, the spectrum of opinions of the members of the Duma delegation to the Balkans corresponded precisely to the traditional apportionment of forces that is revealed each time that the chamber has by vote to define its attitude toward the latest resolution on the defense of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, international sanctions against the FRY, or the official policy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.... Namely, all factions more or less unanimously express

sympathy with the Serbian side, Choice vacillates, Yabloko tries to steer a middle course, and Women have no clear position. The Balkan mission was cause for the creation of a model of the State Duma of the Russian Federation 1/47th of its natural size. A working model, what is more.

One of the first Yugoslav leaders to receive the delegation in Belgrade—Zeljko Simic, deputy prime minister of the Government of the FRY—began the negotiations with words to the effect that “the Russian parliament is the unique political institution that has never been seen to be adopting a one-sided, partial interpretation of the role of party to the conflict.” A statement that is extraordinarily flattering, of course, but very far from the truth. And Mr. Simic, who has the reputation of a rising star of Serbian politics: Although young, he is already a resourceful, subtle, and very well-informed tactician, could not have failed to have understood that seated in front of him were people of whom two or three, perhaps, would abstain, had they to vote for any resolution in support of Serbia, the rest, however, would assuredly vote “aye.”

Professionalism for Nonprofessionals

The “model” did not resemble the full-scale version of the Duma in just one respect, perhaps: It was far more likable—in purely human terms.

Counting the road across the Bulgarian border to Belgrade and back, the parliamentary expedition covered in a week almost 2,000 km by bus and motor vehicle. For nine adult people, who were barely acquainted with one another prior to this and who were, by definition, different (if we are speaking of their philosophy, temperament, experience of life, and “pre-deputy” social position, finally), this was a difficult assignment: hour after hour—together.

The training for compatibility, for “harmonizability,” as vivisectionists from some institute for medical and biological problems would say, in itself appeared unusually instructive. There arose in the detached observer (like the author of these notes, who traveled the whole route with the delegation) from time to time all kinds of radiant illusions as regards the fact that it is on such trips that the foundations may most naturally be laid for the mutual understanding and mutual respect of even irreconcilable political adversaries and that a proper and even benevolent style of parliamentary relations may be cultivated. I began to feel at times: To hell with it. Yugoslavia, however this trip might end, it will produce a far-reaching result—nine persons capable of reaching an understanding on whatever you like will appear in the Duma. A kind of super-effective conciliation commission. Normal people, really, it is obvious. And selected in purely accidental fashion. Perhaps the rest could be sent to a hellhole somewhere in the same way—in small groups. And then you could get laws adopted...

Whiling away the journey, the deputies were able to exchange barbs good-naturedly and astonishingly wittily

for hours on the most risky political grounds. They could guffaw at the embarrassed and frightened emissary of the liberal democrats, who had injudiciously blurted out—literally—that “the LDPR was altogether a party of madmen.” They could suddenly yield to a sentimental impulse and, despite interfactional disagreements, set off to lay flowers on the grave of Rodzyanko at the old Belgrade cemetery. The communist Bezborodov could suddenly on a nighttime bus ride break remarkably tunefully and with great feeling into “The morning paints with gentle light...,” and the democrat Sarychev, join in as best he could.

But the entire idyll falls apart instantly as soon as a television camera or microphone appears in the members of parliament’s field of vision. The deputy Marychev, with eyes glazed with commitment and zeal, immediately began to convey to the Serb community “the position of the Liberal Democratic Party and its chairman, Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy, personally.” The deputy Dyudyayev, writhing in a cruel grip, gave himself over to inarticulate imprecations against the “aggressive policy of the NATO bloc and the pro-American position of the Russian leadership”....

It was with good reason, for that matter, that we employed somewhat earlier the word “conscientiousness.” For the Russian deputies this is, apparently, a monstrously loose concept. And it could be seen repeatedly that, aside from the experience and practice of diplomatic work (which to an almost equal extent was catastrophically lacking in all the participants in the delegation), the success of such a mission largely depends on some base qualities essential to the member of parliament. I am talking about political professionalism, in the most general sense of the word. And, specifically, about receptivity to a large volume of new information and about the ability to analyze it promptly and dispassionately. About the capacity for looking, and seeing. Listening, and hearing.

General Bezborodov, leader of the delegation, comported himself with exceptional dignity in this respect. There is no doubt with which side his sympathies lay. But for some reason or other he considered himself duty bound time after time to take it upon himself to drum into his colleagues who had overstepped all bounds at the negotiations not proper behavior exactly, but simple decency: The delegation has been sent by the State Duma to the conflict zone by no means to express solidarity with anyone at all or to approve of some people or other here but to hold some people up to shame for something or other. “No one ever entrusted the role of judge to our delegation,” he declared at a meeting with a leader of Serbia. “Time alone will be your judge. We are interested merely in presenting to the Duma the fullest possible information necessary for a balanced decision.” And whatever sings the heart of the convinced communist the deputy Bezborodov gave no one cause to rebuke him for partiality.

But the head of the delegation's ideas as to what, in fact, should constitute the dignity of a member of parliament of a great power who has suddenly—and involuntarily almost—found himself a diplomat were not shared by many. We will name Averchev, Gaydash, Zatulin, and Sarychev here. The others were regularly and irrepressibly carried away.

Adrian Puzanovskiy, for instance, considered it entirely appropriate to proclaim in the middle of the negotiations with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs in Pale: "We have come to support the Serbian people in their just struggle and want to know only how we may be of further assistance to them...." So this, apparently, is what it is all about.

That same Vyacheslav Marychev evidently derived particular pleasure when, causing a furor among Serbian journalists, he brandished in front of the television camera, for example, a sheaf of papers that he had just received from Radovan Karadzic and proclaimed: "We have just witnessed the most important event for our delegation! We have been handed this folder, which contains the whole truth about the Yugoslav war and about the crimes of the Muslims!..." It was of no consequence to the ardent liberal democrat that the delegation had not at that time fulfilled even one-third of the scheduled program and that the next day it had to make its way to the Muslim side of Sarajevo, where meetings with the leaders of Bosnia were planned.

And several days later, during a visit to Serb Krajina, he thought nothing of provoking a most veritable row. In Vukovar the delegation had to split into two groups, one of which quickly flew on a UN aircraft to Zagreb. Mr. Marychev saw off his colleagues with a public toast "to loyalty" raised at an official reception: Look, Serbian comrades, he said, "your true friends are staying behind with you, the traitors are flying off to bend the knee to your enemies".... And what were the others supposed to do here? Spit with irritation? Give him no further assistance? It was a good thing that the trip to Vukovar was at least right at the very end of the program.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves, I believe.

War in Paradise

The delegation achieved nothing in regard to point one of the mandate given its representatives by the Duma (in the form in which we have attempted to imagine this mandate). Sorting out the causes of the present Balkan war, inconceivable in its brutality and obduracy, is not the task of a week's journey.

It is said that civil wars are always accompanied by the warring peoples' mass infatuation with their own history. The present war in the Balkans is no exception: This maniacal passion for historical digressions, for the most detailed expositions of more or less pseudo-scientific theories as to the causes and consequences of medieval ethnic migrations, and for an exegesis of the subtlest details of intrigues and political interests, which

have time after time set European powers against one another in the Balkans, is revealed immediately in any conversational partner, regardless of his citizenship, nationality, religious belief, or social position.

One motif, the most striking, perhaps, is easily noticeably in this entire historical-method complex. The war in the former Yugoslavia undoubtedly did not begin at the moment when the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, orphaned without Marshal Tito, formally ceased to exist. This is by no means a "discrete," "independent" war but a continuation of some other—of far larger scale. Of a war by no means settled, as has thus far mistakenly been believed, but merely asleep. And with whoever you talk now—in Belgrade or Zagreb, Sarajevo, Pale, or Vukovar—it sooner or later appears, all the same, that the argument is about only one thing: the kind of war that is being continued....

In Belgrade you are necessarily reminded of the history of the Ottoman conquest of Southeast Europe. The line on the map delineating the two civilizations—Christian and Islamic—where the invasion was halted is shown on the map. Nowadays this line almost coincides with Croatia's southern border: Serbs, becoming something akin to European Cossacks, growing into the image of warrior-people, and getting used to living in the eternal semi-siege conditions of a "buffer zone," are scattered along its horseshoe. These territories now belong to Croatia and Bosnia, but it is here that the RSK and the RS have arisen.

It is 1937 that is mentioned primarily in Zagreb and Sarajevo. The peak of the development of the prewar Serbian nationalist movement. The first plans for ethnic purges in Kosovo. The birth of the idea of a Greater Serbia: It is to this that the present Milosevic regime aspires, they say. It is to this that the plans for the wresting away of Krajina and Eastern Hercegovina lead.

Belgrade historians have collected and published a gigantic amount of material devoted to the genocide of the Serbian people in the years of World War II. Reference books, white papers, atlases, and collections of photographs are all awaiting presentation to an unknown international tribunal that will someday condemn the crimes of the Croatian Ustasa. Croatia's Ante Pavelic was Germany's loyal ally in the war. Some 600,000 Serbs were exterminated in Croatia's concentration camps.

Zagreb is ready with a response. The morbid epic of the Serbian Chetniks, who were a dependable support of the Italo-German occupation of Croatia closer to the end of the war.

And so on ad infinitum.

But among the sundry opinions there is one according to which the preconditions of the tragedy should be sought far closer in time. December 1964 is marked especially in the chronology of the Yugoslav crisis compiled by the Belgrade European Studies Institute: "The national affiliation of the chosen members of the party leadership was

read out at the Eighth League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress in order for republic and regional parity within the federal party leadership to be introduced at the next, ninth, congress (March 1969).... At the eighth congress J. Broz Tito for the first time publicly declared himself to be a Croat...."

Perhaps this really is where the whole problem lies: The communist chiefs, even though they knew that they were building their federation on a huge ethnic mine, themselves set the timing mechanism. This was the official ideology they had chosen: It was ordained that everyone firmly remember each minute his national affiliation. Although they had hit on point five on the passport and on each trifling piece of paper, the Stalinist ideologues still preferred to stop somewhere half-way.

Socialist Federated Yugoslavia survived Tito by 10 years. It then exploded: The charge had been primed ahead of time. Some people, it would seem, are still hoping to put the scattered fragments back together again and are for the sake of this prepared to saturate this land with blood a meter deep. This is, most likely, the case. Why, otherwise, this carnage?

It is impossible to put credence in the "struggle for living space" and the suffering from "suffocating closeness" version. A week of journeying around the former Yugoslav republics compelled the belief that this war is being fought directly in paradise. And if paradise has its own, "inner" Eden, it was this that had to become the arena of the most savage and most destructive slaughter, what is more. There are more modest places here—the monotonous and flat Vojvodina, for example. All is quiet there. There, at least, fortunately.

But Bosnia is an unimaginable, luxuriant beauty. Mighty mountains, and at the same time ones that have been inhabited and built up by man down the ages. Spacious and fruitful valleys. Full rivers. Succulent pastures. Very rich mineral resources. The solidity and sturdy sufficiency of cities and villages. Splendid roads. A developed industry that has not, however strange, deformed the environment. How many more people could this land keep in sufficiency and prosperity? Who was cramped here? For what devil was all this not enough?

Something does not square with the widely discussed religious underpinnings of the hostility either. The localities of the traditional preponderance of Muslim and Orthodox here curiously interlay one another. Dozens of villages along the roadsides, and not a single mosque. Churches come into view from time to time, but far less frequently than in the Russian heartland, say. By no means above each large village do you find a cross. It is said that both warring armies are destroying the other's places of worship in planned fashion—but there would then have to be extant ruins, at least.... They are not to be seen. Homes destroyed, thousands, but churches and mosques, no. Muslim families eat pork in large quantities and with pleasure. On the Orthodox table the most customary and traditional dish consists of little pieces of

meat: lyulya kebab it is usually called. What could be more dispassionate and true evidence than the cuisine?

The arbitrary nature of the "Muslim" concept is no secret in the former Yugoslavia, incidentally. Back at the start of the 1970's a list of the ethnic communities living in the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia was enshrined legislatively. Two unique innovations pertain to that moment: the nationality "Yugoslav," for indeterminate citizens born of mixed marriages, more often than not, and the nationality "Muslim." Nationality, precisely, by no means implying obligatory religious affiliation but indicating merely the area of habitation.

Over what the war was being fought in paradise simply remained an unsolved puzzle for the Duma researchers. Within the framework of normal human logic it is, most likely, insoluble in principle, for that matter.

But one further observation was made here, on the other hand: If this is indeed paradise, it is for everyone. The military included. From all the signs, combat operations in these mountains could be conducted eternally, particularly if the methods of guerrilla warfare are employed. The mountains are sufficiently high and extensive as to render ineffective the use of modern military equipment, aviation particularly, and to reduce to nothing all efforts to bring the territory under dependable control. At the same time, on the other hand, they are just so high as not to create additional difficulties in movement for small mobile subunits and flying squads, simply put, gangs. And the well-developed infrastructure of roads and supply lines ensures altogether comfortable conditions for guerrilla operations.

The Innocent and the Guilty

Now the "innocent" and the "guilty." There are neither in the Balkan war, of course. It is perfectly certain, in any event, that there are no longer any "innocent" here. At the very first moment of armed confrontation, perhaps, one party might have been considered the victim, the other, the aggressor, but no one will ever prove this now. Because in the three years of war too much hatred has accumulated in this country. Each successive killing is now revenge for a previous one. And that alone. All the rest is immaterial. And the devastated and plundered villages, whose population was massacred to a man, appear absolutely identical and fill the heart of the passerby with an identical horror. Whether these villages are Muslim, Croat, or Serb.

Since May 1991 everyone here has, it seems, fought with everyone else and everyone has come to hate everyone else. At first the multinational Yugoslav People's Army attempted to perform its "constitutional duty to defend the territorial integrity of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia," counterposing force of arms to Slovenia's declaration of independence. It then, considerably more decisively and aggressively, opposed the plans for Croatia's conversion into an independent state. Subsequently the clashes switched, formally, to purely ethnic soil. Croats fought Serbs. The Bosnian Croats, the

Bosnian Muslims. The Muslims, among themselves. Some Serbs, against other Serbs. Now the united forces of Croats and Muslims, against the Serbs.

To ascertain the degree of guilt and innocence of the parties to any conflict, world diplomacy makes active use of a method that is essentially naive and astonishingly ineffective: It affords the quarreling leaders an opportunity to have their say and dispatches its representatives to hear them out. No adequate substitute for this procedure has been devised: The use of neutral observers produces only crumbs of fragmentary information. And diplomatic emissaries are forced to endlessly filter through interim protocols, declarations, and communiqués those same long-known arguments, inevitable in their depressing predictability. It is necessary more often than not to be a virtuoso professional to be able to extract from the pile of negotiating dross the subtlest nuance: a change of position, an initiative, a concession, a hint at a readiness to compromise.

It would be foolish to expect that an untrained crew of deputies would with its bare hands latch onto some large diplomatic nugget. But enough of negotiating work and to spare fell to the lot of the Russian Duma members in Yugoslavia.

Let us make clear for fairness' sake that the Serbian side was represented in the program considerably more fully and that its leaders had incomparably more favorable opportunities for setting forth their viewpoint. In five days the Russian delegation was received altogether by the top leaders of the FRY (Bozovic, speaker of the lower house of parliament, Prime Minister Kontic, his deputy Simic, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jovanovic, and Minister of Defense Bulatovic), Milosevic, president of Serbia, top leaders of the Serb Republic (President Karadzic, Prime Minister Lukic, and Krajsnik, head of parliament), and the leaders of Serb Krajina (Mikelic, chairman of the government, and Bojnica, chairman of the Skupstina). And the deputies spent only a day—and, as already mentioned, only a small part of the delegation even at that—in the capital of Croatia, although even here they met with Valentic, chairman of the government, and Mesic, chairman of the House of Representatives. The visitors spent only a matter of hours on the Muslim side of Sarajevo, on the other hand, confining themselves to quite a brief conversation with Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Lazovic, speaker of the Bosnian parliament.

The distortion was compensated somewhat, come to that, by meetings with high-ranking officials of the United Nations and the Red Cross and with representatives of the UNPROFOR Command, including officers from the Russian "blue helmets" contingent. In addition, a particular part in the work of the parliamentary mission was played by staff of the Embassies of Russia in the FRY and Croatia.

It would, generally, be appropriate mentioning here that it is certainly not often that a team of diplomats of the

class of that which operates at the Russian mission in Belgrade is selected. A member of the delegation once observed that the personnel of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade "knows the situation in somewhat greater depth even than diplomats have the right to know it." In fact, the many years of service (and there are in the embassy many career diplomats who are on not their first long-term assignment here and who have been working since the end and even from the middle of the 1980's here) have made the Russian representatives specialists of the highest class with a magnificent grasp of the stratagems of the Balkan political and military situation, the history of the former Yugoslav republics and their social and economic problems, and the subtleties of national mentality. There is no doubt that without their assistance the parliamentary mission would have had few chances of coping with the unchecked flow of arguments which was rained down on them in the quarreling capitals.

Although it very soon became obvious that these arguments could not be distinguished by any particular diversity. The Serbian leaders concentrated primarily on refuting the widely known charges leveled at them as the sole culprits of the aggressive attacks and savage bombardments resumed again and again around the "security zones" in Bosnia.

In justification of its actions, the Serbian leadership refers on each occasion to the fact that the "security zones" (the UNPROFOR force has as of this time organized six: around Sarajevo, Bihac, Goradze, Zepce, Srebrenica, and Tuzla) in fact afford no one any security inasmuch as the UN troops have not succeeded in demilitarizing them. UN observers, as also the diplomats permanently at the scene, confirm the justice of such complaints. Too many arms, they say, have been stockpiled in these areas, and it is not always possible to take control even of the heavy artillery systems and mortars. Small arms, of which each home is full, even less: It is not even a question of confiscating from the public, even registering them is impossible.

The Bosnian Muslims and the Croats are enjoying great success here in taking advantage of the UN cover in these zones for the concentration, recreation, and training of their troops. Viktor Andreyev, coordinator of the UN force for civilian affairs in Bosnia, recalled in this connection a recently published report of Butrus-Ghali, which set forth these facts in detail. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN secretary general, also spoke with the Russian deputies about the same thing.

The "security zones" are becoming a convenient springboard for sudden attacks on the Serbian positions, after which the attackers safely pull back once again behind the backs of the "blue helmets." It is widely held in the world that the reports of a "Muslim spring offensive" were merely a clumsy propaganda ruse organized by the Karadzic regime. But officers of the peacekeeping force in Sarajevo confidently confirmed in response to the deputies' questions that an attempt at an offensive in the

middle and toward the end of March really was made, and on a broad front. This Bosnian Army action was not crowned with big successes, and Serbs beat back the attack, but the offensive cannot, nonetheless, be seen other than as a large-scale provocation. The siege of Goradze, which was ended only at the price of a decisive show of force by NATO aircraft, was begun in response to the Muslims' actions.

The Muslim commanders, in the opinion of those same officers, have altogether shown themselves to be past masters at provocations. A colonel from the Ukrainian "blue helmets" contingent, Mikhail Tsinchenko, deputy UNPROFOR commander in the Sarajevo sector, reported that Muslim mortar batteries had repeatedly been installed and had begun to operate directly beneath the windows of his headquarters—in the hope of a response from the Serbian side. He affirms with certainty the truthfulness of the information on the deployment by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina of machine guns, mortars, and even field guns in proximity to humanitarian facilities or directly inside them—in hospitals, where refugees are concentrated, and so forth. And the Serbs quite often respond—with incredible ferocity and savagery.

Practically all witnesses to the conflict are prepared to acknowledge that in the majority of instances the Serb forces are actually counteracting and that the initiative of active combat operations usually comes from their enemy. But the inappropriate power of the Serbian "retribution" and the immense number of casualties among the peaceful population resulting from their "counterattacks" cannot be justified. And realistic estimates are needed here also, for that matter. The recent sensational AFP report from Goradze, against which the blockade had just been raised, on Muslim informants' multiple exaggeration of the details of those killed and wounded demonstrated that there are propaganda dodges here also.

But propaganda in this war is another matter, of exceptional importance in itself.

Information Catastrophe

The Serbian leaders are today speaking with despair almost about the propaganda war, which they have conclusively lost. But there is no one to blame for this but themselves. If the atavisms of communist ideology characteristic of the ruling Serbian elite had to manifest themselves somewhere, they had to have done so sooner and more fully than anywhere else precisely in relations with the press. From the very start of the war the Serbian leadership adopted a demonstratively imperious and sharply worded tone in its dealings with journalists.

The Serbian political press is quite candid and unconstrained in its opinions. But only as long as this does not concern the progress of the war and relations with its Balkan neighbors. As far as foreign journalists are concerned, the Belgrade authorities have forced them to operate under extraordinarily difficult conditions. Strict

censorship and the regular application of repressive measures: denial of right of access to the zones of combat operations, deprivation of accreditation, prohibitions on the transmission of reports to their editorial offices, expulsion from the country—all this has become routine practice here. The latest purge of foreign journalists occurred during the visit of the Russian delegation. Four correspondents of AFP (the whole of the Belgrade office), three reporters from CNN, and one each from the Sky News European television service and Radio Free Europe, and correspondents of LE MONDE, EL PAIS, DIE PRESSE, and THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR lost their accreditation in the FRY.

The leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, have made special efforts to establish the most cordial and businesslike relations possible with the world press. The tactics of information warfare for which they have opted have been extraordinarily profitable and effective. The most auspicious working conditions that the laws of wartime permit have been created for the journalists of Western television companies, newspapers, and press agencies. It is sufficient to observe that the sole hotel in the Muslim part of Sarajevo that was relatively unscathed during the artillery shelling—the celebrated Holiday Inn—was set aside not for some army staff, ministry, or hospital even but for the accommodation of a colossal number of correspondent centers of the world's electronic and written press. Journalists are guaranteed a reasonable level of safety as they move around the territories of the warring republics and have been provided with transport, provisions, and, what is particularly valuable for any reporter, means of communication for transmitting his information. The UNPROFOR Command, which is also located in Zagreb, incidentally, has streamlined the issue of accreditation for permanent and temporary correspondents in the conflict zone.

As a result the vast majority of journalists covering the Balkan crisis are physically based on the Muslim-Croat side of the front. From a purely practical viewpoint this is far more convenient and rational than in the areas controlled by the Serbs, and for this reason you encounter practically no one there. But the result is that any shell exploding in direct proximity to the journalists' observation points is one that has come from the Serbian side. "Two dozen Western cameramen immediately rush to shoot any crater from the explosion of a Serbian shell," an officer of the headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping battalion in Sarajevo says, "and two dozen journalists ascertain the name of the person who was a casualty of this explosion. But no one sees exactly the same crater from a Muslim shell in a Serbian village. There is simply no one to come to inspect it...."

We repeat, the Serbian leaders have themselves created all the conditions for the manifest imbalance in the coverage of the events of the war. But journalists' true professionalism should, obviously, have consisted of preserving objectivity in spite of all the unpropitious circumstances. The world press was duty bound to

display far more perseverance for the collection of full information adequate to the actual state of affairs in both hostile camps. The present situation, however, testifies to the defeat that has been sustained here by the international journalist community.

Leopard Skins

The hopeless defeat on the information front is, perhaps, the sole setback of such a scale for the Serbs in the Balkan conflict. As far as the military aspect proper is concerned, their successes are impressive to any specialist. UN observers agree that the Serbian Army has been making almost ideal use of all the advantages conferred by the nature of the terrain, the type of combat operations, the numbers and training of the personnel, and the possibilities of modern arms.

The professional skill of the Serbian Army has compelled the appreciation not only of its direct adversary in the protracted war but of the UNPROFOR Command also. The world press has as of late been saying a great deal about a kind of duel by default that has been under way for several months now between General Rose, commander of the UN force in Bosnia, and General Mladic, commander of the army of the Serb Republic. The brilliant British officer Rose, a veteran of the Falklands War, is markedly inferior in this single combat.

A dispiriting impression was made on military specialists, for instance, by the Serb operation in the Goradze region. General Rose's staff was absolutely convinced that the zone of the latest stirring of the Serb forces would be the surrounds of Tuzla. Mladic, meanwhile, succeeded in breaking away from the hounding by UN observers, pulling back part of his army from Sarajevo, and then in just 24 hours transferring a 16,000-strong corps—together with heavy equipment, auxiliary sub-units, field kitchens, the supply train, and everything else—to an entirely different part of the front zone, at the approaches to Goradze, where not long prior to this the Muslims had concentrated an armed contingent in a strength of almost 10,000 men. The appearance here of powerful Serb forces came as a complete surprise both to the enemy and to UNPROFOR. It actually became known only at the moment when the Serbs organized the concentrated shelling of the city and launched an assault.

How serious a lesson the "blue helmets" learned from this defeat, only the future will tell. But even now it is becoming increasingly apparent that the establishment of dependable control over the areas of combat operations and the effective and swift disarmament of the opposed armies by the efforts of the UN troops are hardly to be seriously expected. The peacekeeping contingents will not stop the animosity in the Balkans by force of will, even if their numbers are increased many times over.

In addition, the experience of the use of international peacekeeping forces on various continents shows that the intensiveness of their involvement in active combat operations cannot grow for any period of time longer

than public opinion in the countries that have sent army units to the zones of bloodshed permits. "Neither your country nor any other has sent its children to die in another's war" was the reminder with which General Rose began his conversation with the Russian members of parliament at UNPROFOR's Sarajevo headquarters. His statements to the effect that the UN force "does not intend to take its place in the Muslim trenches and fight in place of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina" became known several days later.

There are, evidently, no purely military ways of settling the conflict. Negotiating methods remain. The Serbian side is demonstrating here, at first sight, far more assertive initiative. There was no perception of a lack of statements concerning "the Serbian people's ardent aspiration to a complete and conclusive end to the hostility on the soil of Yugoslavia" in a single one of the speeches of high-ranking officials heard by the Russian delegation in Belgrade, Pale, and Vukovar.

But it has to be recognized that such statements are being made by the Serbs today from a position of strength. In the estimation of military experts, the Serbian Army has, in fact, accomplished all its most important combat missions and now firmly holds sway throughout the region of the conflict. It is not even a question of the extent of the territories which it has taken under control but of the quality of these territories. Strategically key heights, roads, bridges, and industrial facilities are now, for the most part, in the hands of the authorities of the Serb Republic. The military-political situation established around Serb Krajina is entirely favorable to it also.

This is why the Serb side can permit itself to look down on all diplomatic projects and plans offered it from outside. All these plans amount essentially to numerous versions of the "leopard's skin" drawing on geographical maps of the Balkans, to a fancifully painted mosaic of zones and territories to be secured under the control of the Serb, Croat, and Muslim authorities, under a UN protectorate.

The Vance-Owen Plan is such. As is the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. And the Vance-Owen Plan once again, but as amended by Izetbegovic. And the plan of proposals of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. None of them evokes even the least enthusiasm among the Serbs. None, to be honest, appears really viable: There are no states that have been chopped into such tiny noodles. Such states would not live long. Especially after a most savage three-year war.

It would be odd to accuse the delegation of Russian members of parliament of not having fulfilled the most important point of the Duma mandate. The deputies did not bring to Moscow any miraculous prescription for a resolution of the Balkan crisis. It simply does not exist in nature.

Not yet. And it remains to believe, it seems, those who maintain that the time of the birth of the lifesaving idea

that will one day restore hope of peace to all who are participating in the bloody Yugoslav drama has not yet come. It is dreadful to have to say this, but people have not had their fill of fighting here yet. Yugoslavia has been ravaged and deformed by war, but has not yet been exhausted, evidently, to the extent that revulsion and horror at what has been done have forced its leaders and its peoples to solicit peace. Not from one another. Not, more precisely, enemy from enemy. Among themselves.

Zatulin Discusses Duma Delegation's Conclusions on Ex-Yugoslavia

944Q0384A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 19,
18-24 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations With Compatriots, by Andrey Sharyy; place and date not given: "Carthage Is To Be Restored?"]

[Text] The April tour of a group of Russian deputies of the republics of the former federative Yugoslavia lasted nine days.

According to one of its members, Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations With Compatriots, the delegation "went practically everywhere and met practically everyone." "Certain obvious conclusions" of the group were offered the Duma at the end of the past week, in the form, specifically, of a draft federal law on a suspension of Russia's participation in the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

"We consider it essential that the Duma address to the parliaments and peoples of the world a message reflecting its idea of how the Yugoslav conflict should be settled," Konstantin Zatulin shared his conclusions. "First, an immediate cease-fire, without any conditions. The second idea is an appeal to parliaments that they not add fuel to the fire. Finally, the third initiative concerns a conference with the participation of the great powers and the Balkan countries, which would discuss, in particular, the prospects of a lifting of sanctions in respect to the new Yugoslavia."

[Sharyy] This initiative is, obviously, the main conclusion that the group of Russian deputies reached in the course of their trip?

[Zatulin] Yes, and it is reflected in the documents of the State Duma: that it be recommended that the president, the government, and the Foreign Ministry adopt vigorous measures within the UN framework for a repeal of sanctions. I would like to explain why Carthage, which is to be destroyed, is in this case to be restored. Sanctions are pernicious and ineffective. However paradoxical, they have united the Serb people now living on the territory of various states. Militarily, the prohibitory measures do not play a big part: The armed might of the Serbs is great enough. But when it is a question of the position of the civilian population, the prospect of social

conflicts.... Here, yes, sanctions are simply strangling Yugoslavia. The immorality of an attempt to bring an entire people to the brink of extinction is obvious.

That Russia formerly adopted the decision to participate in the sanctions is a cause of constant internal political friction. We were in too much of a hurry, disregarding the country's national interests, and all of Russia's subsequent diplomatic maneuvers have been clumsy attempts at self-rehabilitation.

[Sharyy] The Duma occupies a hard-line position in respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it would seem?

[Zatulin] Deputies structuring their relations with the diplomats on a confrontational basis is not what I would want. But we are having to do this, unfortunately: Compliance with the decision of the State Duma is being monitored, and unless the Foreign Ministry and the government take the appropriate action, we shall be forced to pass a law on Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the regime of sanctions. This is a disputed, declaratory decision, which will do little, but it will help Russia preserve its honor. And honor is something in itself. It is absolutely pointless for our foreign minister to imagine himself a latter-day George the Dragon-Slayer, who is intent on lancing socialism and communism in Serbia.

I am concerned for the friendship of Russia and Serbia, but I do not believe that friendship can justify everything. What kind of friendship of Moscow and Belgrade, generally, are we talking about? The Serbs had and continue to have a desire to rely on Moscow, but our Foreign Ministry has never endeavored to lend a hand. Russia cannot allow a people that are related to it to be reduced to a primitive condition. The Yugoslav conflict has demonstrated that no one can be confident of his own security with a hungry, confused neighbor, one armed to the teeth, what is more. The Serbs, like the Russians, are not in a position to secure for themselves a decent life but they could perfectly well spoil the life of others.

Yeltsin Visit to Germany, Future Ties Eyed

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in Russian 18 May 94 p 4

[Article by Mikhail Karpov: "Yeltsin and Kohl Have Attempted To Peer Into the Future: This Thought Is Suggested by a Close Inspection of the Results of the Visit"]

[Text] Bonn-Moscow—It is customary to consider that the main content of the Russian president's second visit to Germany was defined by a set of several mutual problems with the tinge of a row in the making, primarily the withdrawal of the troops and restitution. It was to these, in the main, that the material of journalists accredited to the visit were devoted. In actual fact, the range of issues was incomparably wider. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already written about the jointly formulated approaches to Russia's membership of the

Council of Europe and its affiliation to the Partnership for Peace, its participation in the political aspect of the Naples G-7 meeting, and the expansion of the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The range of problems lacking a tie-in with the present moment was not confined to these. The ceremonial act of 31 August in Berlin will definitely dot the "i" in the culminating stage of Russian-German relations. Will it be conclusive for the sphere of the Russian Federation's dealings with the rest of Europe and the world? Yeltsin believes that it could be dotted in December in Budapest at the meeting of heads of state and government of participants in the CSCE. There, the president believes, it will be essential to harmonize the principles of the international arrangement on the basis of which we enter the 21st century. Simultaneously Yeltsin's approach will give a good boost to the more assertive activity of the CSCE, for which other abbreviations have more often been substituting in the international arena as of late.

Next year the world will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, which also could be seen as the starting position for the building of the new world order. But there are certain apprehensions as to whether Russo-German relations might by this time have lost their present quality. The victory of the Social Democrats, who are currently in opposition, is expected at the November Bundestag elections. And much water will have flown in Russia also in this time. Optimists are rejecting the possibility of a cardinal change in the foreign policy course of both countries since they are in exceptional need of one another for a strengthening of their own authority in the world. Pessimists are certain of the appearance of a new balancing act. The position of Germany, following its release from the stigma of vanquished state, will, they calculate, become tougher and more demanding. In respect to Russia the arguments will amount to its increasingly distinct desire to demand respect for its geopolitical interests. There is no escaping differences under such conditions, it would seem. But the point is that this outline forgets the objective prerequisites of the joint actions of the Russian Federation and the FRG in the international arena. And no political forces can disregard them. Boris Yeltsin, incidentally, is, by all accounts, preparing for a change of guard in Bonn. The invitation to visit Moscow extended to a favorite in the struggle for the office of chancellor, Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and prime minister of the land of Rhineland-Pfalz, testifies to this. And this did not, it would seem, appear tactless in respect to Kohl but testified merely to Moscow's desire, given any political alignments, to preserve the "special" character of the relationship with Bonn, which will require serenity and farsightedness. Nor is there any desire for a loss of the latter on the Rhine, where a readiness to meet with Russian politicians of various stripes has been stated—who does not realize that the political era of Boris Yeltsin is not infinite?

Thus a fitting continuation of what has been started may perfectly well be expected in the future also. A different

situation could arise in international affairs. One example: The response to the announcement of Germany's decision to support Russia in its aspirations as regards the G-7 on the part, primarily, of the United States and Japan was guarded, to say the least. It softened a while later, it is true. But the possibilities of this discrepancy or the other arising in the future also cannot, it would seem, be ruled out.

The vectors of temporary contradictions could take shape in other directions also. Removing the chance of their emergence if only in some is possible only by constant work on the future, into which Yeltsin and Kohl attempted at the time of the visit to peer.

Commentary Assesses Geneva Talks on Bosnia

944Q0385A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 17 May 94 p 4

[Article by Sergey Tsekhmistrenko, KOMMERSANT-DAILY columnist: "Negotiations in Geneva on Bosnia: State Duma Accompanies Kozyrev and Christopher Duet"]

[Text] On the eve of the Geneva meeting held Friday by the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and a "trio" of the European Union (Belgium, Greece, and Germany), few would have ventured to predict its success: Too much divided the great powers. But, fortunately, as has happened more than once in history, everything occurred exactly the wrong way round: The ministers who came out on the stage of the conference hall of the Hotel Intercontinental after six hours of intensive negotiations informed the world of the birth of a new political sensation. The results of the Geneva meeting are analyzed by Sergey Tsekhmistrenko, KOMMERSANT-DAILY columnist, who has just returned from Geneva.

51:49 in Favor of Russian Diplomacy

Although the idea for a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs was formally proposed by Moscow and Paris, Russia deserves the main credit for the fact that it did occur. Perhaps the negotiations between Andrey Kozyrev and United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the beginning of May in Cairo were the turning point—at that time the Russian minister succeeded in convincing the American, who had assessed the potential of a "Geneva meeting" skeptically. However, almost up until late night on 13 May it seemed to all of those who arrived on the shores of Lake Geneva that reality would confirm Christopher's correctness. But the communique distributed before the final news conference indicated the opposite: The desired compromise was found. And precisely thanks to Russia.

Essentially, the communique proposes an integral settlement concept whose central element was principally a new approach to the future arrangement of the Bosnian state. Henceforth it will be viewed in its way as a union

consisting of two parts—Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Croat (what is meant in the latter case is the Muslim-Croat federation that is being established). Moreover, from the standpoint of international law, both sides are given equal status. As for the key problem—territorial demarcation—the ministers proposed to resolve it after dividing the Bosnian territory between the federation and the Serbs in a ratio of 51 to 49. But peace was necessary to implement all of this, and therefore it was decided to call on the sides to conclude an agreement on a cessation of military operations for four months, which could be prolonged afterwards. Direct negotiations of the parties to the conflict were also supposed to be renewed—this was to be achieved by a contact group of the world community, which in the course of the next two weeks was to convince the Serbs and the Muslims with the Croats to continue the dialogue that had been broken off.

As for the question of sanctions (against both the FRY ((Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)) and with respect to the embargo on the supply of arms to the Muslims), Russia and the West agreed for the first time in Geneva that they should be observed rigorously, and that they could be gradually canceled only after the implementation of the aforementioned points. The removal of sanctions as a preliminary condition of a settlement was rejected.

Russian diplomats in Geneva really felt cheered in Geneva. And not by chance: The main points of the adopted plan were set forth in a message from Boris Yeltsin to Clinton, Mitterrand, Major, and Kohl. As was reported to the KOMMERSANT-DAILY columnist by a highly placed official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a majority of the provisions of the letter were included in the communique practically without any changes. Never before have Moscow's proposals been implemented so completely at such meetings. In this connection, in the opinion of a Russian diplomat, it can be considered that Russia today is really playing a leading role in the settlement, although it was not very long ago that the palm leaf of victory belonged to the European Union. Incidentally, Kozyrev also observed: In the heat of polemics in the negotiations, the Western colleagues appealed more than once to Yeltsin's letter as a primary source.

But there were also two other circumstances that determined the outcome of the negotiations. I refer to the adoption on 12 and 13 May respectively of resolutions of the United States Senate and the State Duma of Russia on the question of sanctions. News about these decisions suddenly rallied the main players—Kozyrev and Christopher.

Our Main Thought—That There Will Be No Pol Pot

The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia commented in an interview with journalists on the lively interest of the members of the Duma—to the detriment of domestic problems—in the words of a well-known

Soviet ditty. Nevertheless, there was an unexpected effect when they learned of the Duma resolution in Geneva, where there was talk of a unilateral departure by Moscow from the sanctions regime against the FRY in the event the United States removed the embargo on the supply of weapons to the Muslims. Both Kozyrev and Christopher, in order not to permit a war of parliaments, decided to avoid extremes. Judging by the communique, Moscow rejected a former position—the gradual removal of sanctions right now (in the form of its own kind of overture that recently displayed a yielding to Belgrade), but Washington did not insist on the opposite, that is, on a toughening of sanctions. Both ministers disavowed the decisions of their parliaments. But while this has become a usual thing for Kozyrev (it is enough to mention his battles with the Supreme Soviet), Christopher's step was perhaps unprecedented.

In general, Christopher was placed in a very awkward position in Geneva. Just the day before, Washington assured the partners that the Muslims with the Croats have agreed to 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia. Therefore, when it became known that the wards had misled the patron, demanding 58 percent, confusion resulted, although Charles Redman, the special representative of the United States, attempted to present all of this as "a joke." But, in addition, the map of the division proposed by the Muslims and the Croats said little about their peaceful disposition. In the words of one of the officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this was a "war map," inasmuch as an attempt was made in it to transform the Serbian enclaves into territories that were not connected.

However, it will not be easy to put the Geneva agreements into effect. For the Serbs today control almost 73 percent of the territory of Bosnia, and few believe that it will be possible to convince them to "squeeze" into 49 percent. Indeed, President of Bosnia Alija Izetbegovic has also already expressed the first doubts regarding the initiatives by Russia and the West. However, Kozyrev, after flying into Moscow, was in an optimistic mood—nobody from the Bosnian side has yet expressed complete rejection. But "who is who" will become evident within two weeks: If by that time no movement occurs, then, in the apt expression of one Russian diplomat, the world community will put the "carrot and stick" in motion. But it is already clear today that a new page has been written in the history of the settlement of the Yugoslav conflict.

Accident Prevention Accords Signed With Norway 94P20856Z

[Editorial Report] Norway has signed two agreements with Russia that will help prevent oil blowouts and other industrial accidents.

The daily AFTENPOSTEN of 25 May in Norwegian on page 6 reported that the first agreement involves a collaborative effort between the Russian Academy of

Sciences and the Norwegian Academy of Technical Sciences to create safety legislation for new installations in the oil sector. Russia has committed 30 manpower years to the effort, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has granted 1.1 million kroner to fund the Norwegian researchers involved in the project through 1994.

The second agreement involves a project for quality control requirements within the industry. Russia has committed 30 manpower years to this project as well, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will spend 600,000 kroner on it.

An agreement for a collaborative project on risk analyses of the nuclear plants on the Kola peninsula is also planned.

The agreements are in response to a request by the Russian Academy of Sciences and took 18 months to work out.

Foreign Investment Said To Benefit Small Business

944Q0370A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
2-8 May 94 p 12

[Article by Doctor of Economic Science Prokopy Drachev, first vice president of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees: "Russian Small Business and Western Big Capital"]

[Text] *The creation and development of a network of small and medium-size enterprises in different sectors of the national economy in the conditions of crisis in the Russian economy is a number one priority in order to saturate the consumer market with goods and services, create new jobs, and bring into production unused production and material resources. Such enterprises will help develop competition, overcome sectoral and territorial monopolism, improve the economy and the financial sphere, and expand export potential.*

While They Were Being Set Up, the Money Melted Away

At first glance, small business is constantly at the center of attention. It has been said many times what exactly entrepreneurs need in order to get on their feet, flourish, and even expand abroad. In reality, however, the state's attitude toward small business has not changed at all. The standards applied to them—tax, credit, and leasing—were the same as those applied to large businesses.

The president of Russia's decree on the development of small and medium-size business proved unfocused, declarative, consisting of generalized statements and exhortations for the ministries to support entrepreneurship economically.

In May 1993 the president and the government did finally issue a decree on priority measures in small business development. It contained the main point: the decision to allocate money for their development and

instructions to the new Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship and Development of Competition to distribute it. According to economists' calculations, however, 100 billion rubles [R] is needed to revive the small business sphere rather than the R25 billion that has been allocated—and even that only on paper. By the end of the year only R5 billion was left at the fund's disposal. Members of our union (who presented relevant programs) also counted on some share of that money. Unfortunately, the procedure for distributing the money turned out to be very complex, and the fund has never really managed to get a grip on it. For more than half a year it was busy setting itself up and developing a concept of monetary distribution, while the money melted away under the onslaught of inflation.

With this arrangement, small business will not see fundamental changes in the foreseeable future. According to preliminary data, in the future the Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship and Development of Competition intends to use the long-awaited money as credit that will be provided to small businesses on the same terms as the Central Bank's prime rate—210 percent annually. In order to utilize such credit successfully, the amount has to be turned over four times a year. This means that it can be used only for trading, not production. Entrepreneurship in the production sphere, the one capable of saturating the market with goods and services, needs preferential credit support and taxation regime, exemption of reinvested profit from taxation, and a tax break of two to four years depending on the nature of the production.

Alas, Russia has practically already chosen a very unfavorable road for the development of entrepreneurship. Its fate was determined by the government, which made changes to tax legislation that left entrepreneurs in a state of shock. Tax rates and indirect taxes were increased, new taxes and duties introduced. As a result, an entrepreneur will have to give up for public needs 35-43 percent of profits, and the combined tax on payroll reaches almost 40 percent. The only real benefit small businesses got is exemption from paying estimated tax on profit. It is also very good that profit reinvested in capital assets and put into R&D and design work (NIOKR) will not be taxable. However, in the current conditions few small enterprises can afford such expenditures without additional credits.

Security—in 149th Place

In this situation small business could get help from foreign investment, but the terms of obtaining it and the insignificant volume do not meet the current needs and cannot satisfy Russian entrepreneurs. The main reason, in the opinion of international financial organizations, is that the investment climate in Russia over the past five to six years has changed for the worse. For instance, the financial magazine YEVOPEYSKIYE DENG1 ("European Money") in March 1993 placed Russia in 149th place (among 169 countries) in terms of investment security. In addition to difficulties built into the code of

law, foreign investors also encounter many organizational and informational problems. This precipitates their reluctance to increase investment in Russia.

Privatization with the participation of foreign investment can and should play an important role in the development of small and medium-size business. It opens the opportunity for the free import into Russia of managerial experience and know-how. Another advantage of such privatization is that enterprises undergoing privatization will be appraised at their real value. A private investor will invest his money only if he is certain that the enterprise he is acquiring will flourish and bring in profit. So far he is encountering only difficulties, the main among which remains the haphazardness of economic legislation. For instance, certain types of activities are permitted only by license; quite often far from the best facilities—take it or leave it—are offered for privatization; there are numerous restrictions regarding auctions and competitive bids, while almost all such deals must be licensed. For the foreign business world the Law on Foreign Investment in Russia, which contains the most general provisions with a considerable set of restrictive conditions, so far has not become a document for practical action. Serious modifications to it are urgently needed, as well as developing as soon as possible a set of accompanying documents that will specify in concrete terms the norms of participation and preferences for foreign investors.

Until recently, however, Russian state bodies did not treat seriously the problem of attracting foreign investment. The Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees petitioned the former Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on these issues many times but never received a reply. However, the issues raised a year ago have not lost their urgency. The main among them, in the union's opinion, is the question of ownership rights. It still has not been defined clearly who and at what level makes the decisions on granting which kind of ownership. From the standpoint of international standards, we have not defined ownership rights at all, and therefore a foreign investor does not know what he can count on when he acquires a Russian enterprise. In order to create a favorable investment climate it is also necessary not only to make corrections to the legislation but also to guarantee observance of already existing statutes.

Structures qualified to work competently with foreign investors of capital in Russia so far are not sufficiently developed. Potential foreign investors are reluctant to come into the Russian market among other reasons because they do not find local structures professionally trained to interact with them.

International Investment Center Will Select a Company

Against the background of such unfavorable trends, the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees, in partnership with the international consortium Newform International (Paris), in August 1993 created the International Investment Center, whose task is to facilitate attracting foreign investment into the Russian economy.

The center was founded in order to bring together and utilize the experience of specialized consulting and engineering firms, whose sphere of activities encompasses the main spheres of applied knowledge. All projects are carried out by independent international experts. The center will transfer to the customer the technologies and ensure the participation of local partners in the project.

Through its international contacts, the center will select for each project a company responsible for its implementation, based on its experience and reputation, as well as the knowledge of local conditions. The company to which the project implementation will be commissioned uses as needed the capabilities of all members of the Newform International consortium. Well-integrated into the world economy with international contacts, the center's flexible structure and its multiprofile orientation allow it to develop and realize technically and economically most complex projects and pick the management for them.

The International Investment Center has already begun to implement a number of projects. Among them, first and foremost we should mention the project to develop a timber raw material base in one of the rayons in Tomsk Oblast utilizing waste-free wood processing technology and the development of a social infrastructure, and the project on the construction of an international airport in Ufa.

In addition, the International Investment Center has begun to actively promote abroad the products of members of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees, using advertising and promotional materials supplied by customers, and assist in signing the contracts. On the other hand, it is using the capabilities of Newform International to identify potential buyers for their products.

The Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees has established working contacts with Russian ministries and agencies dealing with investment programs in order to identify Russian projects financed by foreign and Russian state institutions and funds, and determine how the International Investment Center may join in their implementation.

The regional unions of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Lessees were advised to cooperate more closely with local administrations in developing and implementing investment projects and programs, and select concrete projects and designs for which the International Investment Center could provide, on a commercial and contract basis, international evaluation and find foreign investor companies.

The center closely cooperates with such recognized international specialized companies [as published] as the World Bank (Washington), the African Development Bank (Abidjan), the UN Development Program (New York), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (Rome), the Asian Development Bank (Manila), and the Inter-American Development Bank (Washington).

Policy Must Be Registration-Based

How do we stimulate and boost investment? I think that in order to achieve this it is necessary, in legislative order, to completely exempt from taxation domestic and foreign investment in the Russian economy (first and foremost in the development of small and medium-size business in priority sectors), as well as give up for a certain period of time taxing profits received. Incentives must be provided for capital to flow into those sectors and spheres of activities of small and medium-size business where the problems of life support and structural restructuring of the economy are concentrated:

food production and processing, basic necessity goods production, etc. For this, however, our investment policy regarding potential investors must finally become based simply on registration. This may be perhaps one of the most cardinal problems of reforming the Russian economy today and in the future.

Implementation of the set of priority tasks in the area of developing small and medium-size business in Russia must not only ensure the achievement of goals associated with economic stabilization but also form a positive attitude toward entrepreneurial activities and the emerging entrepreneurial class.

KAZAKHSTAN

Legislature's 'No Confidence' Statement

944K1340A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 31 May 94 p 1

[Supreme Council statement: "The Supreme Council Has Expressed a Lack of Confidence in the Socioeconomic and Legal Policy of the Government and Called for a Dialogue Among All Branches of Power"]

[Text] Recognizing the lack of an alternative to the course toward deep reform of social relations, the state, and the economy and expressing its readiness for constructive dialogue with the president, the executive and judicial branches, and social associations, wishing to reach a compromise and agreement among the various political forces that reflect the social and national interests of the citizens of the republic, and noting that the government, by declaring a course toward a market economy, is essentially blocking this, which has led to economic chaos—the Supreme Council shall adopt the following statement as a basis for its immediate activity:

I

The government was unable to develop a national program of reforms which could become the basis for the consolidation of society, which made it impossible to have constructive interaction among the branches of power or to conduct an integrated, logically complete legislative policy as a result of which the democratically elected Supreme Council, reflecting the will of the majority of voters as expressed by them at numerous pre-election meetings, has been forced to express a lack of confidence in the socioeconomic and legal policy of the government.

In the given situation the only possibility of avoiding complete paralysis of power is to have a constructive dialogue among all of its branches as well as social and political forces in order to create a national program of reforms and to form a government capable of carrying it out.

Until the adoption of a coordinated program the Supreme Council shall focus its attention on the following issues:

1. Consideration of the president's edicts adopted in the absence of a legislative organ.
2. Execution of the budget and approval of the budget for the next fiscal period.
3. Performance of oversight functions.
4. International treaties subject to ratification.
5. Expansion and strengthening of international ties.
6. Consideration of laws adopted on the first reading by the Supreme Council of the 12th convocation and returned by the president for further discussion.

II

The Supreme Council recognizes as a priority the task of immediately providing the maximum possible social protection for the population and making this protection more targeted and effective.

The Supreme Council intends:

1. To undertake a number of legislative measures for staunch support of commodity producers.
2. To legislatively limit the authority of the executive power to dispose of state property.
3. To expand the independence of enterprises with all forms of ownership.

These measures are needed exclusively to ease the consequences of the crisis for the population and the economy, to eliminate the unsystematic legislation which is ruinous to the state, and to provide for stability of legislation in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

III

The Supreme Council expresses its hope in the possibility of achieving accord among the branches of power and sociopolitical forces.

The Supreme Council proposes getting started immediately on consultations among representatives of the president, the Supreme Council, other state organs, political parties, and other social associations to work out conditions for working on the coordinated reform program.

Adopted on 27 May 1994.

Deputy on Why Committee Post Was Refused

944K1345A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Mekhlis Suleymenov, deputy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council and member of the Kazakh Academy of Agricultural Sciences: "Why I Withdrew My Candidacy From Three Nominations"]

[Text] I would not go into explaining my motives for three times withdrawing my candidacy from nomination to the post of chairman of several Supreme Council committees had it not been for T. Kvyatkovskaya's article "Should We Appraise the Parliament in Tenge Value?" (ASIYA No. 17, 1994). It said the following: "There is no question that Mekhlis Suleymenov, an agrarian scientist of international renown, would have been elected to the chairmanship of the agrarian committee. His candidacy was proposed by the speaker, and he had support among both the 'right' and the 'left.' The most likely explanation for this decision is that the scientist found it impossible to give up completely his scientific plans and goals."

This implies that I was offered the post of agrarian committee chairman but refused. I would not want the public to see my actions in this light. Therefore, I will discuss it in more detail.

I arrived in Almaty on the evening of 18 April, that is, the night before the first session. In the morning I was told that agrarian deputies had already held a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister S.V. Kulagin. Among other things, the question of a candidate for the post of committee chairman was discussed. Only one name was mentioned—that of the former chairman, Yu.M. Ilyashenko, who had been elected by the president's list in Akmolinsk Oblast. Nobody mentioned my name.

On the first day of the Supreme Council's work the agrarian deputies held their own meeting and discussed the candidacies of possible contenders for the post of committee chairman. Among the nominated were Yu.M. Ilyashenko; A.K. Yengaliyev, deputy head of the West Kazakhstan administration; and K.A. Aubakirov, deputy head of Zhambylsk administration. Nobody mentioned my name. Therefore, I suggested myself through self-nomination.

When various deputy groups began to discuss candidates for committee chairmen, I was approached several times. Deputy N. offered the following: "We would like to ask you not to compete for the agrarian committee. We cannot 'take' all the committees—we have to give three or four to Russians. We have looked it over several times and decided that the agrarian committee should go to a Russian—Yu.M. Ilyashenko. You, on the other hand, we see as chairman of the science and education committee."

Then I was approached by Deputy Sh., who advised me: "Why do you need the agrarian committee? Your place is at the helm of the international relations committee. They will not find a better candidate!"

Then the agrarians came into the room and said: "Do not go to other committees under any circumstances; your place is at the helm of the agrarian committee!" I also learned that the speaker also was inclined to see me in precisely this committee.

Therefore, when I was nominated for the chairmanship of the international relations committee, I declined the nomination on the grounds that I would run for the agrarian committee. It was a surprise to me that I was nominated for this post by Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Kekilbayev himself. Yu.M. Ilyashenko and K.A. Aubakirov were immediately nominated as alternative candidates. In the course of the discussion neither the "right" nor the "left" supported me. At the same time, support for my rivals was as thick as the wall. I was especially upset by two remarks.

Deputy F. Kozlov, who before this actively supported the candidacy of K. Nagmanov for chairmanship of the industrial committee by saying: "I am a Russian, but I urge you to vote for a Kazakh!" this time said: "We have

already elected the chairmen of seven committees, and they are not Russians! Let us finally heed the appeal of the president, who asked us to take into account, among other things, the ethnic balance in electing the Supreme Council leadership!"

Deputy Sh. Murtaza expressed the opinion of a considerable number of deputies by saying that he sees at the head of this committee not a scientist but rather a person who grew up in a Kazakh village and knows all its troubles. Naturally I, with my "international renown," good English, and so-so Kazakh, did not fit the description.

After these comments I withdrew my nomination, saying that given such a heavy discussion I did not consider it possible to continue to compete.

Later I was also nominated to the leadership of the science and education committee, where U.A. Dzholdasbekov was a clear favorite. So I had to give up my claim there as well.

As a result I found myself without a portfolio, which I do not regret. I was told that I could still be elected because some deputies say one thing but vote differently. But I decided not to test fate. Now, though, I sit in an office that is four times smaller than my director's office. On the other hand, there are three of us in it. So I do not get bored.

Development of Armed Forces Evaluated

944K1312A Almaty ABV in Russian 30 May 94 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Gribanov: "The Army of Kazakhstan: Spring Escapes"]

[Text] *Almost two years ago, during the period of the creation of the Armed Forces of the republic, the views of many military men boiled down to the belief that our country would come to have one of the strongest armies in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Kazakhstan inherited the military districts of the Soviet Union that were not the worst. Their geopolitical situation made it imperative for the leaders of the USSR to continuously monitor the combat readiness of the troops and to equip them with the most up-to-date materiel.*

Present-day judgments concerning the army of Kazakhstan are conflicting—from unreserved recognition of its potential advantages to sharply worded criticism of the government for squandering the people's money to maintain "toy" troops. Clarifying the real situation in the army turned out to be a difficult affair. The endless red tape on the part of employees of the press center of the Ministry of Defense who must ensure liaison between the military and the press suddenly ran into the impenetrable fence of military and state secrets.

Nonetheless, Major General Sabit Taulanov, chief of the cadre directorate of the military department, acknowledged that it is premature to refer to high combat

readiness on the part of the army of Kazakhstan. However, in case of need, the residents of Kazakhstan will be protected by ground forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense Troops, and, strange as it may sound, the Navy. This service, which is new for our republic, importantly conjures up the children's joke about "a submarine on the steppes of Kazakhstan" and for now is represented solely by the Naval Department of the Ministry of Defense. Kazakhstan does not have any submarines yet; however, there is hope that in the future military vessels of the republic will ply the expanse of the Caspian Sea.

In the opinion of General Taulanov, problems in the republic's army began because of non-Kazakh officers leaving the country. According to data from the Ministry of Defense, the shortage of officers in the Army as of now comes to 30 percent. However, according to data received through unofficial channels, the actual cadre shortage exceeds 50 percent. It is no secret that an overwhelming majority of officers who served on the soil of Kazakhstan spoke Russian. They have been leaving for Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Nobody is holding them back. Most of the officers left because of beggarly pay and social and housing problems which had gone unsolved for years.

The junior command echelon (from lieutenant to major) has been particularly thinned out, that is, precisely those whose duty it is to make new recruits into soldiers and directly lead them. They are trying to fill the void by using the higher military command school in Almaty, the only one in Kazakhstan. It graduates 200-210 young officers a year. Only 53 persons from the last class remained in the republic. The rest of the non-Kazakh officers left for their native parts. Previously, the school graduated only motorized infantry personnel; now, motor vehicle, artillery, and tank personnel train next to them. In the new school year, logistics and engineering cadets will be added. In addition, the total number of those admitted to the school will increase by a factor of two. Diversification is a good thing, but unfortunately, under our conditions quantity seldom turns into quality. The Ministry of Defense sees the annual assignment of 450 residents of Kazakhstan for study at the military schools of Russia as the next scenario for the replenishment of the lost officer cadres. However, the difficulty is that our cadets are frequently expelled from the schools. It is likely that insufficient level of knowledge, large distances from home, and complications in mutual relations are factors. Besides, there are no guarantees that, having become an officer, a cadet from Kazakhstan will not remain in Russia to serve.

Following many years of oblivion, short military courses of the "takeoff + landing = officer" kind have been resurrected in our country. National Hero of Kazakhstan Sagadat Nurmagambetov, minister of defense of our republic, began his military career in similar courses during the war years. From the history of the war we also remember how latter-day lieutenants led soldiers into

battle after two months of training, were the first to perish, and left the rest on the ground.

A call-up of reserve officers who received their military ranks simultaneously with college diplomas for a two-year stint became the last trump card played by military officials. Some 1,500 "students," strictly civilians, ended up in the army. They are reinforced by 700 volunteers from among reservists. However, a majority of both groups do not have the necessary knowledge and experience in operating materiel and commanding soldiers.

It is necessary to discuss the soldiers and sergeants of the Kazakhstan Army. They will and do carry out the orders of their officers. General Taulanov maintains that the troops have a 100 percent complement of enlisted men and sergeants, despite the fact that in the last five years the authority of the Army has been substantially undermined. Cases of evasion of service and absence from units have been reduced to a minimum. To a great degree, the fact that residents of Kazakhstan serve for the entire 1.5 years only within the republic has contributed to this. As far as "dedovshchina" [recruit abuse] is concerned, in the opinion of the general, it afflicts "guys who are unaccustomed to labor and do not wish to accomplish the assigned tasks. This prompts fellow servicemen to physically influence disobedient ones."

We believe that not everything is that simple within the community of soldiers. Inductees begin to experience their first problems in military commissariats during examinations by medical commissions. Colonel Galim Aldamzharov, deputy military commissar of Almaty and the capital city oblast, states that according to the findings of physicians, one in three draftees is unfit to serve. Their weight falls 20-25 kilograms short. They are afflicted with intestinal disease, tuberculosis, and a bunch of other conditions.

Employees of military medical commissions admit that they are pressured in certain military commissariats, and a certain proportion of the "unfit" are put in the ranks of soldiers. It is precisely of unhealthy soldiers that the first group of escapees, deserters, and military criminals is comprised. The second group consists of those who, according to the general, do not wish to carry out commanders' orders. These guys are not prepared for service either physically or morally. We cannot help thinking of the system of school-based and pre-induction training. It was also destroyed in the heat of "disarmament." The third group consists of "martinets," the mainstay of "dedovshchina," mainly sergeants and second-year servicemen. They establish their own rules in view of the reluctance and inability of officers to discharge their official responsibilities.

According to data from a well-informed source, the number of crimes committed by servicemen keeps growing. Based on the totals for last year, in the capital city oblast alone more than 500 criminal cases were

instituted, including those involving particularly dangerous crimes. Some 320 servicemen left places of service without official leave; 118 of them have already been convicted, and the search is on for the rest.

The issue of omitting Article 232 of the Criminal Code (absence without official leave) which draws up to two years of disciplinary battalion for the escapee is being worked on. Otherwise a good proportion of the Army would trade in barracks for cells. A one-month disciplinary confinement to the guardhouse is proposed as an alternative.

The combat readiness of all armies is judged not only on the basis of the strength of troops but also on the results of army exercises. In the two years of existence of the Kazakhstan Army not a single large-scale exercise has been held. They have restricted themselves to command post exercises, unit commander training, and end-of-training performance evaluations. The Ministry of Defense is inclined to associate this fact with difficulties in forming the Armed Forces of the republic. However, other reasons making it impossible to conduct such exercises are also apparent. Between December 1991 and May 1992 a power vacuum prevailed in the former Union army. The Union no longer existed, republic armies did not yet exist. In the words of many military men, this period was sufficient for once menacing districts to be stripped. Weapon depots were plundered, elements of air defense and space surveillance systems were removed. All drugs of any value were removed from the central military hospital.

Of course, we cannot call the Army of Kazakhstan indigent troops. It does have modern combat materiel. Under a military treaty with Russia signed this year our Army will be able to mitigate a weapons shortage. This is necessary and advantageous for both sides. However, use of weapons needs to be learned. Meanwhile, trainers are clearly in short supply.

Transport Minister Interview on Railroad Performance

944E0868A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 20 May 94
pp 1-2

[Interview with N. Isingarín, by GUDOK correspondent T. Shirshova, Alma-Ata, under rubric "On the Commonwealth's Main Lines": "Seeing the Prospects"]

[Text] The Kazakhstan republic's Ministry of Transportation was the scene of a meeting between Transportation Minister N. Isingarín and representatives of the branch press: three railroad newspapers and a GUDOK correspondent. The participants in the meeting touched upon various questions pertaining to the current status and prospects for developing the railroads of Kazakhstan. We were publishing that conversation today.

[Shirshova] Bigmatzhan Kabatayevich, could you please discuss the state of affairs on the republic's railroads? Does the branch correspond completely to today's requirements?

[Isingarín] If one speaks about our railroads immediately after the collapse of the Union, during that period they were capable of providing for the necessary volume of freight and passenger shipments. It was also impossible to complain about the rate to which they were provided with equipment, since, beginning in the 1970's, there was active development of Kazakhstan's main lines, especially the Virginland Railroad. But after the break in the economic ties among the former union republics, certain shortcomings were revealed.

The configuration of our railroad network does not correspond to the internal railroad-car flow. For example, the republic's center is not linked with the western rayons of the republic. The economy, under conditions of sovereignty, requires the development of those structures which, when Kazakhstan was part of the Union, would not have been given the go-ahead, since there was no need for that. For example, today the petroleum-gas industry is developing in West Kazakhstan. But in specifically that part of the republic there is no capability of organizing rail shipments in full volume.

Could we have previously built a petroleum refinery in Aktau? I would scarcely think so, since we got our petroleum products from Russia.

After the separation, Kazakhstan's railroad workers proved to be without the industrial base that they needed. And currently not a single finished article is being produced in our republic to meet the needs of railroad transportation. That is the main problem today!

In addition, railroad transportation has proven to be not ready for the changed trends in passenger flows. Previously even the people on business trips were sent basically to Moscow. But currently the number of passengers leaving Alma-Ata and going to Alma-Ata has doubled. The volume of shipments within the republic has increased. But our pool of passenger cars has become obsolete, they are wearing out, and there is simply a catastrophic shortage of them. And so we simply cannot carry approximately 20-25 percent of our potential passengers.

Because of the break in the economic ties and the failure to receive payments, there has been an increase in the freight shipments within the republic. Previously the virgin lands received petroleum products from Omsk and Tomsk, and last year they came from Guryev. East Kazakhstan and Semipalatinsk Oblast used to receive coal from Kuzbass, but currently we bring it in from the Shubarkul deposit (Kazakhstan), that is, a distance that is twice as long as previously.

There has arisen a problem with improving the system of administering rail transportation in the republic, because the previous union scientific and normative base has been lost.

[Shirshova] How, then, will the branch develop in the future?

[Isingarin] Most probably Kazakhstan's rail transportation will be constructed according to the Russian model. Therefore we are attempting to preserve close ties with the RF MPS [Ministry of Railroads]. This is expressed in a number of agreements that were signed by Kazakhstan Mintrans [Ministry of Transportation] and MPS. We support branch publications—the ZHELEZNODOR-OZHNYI TRANSPORT magazine and GUDOK newspaper.

Incidentally, GUDOK once published an article in which, in particular, it was mentioned that Isingarin is dreaming of creating an MPS of the Commonwealth countries. That is true. And I shall even add that I proposed creating a company on the scale of the CIS—"Gruzovoy Vagon—1520"—in order to unite all the railroad-car pools and to create on their basis an inter-governmental structure in which each country would be a shareholder with its own railroad cars, but in which there would be a single repair base and a single system for regulating the pools. But nothing has happened yet. The politicians are still holding onto their sovereignty, even if it harms the situation.

Currently I am proposing creating from the Commonwealth's railroads a transnational railroad company with a single scientific-technical policy and a single leadership. The people of Kazakhstan are ready to forgo a certain part of their sovereignty for this purpose. But we shall all be winners since we shall not create our own scientific-technical base in each country.

The transnational company could be created on the basis of the Russian MPS, but so far the CIS countries are probably not ready for this idea. Although the European Community's Commission on Transportation already is a kind of ministry for Europe's transportation.

But for the time being the situation is forcing us to think about independent steps. We are uniting our own scientific forces, and with the aid of the Russian Academy of Transportation we are creating a national scientific center. Much is being done in our republic to manufacture spare parts. The steel-casting plant in Pavlodar produces parts for automatic couplers, and the motor-vehicle repair association in Alma-Ata produces elements for attaching reinforced-concrete ties. We have to produce 30-40 percent of the spare parts that we need.

Currently we are also creating a plant base for repairing equipment. We shall also produce certain things, for example, passenger cars. For this purpose we intend to increase our business relations with Germany, Russia, and Turkey.

Today we are unable to carry all the passengers across West Kazakhstan, and we also have a complicated situation with such shipments in the south of the republic. It is necessary to create new routes, and to make a number of trains daily ones. For this purpose we are attempting to purchase a hundred passenger cars in Germany.

[Shirshova] What is the rate policy on the railroad main lines?

[Isingarin] The rates are regulated by the state. Everyone thinks that the railroad workers must not suffer any losses from the shipments, but at the same time the republic is experiencing a sharp increase in the prices of energy carriers, although in our republic they will soon exceed the worldwide prices. But if there is another rise, the railroad workers will also be forced to raise the rate for shipments. This will impact upon the clientele. And the raising of the prices of their output will lead to the ruination of the railroads themselves. So everyone has to behave very cautiously.

[Shirshova] A problem that is no less urgent today is the problem of nonpayments. What are the railroad workers undertaking in order to get the money that is owed to them? Aren't they suffocating from their debts?

[Isingarin] At one time the Kazakhstan government made the decision: no freight would be shipped without prepayment. But currently, one after another, decisions are being made that require the railroad workers to ship without prepayment, whether it be coal, or grain, or gas for the population.

As of today, we are owed 1.5 billion *tenge*. At the same time we ourselves have become debtors. The Virginland Railroad, for example, owes Russia almost 200 billion rubles. All this has led to a situation in which the railroad workers have been forced to accept output as a form of payment on account, to pay for the shipments. For example, it was decided that half the Ekibastuz coal that is en route to Russia should be channeled into paying off the miners' indebtedness to the railroad workers. We shall transfer that money to the Russian MPS in order to pay off our debts. The Kazakhstan government supports this kind of reciprocal settlement: there is no other alternative.

[Shirshova] How have the market and the new relations had an effect on the operation of transportation?

[Isingarin] Railroad workers were among the first in the republic to sense sharply the uncontrollability of the market. The volume of shipments dropped by one-half. Recently we resolved the question of preferential payment for them. If the customer has money for prepayment and has freight, the railroad workers guarantee to him that he will receive shipment benefits. We want to attract freight in this way.

[Shirshova] Do the railroad workers have any hope of getting money in exchange for shipments? I am talking about indebtedness to three railroads of 1.5 billion *tenge*.

[Isingarin] At the present time there is a republic-wide reciprocal offset. If it proves to be possible to carry it out intelligently, the railroad workers will be able to count on success. Starting in February of last year, the railroad workers have been attempting to get payment of shipments without invoice acceptance, but they have been unsuccessful...

[Shirshova] We like to make parallels with the state of transportation abroad. But the countries in the near abroad give their railroads subsidies for their development. Can the Kazakhstan railroad workers count on this?

[Isingarin] Only a rich country can give subsidies. As you know, the republic's budget at this moment is in a very difficult situation. There won't be any subsidies. In addition, railroad transportation, unlike many other branches in Kazakhstan, is currently operating at a profit. The only problem is that the profit drowns in the reciprocal debts.

[Shirshova] Will the existing system of administering rail transportation be preserved?

[Isingarin] We have already discussed among ourselves various alternatives and have decided that, at this stage, it is more desirable to preserve the existing system of administration. When the economy settles down, the questions of material-technical supply are resolved, and the market requirements are defined, then we shall also improve the administrative system.

If one speaks about the economics of railroads, the reduction in shipments will continue for many years. We shall not return to the volumes of the 1980's in the foreseeable future. In addition, there has been an intensification of labor. Even if, within, say, 20 years, we do return to that volume of shipments that we used to have, we shall cope with it with a much smaller continent of workers. Our hope is to open two new international through-shipment main lines: the Trans-Asian and the Eurasian main lines.

[Shirshova] Today China is worried about the rise in prices for through shipments by way of Kazakhstan. There is less freight than one would like. What is the reason for this?

[Isingarin] The Chinese railroad workers are waiting things out. They are building 1620 kilometers of second tracks between Urumchi and Lanchow. As soon as the construction is completed in 1995, a broad exit will immediately open up for a flow of freight, and it is our task not to create any barriers to this flow, either in the form of customs barriers or rate barriers. It is necessary for us to think about how, in the year 2000, we can guarantee the shipments of freight from China in a volume of 10 million tons, of which 5 million will be by rail. I feel that we must be able to carry the same number of millions in the direction of Turkey and Iran. If that through shipment occurs, the volume of work will

undoubtedly increase and this will simultaneously resolve a number of problems linked with personnel downsizing, earnings, etc.

Officials Review Anticrime Measures

944K1341A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 May 94 p 1

[KAZTAG report: "Before Starting an Offensive Against Crime, the Workers of Law Enforcement Organs Plan To Bring Order to Their Own Ranks"]

[Text] A meeting of the republic's council to fight crime was held on 25 May. The leaders of a number of ministries and departments were invited to it. Kairbek Suleymenov, a state adviser, gave a report.

The speaker noted that a lot of criticism is being directed against the president and the government for the state of crime. But few take upon themselves the work of analyzing how consistently measures are being carried out that are directed at strengthening law and order and legality. For example, necessary changes to legislation are being made effectively. Work is coming to a conclusion on the adoption of a crime and a criminal procedure code. A state program of legal reforms is being implemented. Organizational measures set forth in the anticrime program and the program to fight crime in 1993-1995 have been implemented in many ways through edicts and decrees of the president and decisions of the government. In a word, there is a legal basis for strengthening the fight against crime in the republic. And the references of executives of law enforcement organs to its absence only indicates their unprofessionalism and poor understanding of the situation, and their elementary legal ignorance.

The speaker recalled that the February 1992 decrees of the president proposed to discharge those who were unable to cope with their duties from the positions they occupied. However, there has been no work in this direction to the present day. It is not a question of firing personnel, but it is no longer possible to condone the obvious idleness of individual workers. A good third of the officials on the job are of no use, but the departmental chiefs resigned themselves to this a long time ago. In the last two years, just in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], 636 extraordinary incidents and 380 violations of the law were committed, and 215 officials were convicted for various crimes. Four thousand and seven hundred and sixty-six persons were discharged for unfavorable reasons. The offensive against crime will not start until strict order is established in the system of law enforcement and judicial organs itself.

The economic services of the MVD are not working effectively, where under the slogan of healthy competition they actually continue to duplicate each other and where various organs work on trivia.

In summing up what was said, Kairbek Suleymenov declared that in individual oblasts whole subunits have

not given any results for years, and a good half of the officials of the economic services of the MVD are not worth their salt, and no one is in a position to compel them to work on important matters. The solution, in the opinion of the state adviser, is to unite these services and to conduct a tough objective report on the efficiency of the personnel.

The protection of public order is also organized with poor results. The meager means of the budget are frequently spent on computer equipment, which later rusts in storehouses. Acquired motor vehicles are used by thousands of chiefs of all ranks for personal purposes, but not for patrolling by mobile militia groups.

It has also become the norm for the courts to examine cases with a violation of dates. The Procuracy continues to engage in writing concepts that are not read by anyone and in senseless checks on the state of lawfulness. Cases of liberalism toward dangerous criminals on the part of the courts have become general. The Ministry of Justice does not have continuous effective information about punitive practice.

Kairbek Suleymenov also said, in particular, that the distinguishing feature of criminal tension is the theft of firearms and ammunition in military units. In the last two years and four months, more than 1,300 firearms items were stolen, including 160 assault rifles and more than 500 pistols. In this same period, 2,059 rifle barrels were confiscated from the population, including 91 assault rifles and 825 pistols. Firearms were employed in the commission of 2,465 crimes.

The state adviser proposed to carry out an action of the voluntary surrender of firearms and ammunition, which will promote an improvement in the situation.

Taking part in the discussion of the report were Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Shumov, Procurator General of the Republic Zharmakhan Tuyakbayev, KNB [National Security Committee] Deputy Chairman Zhenisbek Zhumanbekov, Deputy Minister of Defense Valeriy Sapsay, and Commander of Internal Troops Aleksey Filistovich.

The result of the discussion of the question was the adoption of a protocol decision directed at reinforcing the fight against crime and strengthening legality in the republic.

TURKMENISTAN

RF Railways Minister Meets With Turkmen Officials

944E0878A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 31 May 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Meetings in the Turkmen Land"]

[Text] On 27 May 1994 the President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov received G. Fadeyev, chairman of the Council on

Rail Transportation of the CIS Countries and RF Minister of Railways.

B. Sardzhayev, deputy chairman of the Turkmen Cabinet of Ministers, and Kh. Khalykov, chief of the Turkmen State Railway, took part in the conversation.

The minister informed the President of Turkmenistan of the work done by the Council on Rail Transportation to coordinate the activities of railroads on the interstate level. Preservation of the technological uniformity of the rail network of the former USSR was noted as an important result of the Council's work.

The President of Turkmenistan had high praise for the role of the Council on Rail Transportation in supporting the transport of freight and passengers in the interests of the economic and social development of all the member states of the CIS and the Baltic countries. He noted the need for further consolidation of cooperation among railroads, in particular the railroads of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan is devoting a great deal of attention to the creation of rail transport corridors, which are important not only for the particular region but also for Russia and the other countries of the CIS. They have in mind construction of new rail lines from Tedzhen through Seraks to Meshkhed and from Gazandzhik to Gyzyl-trek; these lines will provide the shortest route to Iran and on to the Persian Gulf for freight from Russia's eastern regions, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan as well as for international transit freight.

Salarmurat Niyazov stressed that the doors are open for mutually advantageous cooperation by all interested states in carrying out these projects. As for Russia, a joint working group has been formed on the basis of the protocol of the talks between the RF minister of railways and the chief of the Turkmen State Railway to study the set of questions related to Russian participation in building the above-named rail lines. As the result of its work, which should be completed before 1 September of this year, proposals will be prepared for the governments of Russia and Turkmenistan.

The support of the RF Ministry of Railways for the formative process and efficient operation of Turkmenistan's independent railway was noted as part of the development of bilateral Russian-Turkmen cooperation. At this meeting questions of improving the quality of transportation ties between Russian and Turkmenistan were also discussed.

In conclusion the President of Turkmenistan wished the participants of the 11th meeting of the Council on Rail Transportation good results and successful implementation of the decisions adopted in the interests of further development of mutually advantageous cooperation.

UZBEKISTAN

Relations Between Uzbek Opposition Parties Viewed

944K1210A Moscow ERK in Uzbek No 3, 16 Feb 94 p 6

[Article by Namoz Mamatkulov, secretary of the Erk Party Surkhondaryo Oblast Council: "The National Movement Is Undivided"]

[Text] One of the facts of the perestroika movement was national awakening. The struggle for independence in the colonial republics is a direct continuation of this national awakening movement. As long as the Union was preserved, it is clear that basic democratic reform in some of the republics was not implemented.

Thus, there was a need for a political organization with a national orientation in Uzbekistan. The Erk Democratic Party came to the fore to fill this need. From the time the party was formed it set for itself the goal of national independence and used its power in this direction. On the foundation of the earlier national awakening and this movement, basic reform in society was the path selected by Erk.

Viewed from this point of view, it was natural that the national aim was not to move toward the literal concept of "democracy" accepted in the West. Forces not completely understanding the meaning of this began to take aim at Erk from various directions the day it was founded.

On one hand, representatives of the totalitarian regime placed obstacles in its way (this is why the party was not officially registered for a long time), and on the other, radical communists who had suddenly become "democrats" attacked it.

Perestroika was brought about through the dismantling of the empire, and its colonized people attained national liberation.

Under this historical situation, communists who had turned into "democrats," including representatives of the Birlik movement such as Abdurayim Polatov, completely repudiated the goal of independence; "we will not separate from Moscow: If we separate from Moscow, we will be unable to attain democracy," they claimed.

However, the healthy part of the Birlik movement was together with the Erkists in this struggle. The majority of the members of this movement joined the ranks of Erk. This became especially evident during the referendum held to preserve the Union.

Under existing circumstances the forming of democratic traditions in the concept of a nation and in society became a regular duty. Thus the Erk party, as a constructive opposition, opted for the parliamentary way of

democratic struggle, in other words, entering the government through the electoral process. In the Baltic republics, representatives of the national movement came into the government by means of elections, also.

On the basis of the plan and struggle of the Erk party, the passing of the Declaration of Independence at the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan and the participation of Muhammad Solih, the founder and chairman of the party, in the presidential elections was an expression of this goal. These actions undoubtedly raised the political understanding of the nation.

After the elections the party continued its path of struggle, and ERK, its press organ, continued to cast light on events in the Republic although it was placed under merciless censorship.

Erk did not stop at this. It gave precedence to the people's interests and its own suggestions, and struggled to introduce these into the direction of the government.

Forces in favor of strengthening democratic principles in the government began to group around Erk and the Forum of Democratic Forces of Uzbekistan was formed. Birlik also joined this Forum. Birlik cochairmen and activists Bek Toshmuhamedov, Gulchehra Nurullayeva, Dadakhon Hasan, and others demonstrated that Erk was firmly on the road. Not only did the government oppose the formation and activity of the Forum, but also the Polatovs, whose goal and struggle was unknown.

Individuals who attach the title of "democrats" to themselves like Abdurayim Polatov, who was then and is now a communist, have found no other function than denigrating the Erk party. For example, it is sometimes forgotten that Polatov, who calls himself a "democrat" and yelled "Down with communism!", was secretary of the Communist Party's primary party organization at the Cybernetics Institute where he worked.

I was never a communist, but if I had been, I would have been ashamed at yelling something like that.

After the Istiklol Yoli [Independence Road] Party was founded, I expressed my opinion about this on Radio Liberty. In response, Abdurayim Polatov, in a radio interview, said that he was glad and the government was also glad that two traitors had left the Erk party.

Polatov lied when he said in his interview that "Erk was founded before the parliamentary elections of 1990." In the first place, the 1990 parliamentary elections took place in February 1990. As for the Erk party, it was founded in April 1990. And Muhammad Solih was not elected to parliament in his capacity as party chairman, but as a writer and public servant known to the people.

Polatov has accused Erk of being in the constructive opposition. Yes, we are a party of constructive opposition now and in the future. We are different from the "shadow parties," which declare the government's line to be their own line, and the radical communists, who lack both their own line and proposals for one. The Erk

party has a clear program in every sector and concrete proposals which it has stated to the government in every sector. We are fighting to apply this program to life.

If we come to the allegation of Abdurayim Polatov, the only reason for this is that he is jealous of the Erk party, because when Erk was organized in April 1990 he himself was struggling to organize a party. He named it the Birlik party. But the majority of Birlikists refused to join it.

The basic democratic forces today are grouped around Erk, and the party, under the present serious conditions, is acting in solidarity with all progressive forces in the Republic. Our friends, who know themselves to be true Birlikists, are fighting shoulder to shoulder with us.

Following the last party congress, democratically inclined religious officials, who had wavered earlier, joined our struggle. Their activity has been a great help to us since the Erk party wants our nation to be formed as a nation of high principle.

There are those who do not recognize this unity movement. But there are more who do than do not. They are the Uzbek people.

Bank Officials Discuss Draft Law on Foreign Investment

944K1324A Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO
in Russian 3 May 94 p 2

[Article by Yu. Ryazhentsev, under the rubric "Looking to the Upcoming Session of the Republic Supreme Soviet": "Guarantees for Investors Are Guarantees of Success in Attracting Foreign Capital to Priority Sectors of the Uzbekistan Economy"]

[Text] The draft Law on Foreign Investment and Guarantees for the Activity of Foreign Investors is being broadly discussed in Uzbekistan business circles. There is great interest in it.

There is, of course, a Law on Foreign Investment in effect in our republic. What is new and different in the proposed draft law? This was the subject of our conversation with S. Kh. Abdurakhimov, chief of the Administration of Analysis and Expert Examination of Investment Plans of the National Bank of Foreign Economic Activity, and Sh. A. Ishankhodzhayeva, chief of the financial-economic analysis department of this institution.

"If we provide reliable guarantees for the activities of foreign investors," says Saidakbar Khodzhiakbarovich, "then you can say that we will open up a broad way into our republic for foreign capital. There is a distinction here between the already-mentioned draft law and the present one. The draft law put the very important point about guarantees for the activity of foreign investors in a special heading.

"To understand the essential features of the proposed draft law better it has to be viewed together with the

other laws, draft laws, and governmental directives concerning questions of foreign investment in the economy. Above all I would like to recall the recent decree of the Cabinet of Ministers entitled 'Measures To Ensure Insurance Protection for Investments in the Republic of Uzbekistan,' under which the Uzbekinvest National Insurance Company is formed. Its assets will be placed in first-class foreign banks. This will provide a reliable guarantee of insurance coverage for foreign and domestic investments.

"In the present state of the reforms it is especially important for this insurance company to cover political risks. Incidentally, it is precisely political stability that attracts foreign investors to our republic. The investor must be absolutely confident that he will be able to recover the capital invested in the matter with profit under any conditions, independent of the current political situation. For our partners, therefore, the formation of Uzbekinvest opens great prospects. A business can be promoted confidently, in complete safety. After all, although Uzbekinvest is a state company, its insurance fund can be used at the stipulated moment for insurance payments to investors at the decision of the supervisory council, formed of the managers of first-class banks in various countries.

"In this way a reliable protective mechanism is created, a system to insure property against expropriation and also against any kind of administrative measures that harm the interests of investors."

"It must be said," Shakhnoz Agzamovna Ishankhodzhayeva continues the conversation, "that the draft Law on Foreign Investment and Guarantees of the Activities of Foreign Investors gives clear definitions of the meaning of foreign borrowing and investment and a classification of foreign debts, government guarantees, and the like. And here is what I would like to note. During discussion of the most recent version of this draft law there were significantly fewer criticisms, which indicates good cooperation between the authors of the law and the consultants from interested departments.

"For example, questions related to foreign investment are today regulated by a whole set of legislative acts. But there was no bankruptcy law. The investor, though, must know exactly the conditions under which an economic unit or natural person can be judged bankrupt on a legal basis. And here the draft Law on Bankruptcy proposed to the session has a definition of the elements of bankruptcy. Civil liability is stipulated for persons whose improper actions lead to bankruptcy. Thus, the draft laws submitted for the session are one more practical step by us on the path to creating a market economy. After all, the set of laws and draft laws that are already in effect are directed to creating favorable conditions for the production of export products that meet the highest world standards and to creating a protective mechanism for investors."

Because the National Bank of Foreign Economic Activity specialists took an active part in preparing the draft laws on foreign investment, I asked them to talk about some of the specific details which, if it can be put this way, have created obstacles in practical affairs. And I learned that it was in fact the bank specialists who proposed creating conditions to increase the flow of cash for investment projects during the period of credit repayment. They consistently defend the need to create conditions for investors so that the profit norm in our country is better not only for foreign entrepreneurs but also for domestic ones.

Ecological Problems of Desert Zones Viewed

944K1324B Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO
in Russian 3 May 94 p 2

[Article by B. Bakhritdinov, head of the environmental laboratory of the department of geography of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and E. Chembarisov, head of the laboratory of hydrochemistry of the Institute of Water Problems: "The Desert Is Diminishing, and We Are the Losers"]

[Text] The desert zone of Central Asia, including the territory of Uzbekistan, has enormous reserves which at present are far from being fully utilized. What the desert zone encompasses can be clarified by this simple calculation: of the 44.9 million hectares of territory in Uzbekistan the area of irrigated lands is about 4.2 million, while pastures used in agricultural production account for 22 million hectares.

Desert pasturelands account for 82 percent of the total balance of agricultural lands in Uzbekistan. In recent years more than 9.2 million sheep have been kept on them, including 5.1 million karakul sheep, as well as more than 823,000 goats and several thousand camels. In addition to receiving karakul lamb hides pasture sheep herding in the desert produces tens of thousands of tons of meat and wool each year. The enormous role of this sector in the republic economy is perfectly obvious.

In recent decades the anthropogenic impact on desert zones has been increasingly felt. This is reflected first of all in the water arteries of the arid territories. As an analysis that was made indicates, the primary rivers of the desert—the Amudarya, Zarafshan, and Kashkadarya—are contaminated to one degree or another. Phenols, petroleum products, pesticides, and other elements have been detected in river waters. Contamination of water around the large cities has increased especially in connection with the discharges of industrial enterprises.

In the large cities ecology problems are linked primarily with the growing concentration of production. Contamination of the natural environment of rural settlements is somewhat different. As a rule there are no large industrial enterprises in the towns and villages, the density of housing construction is three-five times less, transportation arteries are less dense, and there is lower overall

saturation with motor vehicles. But the ecological situation around towns and villages has also been worsening in recent times. The impact of the city on the environment is manifested in development of nearby land for suburban gardens, recreation zones, trunk transportation routes, and the like. But it is seen particularly in pollution from industrial discharges into the atmosphere and streams. The greatest anthropogenic stress falls on the most heavily settled—but small in land area—Chimbayskiy Rayon in Karakalpakia and the Khorezm region.

So intensive development of the desert pasture territory of Uzbekistan intensified the anthropogenic stress on the desert ecosystems of our republic. We need to determine the precise data on the location and chemical composition of underground waters, the efficiency of methods of opening up underground waters by drilling wells, transporting water with pumping pipelines and in tankers, the use of small desalinization units to supply water to the population, improving techniques of freshening mineralized springs with atmospheric precipitation, and ways to raise water using electrical drive operating on wind and solar energy. It is essential for regeneration of the desert pasture zone to compile a long-range prognosis of the intensification of desertification under the anthropogenic influence, broken down by physico-geographic regions. And the approach to further development of land resources within geosystems should be differentiated here and city planning policies must be straightened out with due regard for how favorable the ecological situation is and the degree of anthropogenic stress on their territories.

Therefore it is especially important and fundamental—both for its ecological and its economic significance—to put on the agenda of the upcoming session of the Supreme Soviet discussion of amendments and additions to certain legislative enactments of the Republic of Uzbekistan in connection with adoption of the Law on Environmental Protection and the Law on Specially Protected Natural Areas.

Cabinet of Ministers Views Energy Conservation Measures, Violations

944K1324C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
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[Unattributed article: "Put Energy Resources Under Reliable Protection!"]

[Text] A meeting of the commission on saving fuel-energy resources was held at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan under the chairmanship of first deputy prime minister I. Kh. Dzhurabekov.

Participants in the meeting were the deputies of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, the khokims [administrators] of the oblasts and the city of Tashkent, and the heads of ministries, departments, concerns, corporations, and associations.

The question of the situation with execution of the laws directed to ensuring preservation and rational use of petroleum products in the sectors of the agroindustrial and construction complexes was reviewed.

Inspections conducted by the republic procurator's office and its organs in the local areas with participation by specialists showed that measures are being taken at the farms and in the administrative apparatuses of the Ministry of Water Management, the Ministry of Agriculture, the state concerns Uzvodstroy [Hydro Construction], Uzplodoovoshchvinprom [Fruit-Vegetable-Grape Industry], and Uzpishcheprom [Food Industry], Uzglavstroydrevprom [Main Administration of Construction in the Wood Processing Industry], and the Tashkentstroy [Tashkent Construction] State Corporation to stop mismanagement in the storage, transportation, and use of petroleum products. This reduced the number of violations of the law in the use of fuel and lubricants. At the same time the proper measures are not always taken with guilty parties. As the result of connivance on the part of ministries, departments, and officials at the farms and enterprises there occur cases or irrational use of petroleum products, unsatisfactory record-keeping on them, illegal writing off of fuel, poor technical condition in petroleum storage facilities, and operation of vehicles with malfunctioning speedometers. Petroleum products are squandered, stolen, and resold owing to the neglected state of record-keeping and relaxed monitoring of their preservation. The sources from which petroleum products sold by private individuals at speculative prices were obtained are not identified.

A shortfall of 92,500 liters of various petroleum products was found at the petroleum storage facilities of just 17 farms in Andizhan, Bukhara, Dzhizak, Surkhandarya, and Navoi oblasts.

The practice was followed where the customs services would use confiscated petroleum products for their own needs and sell them to various organizations instead of turning them in to state storage areas in Surkhandarya, Andizhan, and Bukhara oblasts. In just the first quarter of this year more than 88 percent of confiscated petroleum products were used for their own needs or sold to customs employees and various organizations.

The attention of those at the meeting was called to compulsory execution of the Cabinet of Ministers decree entitled "Establishing Order in the Sale of Fuel and Lubricants."

The decision adopted noted that many heads of ministries, concerns, associations, enterprises and organizations, and local governmental organs did not draw the proper conclusions from decisions adopted earlier and did not fully ensure their realization.

The question of the use of gas, boiler fuel, and thermal and electrical energy at enterprises in Samarkand, Navoi, and Tashkent oblasts and the city of Tashkent was examined at the meeting. Study of the state of affairs in this sphere identified numerous substantial shortcomings, which lead to significant losses of gas.

In a sample inspection of just 13 percent of the enterprises of the above oblasts and the city of Tashkent it was established that about 100 million cubic meters of gas is being lost because of direct mismanagement. The losses of other types of fuel, heat, and electricity are very large. The situation with the use of energy-conserving equipment remains unsatisfactory. The attention of the executives was directed to the inadequacy of the steps being taken on questions of the use of fuel-energy resources.

It was recommended that the heads of khokim [administrative] offices, ministries, and departments review the personal responsibility of the officials guilty of offenses in the questions reviewed, going as far as discharging them from their positions.

The commission also examined the question of switching diesel pumping stations to electric drive. It was noted that realization of these measures will make it possible to free a significant quantity of diesel fuel. A schedule was approved for switching diesel pumping stations to electric drive and switching machine irrigation systems to gravity flow watering in 1994-1995. Steps to realize this program were outlined.

Deputy prime ministers of the republic A. Voznenko, K. Tulyaganov, M. Usmanov, and K. Khankulov took part in the commission meeting.

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